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ABSTRACT
Using the Wood Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service in 1994 as its
major case study, this thesis hypothesises that, although this inquiry had a far reaching impact
on both the personal and working lives of police officers in the organisation itself, it proved
ineffectual in its attempt to control corruption. It argues that corruption, and the subsequent
inquiries into this corruption, can be seen to have a cyclic nature and the failure of such
inquiries has a long and international history. It contends that the nature of the public inquiry
itself can be seen to contribute to the continuation of the cycle of corruption. Clearly, putting
an end to corruption requires more than the investigation, public exposure and punishment of
a few corrupt police, followed by a generalised tightening of the chain of command. Instead,
this thesis demonstrates that the problem is primarily an organisational one and it is important
to look at management reforms.
This thesis contends that the cycle of corruption involves the nature of police work; the catalyst
that triggers the inquiry; the inquiry itself and the issue of the report; and the police and
community responses. An examination of all these factors is crucial to understanding the
cycle’s dynamics. The final report of the Wood Royal Commission was in 1996 and this thesis
specifically analyses the cycle of corruption in relation to the response of the police executive
to this inquiry. It shows how the police response focused on the tactical crisis response central
to operational policing — in this case appeasing official censure and community fears. As little
more than a public relations exercise, senior management strategically addressed the specific
recommendations of the report rather than creatively considering the implications exposed
during the inquiry. The idea that corruption is a symptom of an ineffective system and not
simply a slackening of effective control by senior management was never considered. 
In the aftermath of the Wood Royal Commission there was much discussion about ‘police
culture’ being ‘a culture of corruption’. The forgotten casualties of the inquiry has been
individual police officers, many of whom see policing as a vocation. This thesis has allowed
many voices to be heard and used both qualitative and quantitative methods to analyse a wide
range of information and data, which included personal interviews with serving police officers
and members of external organisations, as well as printed material from Royal Commission
Reports, Hansard and other government documents, internal Police Service documents and
media reports.It has used Bourdieu’s theoretical approach which allows an analysis of the
complex relationships involved between police officers as individuals who operate within the
wider networks of a specific organisation and the way the personal is important as an
explanatory tool of what happens within a policing culture and how this culture is perceived
differently from within and without. Bourdieu’s theory also facilitates analysis of the
interactions of this network with the wider community, putting in context the responses of both
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the police service and the community. The connection with the personal is important as an
explanatory tool of what happens within a policing culture and how this culture is perceived
differently from within and without. Bourdieu constructs an understanding of the ‘nature of the
game’ of policing and the shaping of the individual within police culture, giving insight into
the source of moral dilemmas, personal beliefs and personal behaviour. 
As the current management system of command and control is at the heart of this response,
this thesis has also analysed the assumptions inherent in this management philosophy,
considering both necessary operational strengths as well as organisational weaknesses. A
central theme of the thesis is that open dialogue will reduce the incidence of corruption and
risk within policing institutions. This thesis argues that there must be an integrative approach
to reform — accountable, active leadership combined with critically constructed practical
approaches that tackle the complexity of the dynamics embedded in the ‘nature of the game’
of policing itself.
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CHAPTER ONE
The Cycle of Corruption: The New South Wales
Police Force and the Wood Royal Commission
1.1: Introduction
This thesis examines the question of why, despite numerous inquiries and investigations into
corrupt activities within the New South Wales Police Service, there has been no apparent
end to corruption within this organisation. It will argue that corruption, and the subsequent
inquiries into this corruption, can be seen to have a cyclic nature. Using the Wood Royal
Commission into the New South Wales Police Service in 1994 as its major case study, this
thesis hypothesises that, while this inquiry had a far reaching impact on both the personal
and working lives of police officers in the organisation itself, it proved ineffectual in its
attempt to control corruption. Nor was this failure peculiar to this particular Royal
Commission for this was just one instance in a long and international history of corruption
inquiries that have done nothing to change the pattern of corrupt practices already in
existence in policing organisations around the world (see also Appendix O). It is a major
contention of this study that the nature of the public inquiry itself can be seen to be a
contributing factor fuelling the continuation of the cycle of corruption. Clearly, putting an
end to corruption must mean more than just the investigation, public exposure and
punishment of the few ‘rotten apples’ and a general ‘crackdown’ on work practices for
officers in the Police Service overall.
This thesis will demonstrate that the cycle of corruption existing within the NSW Police
Force is composed of the following parts: first, there is the ongoing nature of police work;
second, the crisis or catalyst that triggers the inquiry to be set up; third, the inquiry itself
and the issue of the report; four, the police response; and fifth, the community response. Of
course, as this model is a cycle that continues inexorably rather than a linear progression
from one through to five, the numbering of these parts above is purely a literary
convenience in the interests of clarity. These are parts rather than stages and frequently
overlap with each other.
The Wood Royal Commission made its final report into police corruption in the NSW police
service in 1996 and this thesis will specifically analyse the cycle of corruption in relation to
this period of inquiry. In terms of preventing corruption, one of the limitations to the
effectiveness of inquiries such as the Wood Royal Commission lies in the fact that the
executive police response necessarily becomes centred on how to satisfy official censure as
well as allay community fears created during the course of the inquiry, concerning themselves
with tightening and strengthening chains of control over the organisation itself. This response
becomes, first and foremost, a public relations exercise, with senior management strategically
addressing the specific recommendations contained in the report rather than creatively
considering the implications of the broader picture exposed during the inquiry. In the crisis
created by the Wood Royal Commission, it will be argued, the police executive demonstrated
a marked lack of interest in the proposition that corruption is a symptom of an ineffective
system not simply a slackening of effective control by senior management. 
As the current management system of command and control is at the heart of this response,
this thesis will also proceed by analysing the relationship of this response and the assumptions
inherent in this management philosophy, considering both its necessary strengths as well as its
2
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Figure 1.1: The Cycle of Corruption: Inquiries, Crisis and Responses
weaknesses. A central theme of the thesis is that open dialogue will reduce the incidence of
corruption and risk within policing institutions. Commanders of organisations who have
constantly been under review tend to respond to demands for further change with a negative
and defensive attitude. This thesis seeks to prove the need for an integrative approach to reform
— accountable, active leadership combined with the utilisation of command and control when
appropriate. Police leaders presently demand accountability by means of rigorous and
inflexible auditing, a process that offers little feedback and few problem-solving initiatives,
and often exacerbates the problems. 
However, although it will be arguing that command and control style management is largely
inappropriate when applied to human resource issues, an in-depth analysis of alternate
theories of management lies outside the scope of this thesis and for this reason will not been
discussed. The research component of this thesis, therefore, is not directed at what and how
the report’s specific recommendations were addressed, but at the overall response of the
Service and its workers to the pressures of the inquiry that was exercised on individuals
during the period lasting from1996 to 2004. The aim of examining this entire period is to
review the steps with which the organisation attempted to arrest corruption and halt the
apparent unstoppable cycle of inquiries and discover the reasons why this response
ultimately failed. 
The thesis is both informed and strengthened by the researcher’s personal experience as a
serving officer. During the period in question I was able to observe the ongoing cycle of
corruption not as a detached researcher but firsthand, from within the organisation. Being a
participant in the process led to my questioning the relevance of the Royal Commission as a
response capable of successfully tackling the phenomenon of police corruption. The
evidence of the existence of ongoing corrupt activity I first observed in police work was in
1986 and the last executive police offence of alleged corruption I reported was in 2003.
During this observation period it became apparent that there was a familiar pattern
discernible in the personal stress and elements of behaviour exhibited during interviews with
police officers at all levels over this ten-year period. In spite of the obvious specificity of
individual circumstances, officers reported that they were still basically advised to be quiet;
assured that the matter was already being properly taken care of already; or denounced as
trouble-makers. The organisation can be seen to draw in on itself, responding with
protestations, denials and convoluted self-justification to counter the outside condemnation
and indignation of the community response. Almost invariably, the leadership remains
reactively defensive. Nor is this pattern of response limited to the higher-ranking officers
and directed entirely at controlling lower ranking officers. In fact, it is just as common
between senior executive officers of equal rank and, in such cases, the opinion of the senior
officer or the officer with the highest level of individual reputation usually prevails.
3
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1.2: The Inquiry
Royal Commissions into police involvement in corrupt practices and other standing
commissions — such as the New South Wales Police Integrity Commission 1996 — have long
had a continuing role overseeing police activities, specifically in the area of police corruption.
Such commissions of inquiry involve outside organisations reviewing the Police Service and
calling its members to account for their behaviour in an attempt to establish the truth about
serious police corruption. The Royal Commission court process then decides whether the
accused police officer is guilty or innocent. It is generally assumed that commissions are about
discovering the truth. Alternately, I would like to suggest that perhaps commissions are also
about finding a truth that is considered to be acceptable to the public and to politicians. Is it
possible for commissions to reveal a truth that has the potential to destabilise the government
and create anxiety in the community? And while commissions can make recommendations,
which may include the prosecution of individuals, they cannot decide guilt or innocence for
they are limited by their terms of reference.
The focus of this study is directed specifically at the period following the Wood Royal
Commission, from 1996 to 2004, when the New South Wales Government called upon the
New South Wales Police to respond to the Royal Commission’s Report and become
accountable for its past and future actions. However, it is important here to put this inquiry in
a broader context. The Royal Commission that commenced in May 1994 was established with
broad terms of reference which included the efficacy of its Internal Informants program and of
its Internal Affairs Branch (Wood 2000: 3). Commissioner Wood’s terms of reference were to
inquire into the nature and extent of corruption; the activities of the Professional
Responsibility and Internal Affairs Branch; the system of promotion; the impartiality of the
Police Service in investigating and/or pursuing prosecutions; the efficacy of the internal
informers policy; and any other matters relating to the abovementioned matters concerning
possible criminal activity, neglect or violation of duty, if the Commissioner considered an
Inquiry into such matters to be in the public interest. 
The commission came about as a response to the fact that a growing number of ‘whistle-
blowers’ had for some time been signaling that all was not well and that there were people
outside the police organisation who were willing to listen to them. As individuals or small
groups, these concerned officers were hoping to effect change in a police organisation they saw
as inherently corrupt. The issue featured heavily in the media, gaining a groundswell of
support from the community, and politicians from the major parties began to find that they
were being lobbied intensively to force the issue out into the open and make it subject to public
scrutiny. In particular, the Independent state politician John Hatton made an historic speech in
the New South Wales State Parliament on 11 May 1994, during which he stated that these were
very serious issues of corruption indeed, involving such activities as the supplying of drugs;
4
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conspiring to pervert the course of justice; and consorting with criminals. Hatton dramatically
presented conversations he had had with serving police that made it clear that avoiding a Royal
Commission into the New South Wales Police was not an option. It was an independent
challenge that no Police Minister or Police Commissioner could comfortably ignore.
These sorts of public relations disasters are by no means unique to the New South Wales Police
Service and are, in fact, an international phenomena. The ‘whistle-blower’, whether motivated
by abstract notions of right and wrong or simply disgruntled and seeking retribution, is the
catalyst for most inquiries. Since the late 1960s there has been a spate of these highly
publicised government investigations into policing organisations around the world, all of
which had been generated by allegations of misconduct, deviancy and corruption. In 1969
Lord Scarman conducted an inquiry into the controversial activities of allegedly anti-Catholic
officers of the Royal Ulster Constabulary; activities that had already necessitated Operation
Banner — the deployment of soldiers from the British Army to support the civil administration
of Northern Ireland against increasing civil unrest. The report recommended a complete
reorganisation of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, with the aim of both modernising the service
and bringing it into line with other British police organisations. 
The fact that these sweeping reforms were clearly ineffective became blatantly apparent fifteen
years later when the issue surfaced again, forcing a second investigation: the Stalker Inquiry
of 1984. This time the highly publicised evidence created political fallout that was even more
highly charged. Headed by John Stalker of the Greater Manchester Police, this inquiry was
again set up by the British Government and once more it involved the investigation of a series
of shootings allegedly perpetrated by the Royal Ulster Constabulary. The victims were all
members of Irish Republican Army, who had been ambushed and deliberately shot in apparent
executions. In both cases it was alleged that the Royal Ulster Constabulary had unofficially
decided upon a shoot-to-kill policy in operations involving suspected terrorists of the Irish
Republican Army and the accusation was that this policy was widely exercised. If such
activities were allowed to continue unchecked, it was claimed, the Royal Ulster Constabulary
was just another terrorist organisation — an instrument of state oppression dedicated to the
perpetuation of the protestant domination of Northern Ireland. 
Another linked set of international investigations into police corruption occurred in New York
City. The Knapp Commission of 1970 and the Mollen Commission of 1994 forced the New
York Police Department into a highly publicised exposure of corrupt practices. Triggered by
the furious media coverage generated by the public revelations of ‘whistle-blowers’
Patrolman Frank Serpico and Sergeant David Durk, the Knapp Commission was set up
in1970. During the public hearings in late1971 the testimony of these two operational
policemen was expanded by testimony from dozens of other witnesses, including former
5
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Police Commissioner Leary and a number of officers and victims of police corruption and
violence. In the aftermath of the inquiry charges were laid against several officers and
recommendations were made to thoroughly reorganise and restructure the police
organisation. Two decades later there was to be another major investigation, the Mollen
Commission, set up to examine similar allegations and, once again, there were damaging
public revelations. Again the inquiry caused a political furore, especially after a report finding
was that the corruption uncovered was far more venal and criminal than the situation assessed
by the Knapp Commission and allegedly redressed in the sweeping reorganisation
immediately afterwards. There existed, according to these revelations, a ‘blue wall of silence’
actively protecting corruption against public exposure and blocking the ability of the
organisation to reform.
In Australia, too, there was an immediate precedent. A few years before the Wood Inquiry
there had been the Fitzgerald Inquiry of 1989, set up to investigate police corruption in
Queensland and creating a national sensation after allegations had been systematically made
public around Australia by an ABC Four Corners journalist, Chris Masters in a program he
called ‘The Moonlight State’. Put in this context, the Wood Royal Commission into the New
South Wales Police Service in 1996, with all its sensational coverage and in-depth allegations,
provided another warning blip on the radar. In all of these cases the very public nature of the
inquiry must be seen to be of crucial importance because each incident has served to focus
public attention upon the apparent inability of police services to control their ranks and to
reform themselves from within. It is this obviously cyclical characteristic that is particularly
relevant to this thesis. 
Cited in the Wood Report, the Mollen Commission in New York had identified the main ways
in which certain aspects of police culture facilitate corruption. First, they encourage
corruption by setting a standard that nothing is more important than the unswerving loyalty
of officers to one another — not even stopping the most serious forms of corruption. This was
considered to embolden and gives excuse for the activities of corrupt police and those
susceptible to corruption. Second, these attitudes effectively thwart efforts to control
corruption. They lead officers to protect or cover up for others’ crimes — even crimes of
which they heartily disapprove (Mollen, cited in Wood 1997a: 10). The corruption issues
involving the Royal Ulster Constabulary, although they more overtly political, bear a striking
similarity in terms of the perceived solidarity and secrecy of the organisation under
investigation. Clearly the investigations in Northern Ireland were just as much about criminal
matters as those in New York. And, just like the Ulster Constabulary, there were found to be
incidences of police allegedly being involved in conspiracy; perverting the course of justice
by the supplying false evidence in criminal briefs, some of which led to convictions for
homicide; and both committing homicides and covering up homicides committed by others.
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Therefore, although those occurring in Northern Ireland might appear to be closely tied to the
highly politicised events of ‘the troubles’, the criminal matters and methods of concealment
demonstrate a remarkable consistency links these very separate police organisations. 
Following the Knapp Commission a distinction had been drawn between the ‘grass eaters’,
those who were involved in petty and generally unsolicited corruption largely due to the
pressure to conform, and the ‘meat eaters’, those who were involved in aggressive
premeditated major corruption of an overwhelmingly criminal nature. The Wood Royal
Commission Report (Wood 1997a) contained numerous definitions of the term ‘corruption’.
Under both the law and police practice policy, corruption includes behaviour by an officer
who expects or encourages someone to neglect duty, or conduct which results in the officer
being improperly influenced in the exercise of functions (see Appendix I). Specific acts of
corruption can involve major transgressions such as the fabricating or planting evidence;
giving false evidence; applying trickery; using excessive force, threats or other improper
tactics to procure a confession or conviction; or improperly interfering with or subverting the
prosecution process. Corrupt police officers can also conceal forms of misconduct by fellow
members of the Service, or assist them to escape internal or criminal investigation. These
corrupt activities were described by Justice Wood as the conventional kind — ‘process’ and
‘noble cause’ corruption (Wood 2000: 3). Further to Wood, the Independent Commission
Against Corruption (ICAC) found that police also engage in serious criminal behaviour and
that, in each case, the relevant conduct is considered to be corrupt, whether motivated by 
an expectation of financial or personal benefit or not, and whether successful or not
(ICAC 2001).
Overall, corruption in the Police Service Act can be taken to comprise any deliberately
unlawful conduct on the part of a member of the Police Service, whether by act or omission,
that utilises his or her position for unfair advantage, whether on or off duty, and the exercise
of police powers in bad faith. It includes participation by a member of the Police Service in
any arrangement or course of conduct where that member, or any other member:
• is expected or encouraged to neglect his/her duty or to be improperly influenced in the
exercise of his/her functions;
• fabricates or plants evidence; gives false evidence; applies trickery, excessive force or
threats or other improper tactics to procure a confession or conviction; improperly
interferes with or subverts the prosecution process;
• conceals any form of misconduct by another member of the Police Service or assists that
member to escape internal or criminal investigation; or 
• engages him/herself as a principal or accessory in serious criminal behaviour. 
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In each case, according to the Wood Report, the relevant conduct is considered to be corrupt,
whether or not it is motivated by an expectation of financial or personal benefit, and whether or
not it is successful (Wood 1997a: 25). 
The above definitions apply to an officer deliberately neglecting his/her duty — that is, where
the neglect is intentional rather than a mistake or error of judgement. It is necessary to include
seemingly ‘unintentional neglect’, even though this may only appear to be a ‘cutting of
corners’, for this simple act of compromise can lead to greater corruption and it can occur
when corrupt officers witness neglect of their professional responsibilities. Corruption also
includes behaviours ranging from receiving bribes to process or noble cause corruption, which
can result in defendants being convicted on the basis of manufactured or improperly obtained
evidence. It is important that leaders/managers in any operational command consider all
aspects mentioned in the above definition, as it was apparent from the Wood Royal
Commission that much of this behaviour was common, not just in specialised squads, but
throughout the whole Police Service (Wood 1997a).
The Wood Royal Commission concluded that police in management hierarchies should be
required to take radical steps to ensure that the environment supporting corruption was
eliminated. In short, the culture that allowed corruption not only to survive but also to thrive
was to be broken down entirely by sweeping reforms. Significantly, Wood noted in a public
address in 1998 that:
What has been universally recognised is the imperative for change, and the need
to break the cycle of corruption, scandal, inquiry and reform, and return to
corruption? That cycle has been shared by many Police Services, and New South
Wales has not been an exception to it, having undergone scrutiny through several
Commissions of Inquiry and investigations (Wood 2000: 10).
The data presented in this thesis supports this concept of a cycle of corruption but expands this
to suggest that periods of inquiry and response are both inter-related parts of that same
corruption cycle. Far from corruption merely developing as a recurrent problem it should be
seen as just one of linked phases of a much more complex cycle. So although police officers’
behaviour is covered by statute law, common law, government policy and departmental policy,
(i.e., point 1, in Figure 1.1, The Cycle of Corruption) the nature of police work and police
management responses nurtures this cycle. 
1.3: The Response
In a document labelled Appendix 31 of its final report the Wood Royal Commission (Wood
1997a: 246) offered a plan suggesting what reforms should be effected in the police
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organisation — a series of defined problems that needed resolution — and the Police Service
at the Executive level concentrated heavily on this checklist. Policy operators and senior police
distributed copies of the appendix and quoted it readily as a source of direction. But, although
Appendix 31 was referred to often within the Police Service, no one really understood them.
Nor did the Wood Royal Commission offer any insight into how to make the concepts found
in the appendix operational. 
In design, Appendix 31 was not intended to be specific about practicalities. It was not a step-
by-step plan for reform. Rather, it was a way to measure reform and evaluate if the
recommendations of the Report were being satisfactorily put into place. In this regard it
resembled earlier guides that had been circulated during equally ineffectual and piecemeal
approaches to the implementation of new management strategies. Appendix 31, which
introduced terminology such as ‘key reform areas’, did not contribute any positive suggestions
about how to implement the key reform areas of this process. Identified simply as ‘effective
leadership and management’; ‘changing culture and value’; and ‘an honest Service which
repels corruption’, such key reform areas were pitched at an abstract level and were, therefore,
less than precise. The police executive simply adopted the language without providing support
to effect their implementation, thus making any lasting or deeper changes virtually impossible.
Although there were, in total, ten key reform areas and this should have involved detailed
educational support, significantly, the Police Integrity Commission simply distributed them.
And while the Hay audit group (2000) certainly endeavoured to give effect to the
recommended reforms, they were given little chance of success.
One key reform area suggested that progress should result in a greater acceptance of diverse
and innovative ideas and cultures — certainly an important abstract goal but in practical
terms hardly feasible without a carefully research strategy. Unfortunately memos from further
up in the hierarchy glibly demanding immediate results are hardly conducive to promoting
the acceptance of abstract innovations. Indeed, this thesis argues, the repetitive cycle of
corruption inquiries and the exposure of new instances of corruption at regular intervals only
serves to rigidify both the internal culture of fear of ideas and the traditional command and
control style response. The fear apparent in the culture of policing had already been
documented in previous Royal Commissions (see Appendix G: 1954, 1971, 1978, and 1979).
Any innovative ideas presented by observers who had been closely watching the police
response to the Commission — for example, academics such as Janet Chan (1996) and David
Dixon (1999) and independent politicians such as John Hatton (1994) — were effectively
thwarted by the fact that there was no agenda with which to introduce them. Instead, anxiety
about innovation strengthened a determination to rely on known management styles and this
was the predominant reaction of an executive that was well aware that they, too, were under
external review. 
In essence, the demand for change created the very fear that stultified the possibilities for change
within the organisation. This research indicates that a key reform area should have been to start
to define what the word ‘reform’ actually entailed in the NSW police organisation and how this
could be converted into a both a theoretical structure and a practical strategy. Fundamental
questions needed consideration but there was no forum in which to do this: just a series of
commands for control trickling up and down through the hierarchy. Specific acts of corruption
by individual officers had been identified and those individuals had been heavily condemned for
their actions after public revelations — especially in regard to the use of video and telephone
interception. In contrast, the organisation’s executive had not been publicly embarrassed during
this inquiry, nor were they ever to be so despite their failure to arrest the ongoing cycle of
corruption and its negative effects on those within the organisation or the community it served.
Certainly the existence of a management problem had been recognised by Commissioner
Wood in the opening pages of the report.
It is a matter of serious concern that senior management appears to have been
unaware of the extent of the problem or, if aware, have failed to adequately
respond to it (Wood 1996: 3). 
However, ‘serious concern’ or not, immunity was assured to any individual of high rank on the
assumption that such decisions had involved a necessary decision to ensure the protection of
the organisation rather than simply their colleagues or themselves. For this reason one of the
major obstacles to the reform process was never addressed. This is hardly surprising as
traditional command and control leadership practices have never really been challenged in the
Police Service despite brief flirtations with incorporating fragmentary ideas from other
management strategies — such as, for example, the Total Quality Management approach that
had been adopted from overseas industry work sites and was never really given sufficient in-
servicing or organisational support.
The historical development of the police organisation itself goes a long way towards
explaining the persistence of this management style (See Appendix N). The first European
settlement was a penal colony but although emancipists and free settlers were soon challenging
this as the colony gradually evolved into a democracy, the lines of control brought intact from
Britain, a state structured by class, remained hierarchical. Policing reflected the need to
preserve public order and protect private property and the security of individuals living within
the state. Significantly, therefore, policing retained a military model with the closed
relationship of the command and control environment restricting dialogue to questions about
how the managers are managed further down the line. Command and control involves the
defensive, reactive model of finding error and dealing with it by punishing the recalcitrant,
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bringing the troublemaker into line to protect the integrity of the chain of command. Whistle-
blowers cannot be effectively managed with an iron glove. Unofficially, the troublemaking
officer may be ostracised, given inconvenient shifts, isolated, defamed and placed under
informal sanctions. With command and control as the dominant management philosophy in the
New South Wales Police Service innovative theory is reduced to the level of crisis management.
The leaders of the New South Wales Police Service did not know of the
problems of corruption in the Police Service, or if they were aware, they failed
adequately to respond to it … [M]any leaders give lip service to anticorruption
plans, the statement of values and other high sounding propositions, although
the reality of their command is that they encourage corruption and
incompetence (Finnane 1994b: 3). 
Commissioner Wood’s observation that management played an important role in the cycle of
corruption was not a problem peculiar to the New South Wales Police Organisation. Following
the Knapp Commission’s investigations one of the most important features to surface in the
proposed reforms was a policy of strict accountability (Palmer 1992: 121). Commanders were to
be held accountable for the actions of their subordinates and produce reports detailing key areas
that could foster corruption. They should monitor corrupt activities and, overall, they should
encourage better recruitment and human resources selection policies and introduce policies to
effect changes in police attitudes. With the Knapp reforms, Bracey (1989: 3) suggested that
managers and supervisors were made personally responsible for the actions of their subordinates,
making ignorance and surprise at the discovery of corruption constituted a prima facie case of
bad supervision. In other words, bad management should have been culpable. 
As Henry suggested at the time of the Mollen Commission two decades later, policing
organisations urgently needed to ‘sustain vigilance and attention to the issue and the practice
of corruption as environments change, and to adapt policies, strategies and structures
accordingly’ (1994: 175). A year before the former Queensland Criminal Justice Commission,
now the Crime and Misconduct Commission, had also emphasised the importance of having
ethics training programmes for staff, not only to point out behaviour that should be avoided,
but also to help officers develop skills in moral reasoning on the job. Gordon (2003) suggested
that in organisations such as the New South Wales Police, one cannot be sure that apparent
structural change, which aims to transfer leadership, power and control to the front line and,
through this, to create more democratic work environments, will actually have the anticipated
effect. Despite the Commissioner’s claims to the contrary (Ryan 1998, 2001), power still
remain centralised in the hands of a dominant few (Gordon 2003: 167).
Tunnell and Gaines (1992: 12) reported that when police chiefs were questioned about the
general pressure encountered in the performance of their jobs, 56 per cent reported that they
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were under political pressure. In practice, it is extremely difficult to maintain a working
balance between police responsiveness and political accountability. From an ethical
perspective, police executives must be accountable to their authorising environments for
their performance and that of the departments they lead (Moore and Stephens 1991: 50).
Therefore, for practical and ethical reasons, police executives must engage their political
environments regularly and often. The record of accomplishment in reports, which are filed
with different kinds of overseers and authorisers, maintains police credibility in the
community (Moore and Stephens 1991: 52).
The failure of the Knapp Commission reforms to effect meaningful structural change can be
seen in the emergence of much the same insistence on reform in the report issued by the
Mollen Commission. The same can be said in regard to the inquiries in Northern Ireland. The
report of the Scarman Inquiry clearly did little to effect any real changes in the organisation of
the Royal Ulster Constabulary, a fact that led directly a decade and a half later to an even
greater level of conflict between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland and enlarged
rather than curbed the level of corruption existing in that police service. Reflecting on this
failure Stalker drew lessons from the events which were unfortunately ignored. 
What I quite failed to anticipate, however, was the studied reluctance of some
senior police officers and government officials to admit that these contradictions
existed – even in the face of evidence to the contrary (Stalker 1988: 12). 
If the inquiry had not been obstructed, he believed that trust and openness could have
developed, even though this might have needed to be over a long period. Stalker’s guiding
concerns are equally relevant to the issue of police corruption in New South Wales because, in
his words, ‘If the police fail the government fails’ (Stalker 1988: 254). 
The final report of the Wood Royal Commission stated that there were four main explanations
for the long-running corruption in New South Wales: command non-accountability; ineffective
supervision; a lack of risk management; and poorly-run internal investigations. Given that
accountability means to be held publicly responsible for one’s actions, police officers, as
public servants, are accountable for their actions both by a legislative oversight regime and by
their personal ethics and each police officer must be seen to be acting in good faith. This means
all officers are accountable by law for the decisions they make when they use the power
attributed to the position of police officer within the community even when they are off duty.
Moore and Stephens (1991: 61) argue that ‘strong mechanisms of external accountability are a key
to legitimacy’. 
Strategic goals involve much wider issues such as cooperation with other external agencies.
When police organisations fail to meet the objectives set for them by the community and
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parliament then cover-up measures can become involved — particularly if the reasons behind
the failure of an organisation will create a high level of political fallout.
At the level of parliament and the community, there is also a fifth class of question,
which has the most leverage of all: there is a high level of interagency contact
although often it can be defensive and marred by elements of secrecy in all that are
involved rather than being seen as an opportunity for problem solving. This is
obvious at parliamentary level where ministers guard the problems in their
portfolios secretly. Very clear examples of interagency cooperation at ministerial
level are areas concerning youth unemployment, welfare and health issues
(Godfrey 1993: 44). 
A relevant question in this area of study, although not at the heart of this thesis, is: what is the
government’s role with the police organisation to counteract police corruption? This question
is relevant because it is the government that is working with or demanding that the police
organisation counteract corruption.
The then-Chief Justice of New South Wales has written: 
Another constitutional principle which is of large practical significance for the role
and operations of the police force is the rule of law. In our community no one is
above the law and this includes those who apply and enforce it. The police have to
obey the law, rules and regulations which, in the last resort, and if necessary, will
be enforced by the courts (Gleeson 1993: 29).
Fundamentally, the cycle of corruption has been perpetuated because neither the relevant
government administrations nor police executive actively encourage real change over time
through constructive interagency support and involvement. Nor do they choose the hard option
of positioning responsibility overall, particularly examining the upper levels of ministerial,
judicial or police corruption activity. Instead, the overriding aim is to rebuild a sense of
stability in the community by dealing with corruption as an exercise geared towards masking
its existence. 
A few years after his dismissal after false evidence had been given to discredit him, John
Stalker coupled his feeling of personal loss — ‘I devoted two years of my life to this task and
I failed!’ (Stalker 1988: 9) — with a sense of anger that he had been thwarted by a determined
cover-up that many believed had extended into the British government itself. Stalker’s review
(1988) of the inquiry poses important questions. Was the Ulster situation any different to
everyday policing within countries not engaged in a political dispute? How can the police and
community build a relationship of trust when the police appear to be abusing their power and
using this to threaten members of that community? How can the police organisation reform
itself from within? What does accountability mean? Stalker argued that it was apparent that if
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accountability had been welcomed in an open and honest fashion, then the community at large
would have trusted the police more willingly. Instead, the Royal Ulster Constabulary united to
form a formidable opponent, virtually impervious to his questioning. In his opinion the actions
of a few had led to the loss of credibility of the whole police organisation, within both the
government and the community. The few that he is referring to were high up in the power
structures of the police and government organisations who, he believed, had good reason to
fear his success.
[T]he way my removal was handled has left the firm conviction in many people’s
minds that I was getting too close to the truth about the activities of policemen
operating under cover and without proper control in Northern Ireland (Stalker
1988: 10).
Although John Stalker’s predicament as was made far more public than most it is similar to
the experience felt by many of those who attempt to apply open policing to public
accountability. The Report of the Wood Royal Commission found that the police organisation
appeared to be marked by a code of silence so strong that Justice Wood described the service
as having a siege mentality. In the New York inquiries this was described as ‘the blue wall of
silence’ behind which individual police officers could safely hide because it united most
officers in their resolve to give investigators the “standard police answer” to awkward
questions — memory loss. Certainly this siege mentality is one of the greatest obstacles to
conducting investigations into corruption in any policing organisation. To Justice Wood the
code of silence refers to the reluctance of those in the Police Service to discuss the existence
of corruption but it also functions as a term adopted by policing cultures to protect sources and
confidential information. For the purposes of the analysis in this thesis, however, the code of
silence will be used to describe that ethic of silence created due to fear. A group or individual
within a police organisation may disagree with what is happening, or may want to change the
situation, but fear of organisational retribution renders them too afraid to speak out. 
In the broader sense, any corrupt or criminal group will have some version of the code of
silence. A related and lesser definition, however, is the ‘need to know’, which implies that
people do not need to know. Honest police officers who become witnesses in internal affairs
investigations face ostracism, alienation or even retribution if they do not respect the code of
silence and can rationalise this by arguing that investigators really do not need to know. In the
case of the Wood Commission, however, the discovery of this apparently criminal ‘code’ led
to an examination of leadership as central to the practice of police corruption. Clearly the role
of the police executive as leaders in times of organisational crisis, historically and currently,
needs to be considered, as does the issue of whether this can be inflexibly conflated as a
criminal code. When executives have to deal with complex issues, a sense of urgency is passed
down the line. Considerable media pressure is exerted so that issues can be resolved as quickly
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as possible. Appendix H has been compiled to list the events upon which the media has
extensively reported in relation to inquiries — in this summary there are eight pages of events
highlighted by written media reports. The response is then motivated by a political agenda and
the timeframe is often impossible to meet effectively. As a way of diverting attention away
from the true crises, executives tend to focus on easier issues that are not operational disasters,
an inappropriate and inadequate response brought about by the pressure of events. The present
form of command and control management does nothing to resolve conflict within the police
organisation; conflict from the community about policing; or conflicts between individuals
within the organisation. 
A major scandal that has erupted during all of these inquiries has been the opaque nature of
policing procedure, inevitably regarded as a perverse solidarity designed to protect corrupt
activities and effectively block any reform measures that threaten their existence. Certainly
this level of individual and organisational loyalty can be seen to have a secret nature.
Internationally corruption has been actively kept in place within an organisation that is not
necessarily in itself corrupt but is indisputably secretive. An examination of the factors that
govern this secrecy, therefore, is for this reason crucial as it is embodied in the ‘nature of the
game’ of policing itself. 
1.4: Policing: The Nature of the Game
Investigating the nature of the game is a key to understanding one of the most important
dynamics underlying the resilience of police organisations to change and explaining why the
cycle of the corruption is kept in motion. It is important to consider that secrecy is not simply
put in place for the purpose of perverting the course of justice but plays an important part in
the effectiveness of policing operations. The pressures of an operationally complex
environment in which experienced and mature officers must carry out their investigations as
quietly as possible involves high levels of confidentiality to achieve results. The secrecy of
operational work is part and parcel of the job, as is its protection of trust as the binding force
behind a team. However, it is equally obvious that there also needs to be a balance of openness.
The Police Service’s future depends on addressing this necessary survival behaviour without
destroying the ability of the organisation to carry out its brief in the most effective manner. 
Professional organisations involved in service that is stressful, urgent and life-saving are
observably different from services based on economics. The exclusive nature of operational
environments, closed to outside influences, can be observed in occupations such as policing,
medical and other emergency services. At the same time professional occupations involved in
public services appear to need to protect themselves and their colleagues while they work
under pressure or come under scrutiny from the general community, particularly if the
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organisation is subjected to an inquiry. Some would argue these environmental factors cannot
be changed. Rather what is needed is an officer’s ability to change his or her responses to this
environment. But as police are given the power to ‘produce effects intended by the legislature’
(Alderson 1979: 11) it is important that they get the balance between secrecy and obstruction
just right. Alderson, formerly a Chief Constable, believes that an open relationship with the
general public is more than just a public relations exercise.
The police in using their law enforcing powers will generally be effective with
public support and generally less effective without it (1979: 11). 
The fact that police enforce laws makes them particularly vulnerable to criticism, even though
they are bound by formal policies about how to conduct this work. Often what direction they
should take in their working day is determined by the needs of the community. Discretion is
an important part of an officer’s power: they can decide whether or not to press charges against
an individual although they should have very good reasons to support this action. Discretion
should not serve as an excuse for avoiding work; protecting the guilty or removing individuals
who inconveniently close to discovering the truth like John Stranger. It is simply a filter that
can be applied when making decisions. 
Falling back on discretion to hide corrupt activities perverts this power. For example, members
of a police executive knowing of corruption among their own ranks and failing to deal with it
lawfully is not an example of the exercise of discretion. Commissioners of Police who are
aware of corruption and have failed to deal with it are committing offences under the authority
of their employment, the Police Service Act. However, both the community and the police
officers themselves need an appreciation of the limitations of ascribed power. Former NSW
Police Commissioner Lauer has been quoted as dismissing the idea of generic corruption
within his force, although he later conceded that the organisation had a limited problem with
corruption and agreed that corrupt officers should be dismissed. 
It is unfortunate that a career in policing, which is often individually motivated by the
expressed desire to serve the community, is frequently seen to be dominated by the activity of
officers serving their own needs and abusing their powers. Irish academics Mulcahy and
Ellison (2001) have explored the notion of ‘service’ and how it influences police attitudes
towards corruption, policing conflict and offering a service to the community. When a conflict
of values occurs within that community, the Police Service will often gather together to form
a united front which identifies the police as doing ‘the public good’:
Modern police work is an onerous and diversified task. Police are called upon not only to
enforce ‘the law’, which is a relatively small proportion of their work, but also to be
counsellors, social workers, psychiatrists, ministers, and even doctors (Sarre 1989: 105).
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However, police who engage in corrupt activities will also strenuously argue that they are
engaged in ‘good work’ and may also incorporate improper activities as part of this work.
Mulcahy and Ellison (2001) describes the construction of the notion of public good as
follows:
The notion of service provision presents policing in benign terms, as an
essentially positive entity for which there is a clear necessity and an express
public demand … Values such as order, peace, equality and justice may be
promoted through effective and fair police work … however, in societies where
the legitimacy of the state is questioned values such as those described above are
neither universally shared nor maintained … thus any hint of conflict can be
deflected, and a commitment to the wider community can be highlighted 
(2001: 395).
Of course, the importance of the idea of all police officers as universally providing a
community service has to be balanced against the realities of ongoing police corruption.
Chief Constable Sir Ronnie Flannagan has defined officers in the Royal Ulster Constabulary
in terms of public service. 
We are no more; we are no less, than public servants delivering public good –
that of the policing service (Royal Ulster Constabulary 1996, cited in Ellison and
Smyth 2000: 7). 
This thesis argues that it is clear that some police are often involved in activities that are not
in the public’s best interests. Yet while researching the thesis, I discovered how powerfully
the concept of public good is experienced by those in police culture and that any suggestion
of corruption within the Police Service as a whole creates high levels of conflict and
confusion, particularly when the suggestion is coupled with the threat that corruption may
be revealed. Corruption allegations cause just as deep a division and as much anxiety within
police organisations as they do in the wider community they are employed to serve. It
becomes extremely stressful when the idea that police do ‘good’ work is repeatedly
challenged by the growing cynicism of a general public that has frequently been given cause
in the media to mistrust police authority. So although many career officers consider policing
as a vocation linked to service, power and duty of care, recent employment trends show that
officers are now less likely to stay in the service for a lifetime and far more likely to move
into other professions (Gardner 1997: 5). 
The seemingly multifarious definitions of corruption causes great levels of distress to
serving officers, particularly when it encroaches on the officer’s basic level of discretion.
For example, Punch (1985) has extended the definition to mean:
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Corruption is when an official receives or is promised a significant advantage or
reward (personal, group or organisational) for doing something that he is under a duty
to do anyway, that he is under a duty not to do, for exercising a legitimate discretion
for improper reasons, and for employing illegal means to achieve approved goals
(Punch 1985: 103). 
The phrase ‘significant advantage’ is a hard concept to tie down. Did Punch mean that an
officer who accepts a free McDonald’s meal is not corrupt? Does accepting a free cup of
coffee constitute corruption? Kania (2004), who is also a police theorist, believes it is
justifiable for police to accept gratuities and further suggests that suitable gifts as a police
practice can benefit the community. Just as police officers must find a place to live and
that choice provides an ‘undemocratic’ benefit to their neighbours, police officers also
need a place to eat. Wherever they dine — whether free, at discount, or for full price —
they are providing that restaurant with more protective service than the other
establishments they do not, at that moment, frequent. If, as the ethically rigid officer
describes, the officers bring bag lunches and eat in their cars or go home for their meals,
they are denying their services to the general public altogether for that brief period of
time? That seems to be a more serious denial of services than the alleged impropriety of
taking the discount (Kania 2004: 7). 
This level of debate over the diversity of definitions is now extremely prevalent in the
policing community and it can be seen to enjoy a resurgence whenever the police
organisation is under pressure. Unfortunately, it often reflects a level of debate that does
not address the complex nature of the problems constituting police corruption. Certainly
corruption is not unique to occupation of policing but, given the formal powers of police
officers and the informal power that they can utilise within the policing environment, the
prevention of corruption here is crucial. The community, the politicians, the serving police
officers and the generations to come need to have confidence that the police will not abuse
their powers. While common sense dictates that ongoing corruption inquiries will restore
the community’s confidence in the police force it can also be argued that an unrealistic
definition of what constitutes police corruption promotes cynicism in serving officers just
as much as it undermines the confidence of the community in the police establishment.
Rowse (2000) believes that institutions inhibit the building of trust, particularly if they are
perceived not to trust their clients.
In his definition Punch (1985) has attempted to draw a line that in most situations cannot be
drawn. If police are seen to stay below a certain threshold of financial or other reward, there
can be confidence that officers are not behaving corruptly. However, this does not sound like
the basis for a realistic debate in an area where ethical decisions are already complex. Such
notions are trivial and yet this type of argument indicates this is a difficult area in which to lay
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ground rules. It is important to define exactly what does or does not constitute corrupt
behaviour and to make such boundaries an integral part of officer education and training.
Palmer, a former Commissioner of Police, states that in order to regulate the acceptance of
benefits, the Queensland Police Service Code of Conduct, established in 1990, properly
excluded such things as incidental gifts, customary hospitality, or other benefits of nominal
value (Palmer 1992: 104). 
This research reviews corruption as constituting a variety of types of behaviour occurring within
police work. Police can accept the importance of having a clear, open definition of these
behaviours so they can be avoided. However, as in all work environments, clear boundaries and
guidelines can quickly become blurred where there are competing interests needing to be
addressed. The pressure of external accountability can send an already struggling system into an
extremely defensive and even more rigid and punitive command and control response so
understanding the impact of command and control is crucial to this discussion of police
corruption. Barker and Wells make a pertinent point here in clarifying that not all misconduct is
corrupt (1982: 9). They attempt to make a clear distinction between misconduct and corruption: 
Police misconduct is not related to corruption when there is any pattern of behavior
which meets two basic criteria: it is a form of police occupational deviance; and
may not involve a material reward or gain (1982:9)
Henry, a New York City Police Policy Officer, quotes Professor Herman Goldstein, who
defined corruption as conduct involving an individual misusing authority in a manner designed
to produce personal gain for him/her or for others (Henry 1994: 160). The important point here
is the misuse of authority and personal gain. Henry clearly delineates the important role of
power and authority as being the essential component of corrupt behaviour. 
In this study, misconduct that involves the misuse of power is considered corruption — for
example, a police officer who is aware of a corrupt action having taken place is bound by law
(the Police Service Act) to report that corruption to a senior officer. The serving police officer
does not have discretion in this instance not to report the corruption that has been witnessed.
To not report would be to participate in systemic corruption and commit an offence under the
Act. The main type of corruption referred to during the Wood Royal Commission is systemic
corruption. This is defined as corruption that is accepted as part of the way of life or ethos of
the organisation, which a significant proportion of its membership either pursues or tolerates
at some stage of their careers (Wood 1997a: 26).
Policing, like organised criminal activity, is based on networks, and police officers can
understand the organisational similarity more clearly than outside observers. Criminal activity
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involves networks of criminals maintaining a code of silence in relation to each other and when
a member of that community reveals information about those networks to police, the network
has been betrayed. Police are also more effective if they are acting as parts of a cooperative
team and can rely on the confidentiality of those in the team. A connection to other serving
officers who are involved in arresting, detaining, even possibly having to kill in self-defence
or in the defence of others, results in the formation of very tight bonds. Corruption can amount
to a kind of defiance that can provide alternative resources and interactions. Networks,
friendships, peer values and storytelling are characteristics of the police profession that can be
seen as essential to the survival and sense of security of officers who frequently work together
under alienating, unpredictable and dangerous conditions. 
However, while the group loyalty aspect of police culture is positive when it results in the
safety of officers, the solidarity associated with this strong sense of group loyalty has also been
established as a support for the proliferation and concealment of police corruption. So, while
police have the function of keeping the peace, and as police engage in this unique position,
they are exposed to actual and potential corruption. Police, when they decide to perform a
corrupt act to obtain a financial gain, for example, by accepting bribes or diverting evidence
away from the court, make a decision that is a misuse of power. Police can also simply abuse
their authority to achieve corrupt ends. Bertrand Russell defined power as being ‘the
production of intended effects’ (Knight 1939: 253). With police power, there is a duty, a moral
and ethical demand, to use power responsibly. Police must protect property without taking that
property; they must protect the lives of those in the community without endangering those
lives. They may deal with women and men who offer them sexual favours, or police may use
the vulnerability of a victim to divert that victim from reporting an offence, such as, sexual
assault or domestic violence. Social relationships may develop between criminal organisations
and individual officers who may seek information, or economic gain — not only financial gain
but to gain acceptance by a powerful group. 
Policing is an ongoing, twenty-four-hour responsibility; an officer can never truly be off
duty. An off-duty officer can make a decision that involves the use of power and, as will be
discussed later, those decisions offer the opportunity to make both ethical or unethical
decisions. It is therefore obvious that rank-and-file police officers need to work in an
environment where the demands placed on them and their managerial counterparts are
transparent and open to dialogue. This thesis identifies the conflict that individual officers
can experience as inevitable from the nature of the policing tasks ascribed. For example, a
police officer may want to correctly log in an expensive computer that has been found, but
their own child needs a computer and so they may look at that property wondering if they
can take it illegally.
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Victims may present as domestic violence victims or in a circumstance that makes them
vulnerable, and an officer may consider asking them out for a meal, or a date, or just sending
them away from the police station unassisted. Police officers genuinely will want to stop
criminal offences such as drug supply, armed hold ups, car thieving from occurring, however
they will think that to really get close to the criminal activity in order to stop it they will need
to join the criminal organisation. A police officer may, as is colloquially understood,
‘freelance’, or in other words, contact criminals to gain information with which to make a good
arrest. This type of individualised tension between police and their police work can be a
constant dilemma for operational police. 
Alderson (1979) writes that: 
The police represent force as a form of coercive power, and it is regarded as
important that it should not be concentrated in the hands of a government or a
person (1979: 12). 
Individual officers can use coercive power; they can use covert means to obtain illegal
outcomes; and they can overtly manipulate situations to resolve a situation in a manner that
suits an individual who is not under the terms of the rule of law. An officer may make decisions
with a degree of personal conflict, or an officer may make decisions with intent, acting on them
criminally. The above cognitive practices are a part of daily operational police working life.
Executive police decision makers will often have to make decisions where they know, for
example, under the Act, that they must report a corrupt police act. However, if it is a colleague,
a relation, a peer, then a senior officer will be thinking seriously about the action that they are
supposed to take and the ramifications of that decision. This can lead to executive officers into
making risky decisions which are corrupt to suit themselves, their colleagues or the
organisation. 
This thesis examines the role of individuals as leaders in a policing organisation; the ways in
which leaders at all levels in the activities of policing must see Alderson’s concept of ‘coercive
power’ as one that should be used responsibly; and the means by which officers are held
publicly accountable for the uses of that power. As executive officers face the reality of being
publicly accountable, it almost has the reverse affect of senior police wanting to hide ‘friends’
who are corrupt so that they, the reporting officer, the friend and the organisation remain in a
stable, unscrutinised state. 
Organisational leaders, in particular, traditionally hold positions of dominance by virtue of the
acceptance of their superiority by others and, not surprisingly, subordinates have come to rely
on leaders to make decisions, or as Foucault wrote, ‘construct new truths’. The ability to do
this is a phenomenon central to the transformational leadership thesis. Consequently, this
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privileged position has allowed traditional leaders to control agendas and thus ‘... produce a
corpus of statements which not only create new ‘truths’ but also recreate the justification for
their own existence’ (Haugaard 1997: 208). In short, their privileged position allows them to
consolidate their need to exist and to embed their right to power within the historical
antecedents and meaning systems of organisations (Gordon 2003: 163). An underlying
argument of this thesis is that active and creative leadership that is flexible and open to
discussion will do much to interrupt the present cycle of corruption. by seeing change as an
organisational commitment rather than a survival mechanism (see Appendix M). 
The active leadership model involves three-dimensional and complex thinking about issues.
For example, it asks questions like: what is the problem? How are we going to address it? What
is the timeframe? How can we resolve it with outside or internal assistance? What are the
strategic implications? Is the officer involved or is the organisation at risk? The actions that
follow such thinking lead to a knowledge base that contributes to the organisation over time.
That knowledge base is not restricted to one individual but is accumulated by the whole team
laying the foundation for strategic action in which strategies are examined and future risks are
much more effectively identified. Experienced managers can then identify risk through open
dialogue with team members rather than perpetuate the closed relationship of the command
and control environment, which restricts dialogue to questions about how the managers are
managed and the crisis is damped down. Leaders at all levels in the organisation who listen
can then act to avoid risks. Experienced personnel who can encourage dialogue in risky areas
ensure the risks become identified before corruption and the resulting crisis occurs. 
1.5: Theoretical Approach
This thesis has used Bourdieu’s theoretical approach because this goes to the heart of analysing
the complex relationships involved between police officers as individuals who operate within
the wider networks of a specific organisation. It also facilitates analysis of the interactions of
this network with the wider community, putting in context the responses of both the police
service and the community to the Royal Commission revelations. The connection with the
personal is important as an explanatory tool of what happens within a policing culture and how
this culture is perceived differently from within and without. Bourdieu constructs a ‘feel’ for
the nature of the individual within society (Shusterman 1999: 51-52), giving insight into the
source of moral dilemmas, personal beliefs and personal behaviour.
Briefly, employing Bourdieu’s theoretical structure, individual police officers act according to
their own bodily dispositions and perceptions (habitus) of the nature of ‘the game’ (the field).
The field, in this case, is the police organisation: the hierarchical structure in which individual
officers occupy various positions of dominance and subordination. In Bourdieu’s theory,
however, this field is not just structured vertically by official rank but is also structured
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horizontally by socially acquired personal status and prestige (symbolic capital) that creates a
social dominance irrespective of official status. Individual police officers operate within a
number of different fields, which can be either autonomous or interrelated — the team, the
department and the police organisation; as well as society as a whole. The analysis of corruption
as an aspect of behaviour existing within police culture is, in this way, greatly assisted by a
framework or theory that allows the interpretation of how individuals think and interact. 
Bourdieu’s theory (1977), which will be conceptualised fully in the next chapter, has already
been explored by Janet Chan (1996) in her article published in the British Journal of
Criminology, ‘Changing Police Culture’. Written in the aftermath of the Wood Royal
Commission, Chan used the theoretical concepts of field and habitus to explain the importance
of the role of the individual officer located within the police organisation — ‘police culture’.
She argued that the individual’s habitus, their personal disposition and that internal point of
view informing their social behaviour and social relationships, could then be located within
those particular social networks existing within the policing organisation and the cultural rules
of that institution — that police culture that had been revealed to be a culture of corruption. 
Webb et al. (2002) have described the abstract concept of field as that:
… constituted by, or out of, the conflict which is involved when groups or
individuals attempt to determine what constitutes capital with that field, and how
that capital is to be distributed (Webb et al. 2002: 22). 
This explains the apparent need of individuals to gain different forms of personal cultural
capital, symbolic capital, even if this involves the use of corrupt practices. This concept does
not simply conflate with monetary capital or financial gain but includes abstract intangibles
such as prestige, respect, honour, influence and personal authority unrelated to rank. Such an
analysis makes it possible to examine a police officer’s behaviour without the value-added
notion that corruption amongst police is necessarily only a ‘deviant’ activity. Instead, the
functioning of individual officers in the working life of the police organisation is examined in
an attempt to go beyond notions such as ‘bad apples’ to construct an holistic theory of the
process of policing. 
This thesis argues that the concepts of field and habitus provide a model for the way police
culture develops, both individually and as a group. Each individual has an unconscious habitus
which, when grouped together with others practicing similar moral values, becomes group
behaviour. The field then becomes the expression of wider, more formal values that impact on
the habitus. The concept of habitus describes the dynamic workings of all police officers, their
role(s) and their beliefs within the community in which they work. The field, as the context
within which policing occurs, is therefore of primary importance to this investigation. The
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field is understood through discussions of cultural capital which, in the Police Service, may be,
for example, expressed through the symbolism of wearing a uniform, acting with authority,
‘doing good’ for the community and being decisive in response to disasters and other critical
incidents. The social field, the culture of policing is established through police work, such as
protecting life, protecting property, preventing crime, arresting offenders, and keeping the
community safe. 
The habitus, therefore, constitutes the subjective opinions and actions of each officer. Habitus
in this work is exemplified in an analysis of narration, interviews and recorded comments. This
study locates the habitus in the behaviour, demeanour and disposition of every officer. This is
not dependent on rank or hierarchical position but indicates that they are merely officers within
the policing organisation. Hierarchical positions define where a person is formally located in
the organisation but not necessarily the ways in which they behave. The habitus is how the
individual thinks and acts. Very important to this thesis is the relationship between the habitus
and field. Are they related, interrelated, at times do they mould and influence each other? 
Chan’s use of Bourdieu’s concepts of habitus and field offered a broader and, in places, a more
specific way for her to explain how ideas, beliefs and behaviours become static in any
organisation. I have extended the discussion to develop the arguments into other important
areas such as symbolic capital, how an individual comes to ascribe notions of power to another
individual and that individual’s group, and the doxa, the fundamental unthought beliefs that,
taken as commonsense, are seen as self-evident and universal truths. The development of a
doxic relationship between the habitus and the field construct an individual’s opinions within
that particular field. The term field, as used in this thesis, represents the area of policing. Two
fields are identified for analysis in this study: first, the field represented by the police executive
and its links to the community being served; and second, the field represented by the
operational arenas, for example, the Local Area Commands, specific task forces and highway
patrols. The term habitus, as used in this thesis, describes the internal feelings, thoughts and
behaviours of individual officers, concerning an individual’s disposition and his or her
embodiment as a police officer at the level of a police officer’s role in a local police station. In
this thesis it is suggested that the dominant doxa of policing is ‘command and control’— that
is, the inter-relationship between field and habitus is the dominant philosophy of command and
control. For Bourdieu the concepts of field, habitus and doxa are dynamic, representing
relationships of power, conflict, action and non-action.
This expands the notion of policing as located in a ‘social field’ and the relationship of that
field to the ‘habitus’ of the police officer. This is necessary as central to this thesis’
understanding of why and how police reform does or does not occur are the specific structural
relations operating within this field — specific power relations, specific formal and informal
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relations and specific forms of discourse. The concept of symbolic capital is useful in
explaining the narrow focus of most definitions of police culture which can’t comprehend the
importance of the group’s capacity to increase an individual’s cultural or social standing as
well. Hence, the attraction of a police officer located in a policing organisation, to an
alternative and more attractive set of networks.
Bourdieu’s work becomes more complex when it is applied to police corruption. A person may
act against her or his own moral values within a group activity or within the cultural norms in
which they work. These actions against an individual’s sense of honour can result in a deep
and lasting internal conflict. It is these concepts that are applied in this study to the operational
police world. The notion of omitting to act, or non-action, has not yet been adequately
developed within the existing literature of policing. It is particularly with reference to notions
of police resistance to matters of reform, fear of change and non-action that this thesis
develops Bourdieu’s work. 
1.6: Research Data and Methodology
The research data collected for this thesis includes 120 in-depth interviews involving twenty
police officers and carried out over a five-year period. All but two of these interviews were
audio-taped and twenty-five of these fully transcribed. Twenty of the transcriptions were
scanned using the NVIVO analysis process, a qualitative method that allows huge amounts of
data to be linguistically analysed pointing towards similarities of theme, emotion and attitude
and even towards relationships between people. Interestingly, the language of encouragement
or praise was noticeably missing from these interviews whereas the language embodying
direction or demand was markedly plentiful. Those interviewed came from various levels of
the hierarchy and interviews frequently took place several times a year during the five-year
period. Many of these interviews were carried out at Police Headquarters but a variety of
different police stations in different locations were also sourced. Although the interviews were
all directed at collecting data about the interviewee’s participation in the reform process, these
were semi-structured and the method employed was as unobtrusive as possible. Both male and
female officers were interviewed but the questions were not especially concerned with gender
issues as these were outside the scope of this thesis.
Ten executive police members were interviewed, including the present and one past
Commissioner of the NSW Police, as well as employees of the Police Integrity Commission.
Ten operational general duties police officers of different rank were also interviewed, and three
detectives working in Command positions. A number of one-off interviews were also recorded
with three unsworn but highly placed administrative officers; two officers from the NSW
Police Association; and two consultants who had been employed to assist in the reform process
during the years 1996 and 1998 — the latter two interviews were the only ones not recorded
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on tape. Except for the operational police, all of those interviewed were in positions that could
make it possible for them to influence the direction of the police organisation. The general
duties police and detectives were interviewed primarily to gain an insight into how the Wood
Royal Commission had affected their personal lives while working for the police organisation.
The research framework of this study draws both on deductive reasoning, testing theory in
practice, and inductive reasoning, developing theory from practice (Langley 1999). In this
way, the framework takes steps towards bridging the gap between theory and practice. As
issues of confidentiality are important within the qualitative investigation, the thesis adopted a
mixed methods approach, the qualitative approach being distinct because the nature of the
inquiry demanded strict adherence to methodological practices designed to protect the
confidentiality of all participants to an extremely high degree.
The research began by collecting evidence in several areas. Firstly, the relevant literature was
reviewed in order to understand more about key concepts such as culture, reform, change,
leadership and learning, as well as analyses of international inquiries for comparative
purposes. Given that the literature was often general in its descriptions and not police specific,
the research extended to material relating to past Royal Commissions and inquiries into
corruption with the NSW Police and, from here, to data available from the NSW Police
Association about the history of the police organisation and commentary in the media about
past Inquiries and Commissions.
Statistical data relevant to the research question was also collected over a five-year period.
Again different areas were sourced including arrest data; conviction rates; complaint data;
community surveys and police surveys. Data was also gathered from the New South Wales
Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research and this was chiefly broken down according to type
of crime or department, rather than, for example, location. These statistics were included in
order to examine some examples of police activity during this period of reform.
1.7: Structure of the Thesis
The thesis is structured into six chapters. Chapter One has introduced the thesis problem and
issues as well as the conceptual tools, methodologies and data collection procedures adopted
for the research. It provides a summary of definitions of police corruption and sketches the role
of leadership as a contributing factor in the continuing cycle of corruption. 
Chapter Two incorporates a literature review of the research relevant to discussions of police
culture and police management, and develops the theoretical work of Bourdieu in relation to
police corruption. This chapter also focuses on the assumption that leaders are extraordinary
26
THE NATURE OF THE GAME — NSW POLICE REFORM 1996-2004  •  CHAPTER ONE CYCLE OF CORRUPTION: THE NSW POLICE FORCE
individuals who are superior to ‘their’ followers. The common assumptions are that leaders’
decisions are not corrupt, but here they will be analysed as an integral part of the process of
corruption which is usually unchallenged. The role of command and control as a solution to
improving police behaviour is reviewed, as is the role of past Royal Commissions. 
Chapter Three details the development of the methodology and rationale that was employed in
assessing the New South Wales Police Service’s response to the issues of corruption and
leadership. Both qualitative and quantitative methods were employed in the collection and
analysis of information and data, which included personal interviews with serving police
officers and members of external organisations as well as printed material from Royal
Commission Reports, entries in Hansard and other government documents, internal Police
Service documents and media reports.
Chapter Four then proceeds to analyse the research data. The dynamics perpetuating the
cyclical nature of corruption is elucidated in this chapter, which is basically a description of a
police organisation in crisis mode as it struggles to demonstrate change without necessarily
understanding the holistic nature necessary to carry out this change. During years immediately
following the Wood Royal Commission as various quick-fix methods were introduced in the
effort to contain the fallout generated by the public and political response. With a new Police
Commissioner in control and new imported policing strategies being introduced, the police
organisation was apparently entering a new era of operational policing. But underneath, as this
chapter will demonstrate, the old command and control management was still retained and
internal communications about the apparent requirements to facilitate reform were rarely
discussed. As many of the Wood Report expectations were simply handed down through the
chain of command there was much confusion about what was to be changed, and who was
responsible for the changes. 
Chapter Five is an in-depth summing up of the principal research findings. This chapter
examines the reasons it is difficult to affect change in police organisations, in particular the
resistance of the command and control structures and their inability to create the environment
necessary for major reforms. Other research questions that will be explored include what
measures were employed by the executive to reform the organisation and describe how it was
predicted what the reform measures would produce. 
Chapter Six, as the final chapter in this thesis, offers practical solutions to the dilemmas
discussed both by the Wood Royal Commission and those emerging from the data analysis
undertaken during this research. The history of command and control management structures
in policing is demonstrated as a major dynamic implicated in the cyclical nature of inquiries
into police corruption. The practice of external supervision is reviewed to discover its
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effectiveness as a method of supervision of the state police organisation. The thesis concludes
that changing the nature of existing management approaches will open up the organisation to
meaningful change, although it is stressed that this will never satisfy the ‘quick-fix’ demands
of politicians, media commentators and, through them, the wider community  —  all major
players in the cycle of crisis that fuels the repetitive cycle of corruption inquiries. 
In this concluding chapter, it will be demonstrated that the thesis has moved in structure from
ideas to practice, necessitating a return here to the integration of theory and practice. It will
argue that previously the notions of culture, reform and change have been presented in existing
literature in the field of policing as generic concepts and that these important ideas need to be
discussed as integral to the innermost workings of the Police Service. Some proposed leadership
recommendations are also put forward, including the recommendation of an integrated policing
leadership model of active leadership combined with command and control traditions.
Importantly, the suggested model, Changing Police Culture (see Figure 6.5) highlights the need
for integration with the community in policing management and operation issues. 
The confidence of the community is an important part of a successful policing organisation.
Justice Brennan in Police Service Board vs. Morris stated that:
The effectiveness of the police in protecting the community rests heavily upon
the community’s confidence in the integrity of the members of the police force,
upon their assiduous performance of duty and upon the judicious exercise of
their powers. Internal disciplinary authority over members of the police force is
a means — the primary and usual means — of ensuring that individual police
officers do not jeopardise public confidence by their conduct, nor neglect the
performance of their police duty, nor abuse their powers. The purpose of police
discipline is the maintenance of public confidence in the police force, of the self-
esteem of police officers and of efficiency (Police Service Board vs. Morris
(1985: 156 CLR 397).
Confidence, however, has to be gained. It is clear that to successfully implement police reform
requires far more than simply the investigation, exposure and punishment of a number of
corrupt police officers followed by a major reassertion of command and control discipline over
the organisation as a whole, leaving in its wake disgruntled, stressed and disillusioned police
officers primed to act as a trigger to ignite the cycle once again. Instead reforms should be
critically constructed practical approaches that understand the complexity of the issues and
have given much thought to the dynamics that are embedded in the ‘nature of the game’ of
policing itself.
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CHAPTER TWO
Setting the Scene
2.1: Introduction
This chapter presents a literature review of the most relevant material concerning what has
come to be known as ‘police culture’ and the use of command and control as the dominant
management philosophy in the New South Wales Police Service. It also examines and further
develops Janet Chan’s (1996) use of the theoretical work of Bourdieu to provide a tool for the
analysis of the cycle of corruption, corruption inquiries, and the police responses to demands
for reform using command and control management techniques in which a leader, in this case
a new politicised Police Commissioner directs and controls change.
During and after the Wood Royal Commission a huge body of articles and books were written
about police corruption from both journalists and academics. Media reports peppered the pages
of daily newspapers and popular magazines and television and radio news and current affairs
reporters relayed specific allegations in day-to-day detail, making this appear more like a show
trial than a Commission of Inquiry. Current Affairs programs and forums expounded theories
and discussed issues about the findings. And academics such as David Brown, David Dixon
and Janet Chan observed the Royal Commission and analysed both the Wood Report and the
New South Wales Police Service in great detail. Book and articles such as Breaking the Code
of Silence (Brown 1997), A Culture of Corruption: Changing an Australian Police Service
(Dixon 1999) and Changing Police Culture: Policing in a Multicultural Society (Chan 1997)
brought to a wide audience not only the details of what had been uncovered but also an
assessments of the reform processes themselves.
The titles themselves speak volumes. This was a ‘Culture of Corruption’ maintained from
within by powerful networks. The Report of the Wood Royal Commission had found that the
police organisation appeared to be marked by an extraordinarily strong code of silence that
Justice Wood described as a siege mentality. Brown’s account in Breaking the Code of Silence
drew a disturbing picture of a police culture that has more in common with a criminal
organisation than a police service — the ‘brotherhood’ remains silent when questioned about
the misconduct of their colleagues, making investigation inquiries difficult and reform almost
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impossible (Brown 1997). It was argued that the Wood Royal Commission and the
appointment of a new politically responsible Police Commissioner from outside the existing
organisation represented a straightforward victory for the anti-corruption campaigners such as
the independent MP John Hatton and a defeat for ‘the forces of complacency’ represented by
the former Commissioner Tony Lauer. It was the complacency of the “old guard” rather than
complete institutional corruption that had kept this culture of corruption in place. And although
complacency had been defeated by the arrival of an outsider to take up the reins of command
and restore discipline, there was still a powerful resistance from the ranks to the changes being
implemented by new educated police managers.
John Hatton himself had made reference to the effects of this secrecy in the New South Wales
Legislative Assembly and on 11 May, 1994 he had called for a Royal Commission that should
have particular reference to entrenched corruption, the activities of the Internal Affairs Branch,
systems of promotion, the failure of the internal informers’ policy and other matters concerning
possible criminal activity that were deemed to be of public interest. 
This House calls upon the Premier, in consultation with the Leader of the Opposition,
to establish a Royal Commission, staffed by personnel other than serving or former
New South Wales Police, to inquire into the operations of the Police Service 
(New South Wales Legislative Assembly. Hansard. 11 May, 1994: 2285).
The new Commissioner was warned about the powerful aspect of this fear of speaking out
existing within the police organisation and how this would attempt to systematically block the
real details of corruption from emerging. This culture was represented by the media as a ‘dark’
organisation. For example, in this extract from the Sydney Morning Herald, written by
investigative journalist Trudy Harris, the article was headlined ‘White Knight Meets the Dark
Force’ and it was also claimed in the headline that the new Police Commissioner had been
warned by Hatton, ‘Don’t Trust Top Police’.
The incoming New South Wales Police Commissioner, Mr Peter Ryan, of Britain,
was warned yesterday against trusting senior officers in the initial months of
reforming the country’s largest police force. Veteran anti-corruption campaigner
Mr John Hatton, who helped trigger the New South Wales Police Royal
Commission into corruption in the force, warned Mr Ryan that he was at risk “of
being used and abused” and should be “extremely wary” of advice from his “key
players”. Mr Hatton further recommended that contracts for senior officers –
assistant commissioners and senior superintendents – should not be renewed for
the next six months (Harris 1996: 5). 
And another journalist in the Australian had reported Hatton as suggesting significant
precautions in a submission to Commissioner Wood.
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In a submission to the Royal Commissioner, Justice James Wood, Mr Hatton
recommended an extensive database on officers, detailing their duties, reporting
Corruption and discipline to be accessed by the New South Wales Police Board.
He also recommended returning detectives to uniform, abolishing middle
management and forcing senior officers to take redundancy. During that time, the
officers must prove that they investigated internal corruption, were capable of
charging fellow officers with misconduct and would protect whistleblowers (The
Australian, 29 August 1996: 2).
The idea that there was more than just a problem with individual or at least isolated groups of
“rotten apples” was given a new, although considerably less sensational dimension by Janet
Chan (1996) in an article published in the British Journal of Criminology in 1996 entitled
‘Changing Police Culture’. This transformed the media’s conspiracy theories into sociological
analysis and replaced ‘White Knights’ and ‘Dark Forces’ with the mundane existence of an
organisational culture badly in need of reform. Pruned of unnecessary exaggeration, the police
culture she sketched in her article was far more realistic. Developing this structure in a book
of the same title published the following year (Chan 1997), this in-depth cultural study opened
up a whole new field of research. For in both these documents Chan had introduced the
theoretical work of French sociologist and philosopher Pierre Bourdieu and, with this, added
a new dimension. Prior to this, examinations of corruption in the police organisation had
focused on corrupt individuals sheltering within a complacent organisation and discussed the
way ‘rotten apples’ could be publicly exposed, controlled and disciplined by good
management practices. However, by looking at corruption in such a fragmented way an
holistic approach to corruption was clearly impossible.
2.2: Janet Chan and ‘Changing Police Culture’
Chan (1996) introduced the importance of the theory of habitus and the role individuals within
the police play as agents in cultural change in terms of developing an appropriate structure of
police accountability and establishing legal regulation and social reforms (Chan 1997: 14).
Chan’s work prefigures this thesis in the way it applies Bourdieu’s theory to the more practical
aspects of policing. Or in the words of Bourdieu who compares the logic of practice to a
sportsperson’s ‘feel for the game’.
Having the feel for the game is … to master in a practical way the future of the
game, is to have a sense of the history of the game (Bourdieu 1998: 80). 
Chan’s study of Bourdieu crystallised the link between theory and my knowledge of police
practice. In many ways her work provided the catalyst that allowed me to develop the
structures in this research. But, while her analysis necessarily meant labelling behaviour as
an outside observer, my personal insider knowledge of the field of police work and the
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experience of police culture brought practical experience to an intersection between theory
and field work that was impossible in Chan’s analysis. 
Bourdieu argues for a strong relationship between empirical evidence and theoretical
propositions and explains the location of individuals within social fields. Theoretical
constructs and practical experience are important in this study and both are regarded as equally
valuable. While Bourdieu opens the discussion towards the understanding that fields are the
site of competitions and conflicts which help produce the internal beliefs of individuals
(Bourdieu 2000: 183), Chan (1996) could only argue this very point from the social structure
periphery. Bourdieu (1977) works from the inter-subjective point of how the various forces
that construct police culture and relationships interact, and therefore gave me a deeper
understanding of the dynamic within which I was located. For this reason the thesis will also
argue that command and control leadership styles are not only ineffective at combating
corruption but are integral to the environment that both shelters and creates this.
Chan (1997) supports these thoughts in her statement: 
A sound theory of police culture should recognise the interpretive and active role
of officers in structuring their understanding of the organisation and its
environment (Chan 1997: 66). 
Chan’s view (1996) is important and useful. As a researcher she records the projection of
Bourdieu’s reading of dynamic relations as she observes policing. Her observations
introduce the reader to the first level of theoretical analysis presented here, one which
opens the door to the deeper equations that Bourdieu was clarifying within sociological
inquiry (Carles: 2001). Police culture is described by Chan as ‘a convenient label 
for a range of negative values, attitudes and practice norms among police officers’ (Chan
1996: 110). Her observations are helpful in that she challenges previous generalisations.
However her position represents an anthropological collective opinion that does not lend
itself to purposeful notions of how to interpret these particular relationships. Habitus is
understood in Chan’s (1996: 115) analysis to be ‘cultural knowledge’. This thesis argues
that it is the ‘habitus’ of the individual, influenced by both their working and their private
life, that causes conflict in a police officer’s actions when faced with police corruption as
an accepted police practice. 
The problems are clear enough when described, but understanding the complex dynamics
underlying them is where Bourdieu is valuable. Bourdieu stresses the use of the empirical
evidence to understand cultures. Chan writes:
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Bourdieu’s theory recognises the interpretive and active role played by police
officers in relating policing skills to the social and political context of policing 
(1996: 115).
However, Bourdieu’s intellectual map manifests realistic coordinates in locating the dynamics
of ‘culture of mind’ within the police, specifically in relation to such matters as personal gain
or cultural capital, which are crucial in understanding the culture of police corruption. The
empirical evidence offered in this thesis is of the significant conflict and internal arguments
between the private and the public. As referred to in general discussions of police culture, this
also involves the issues of self-reliance and independence and interdependence in the working
environment. Janet Chan (1997) describes ‘the close relationship between police culture and
the structural conditions of police work’ within the police social field. Chan (1996: 117) states
that the link between structure and culture has long been recognised but it is particularly the
structure of the interpersonal that this thesis explores. 
This thesis will develop a theory of change in the field of police operations by taking Chan’s
theories a step further, gathering evidence to reveal how culture and structure actually find
their points of interaction. So policing is viewed by external commentators who are in a sense
‘watching’ the collective engagement of structure and culture and trying to make theoretical
sense of these observations. Bourdieu analyses these points of intersection and reads from
them the dynamics of the ‘nature of the game’. Police culture, of course, has often been
described by referring to institutional practices. This assumes that if police behaviour is
watched in certain situations, police culture is also being watched. However, police culture
cannot be sufficiently defined or quantified by merely observing the workplace. It needs to be
experienced. As Chan states: 
The active role of police actors forms links between the structural field and cultural
knowledge, and since they make choices about their actions, these relationships
between the elements are neither uni-directional nor deterministic (1999b: 114).
Chan at this point is starting to look at the complex interpersonal relationships that are part of
the habitus. Bourdieu offers a way of exploring the links between structural conditions,
cultural knowledge and institutionalised practice, whereas Chan depicts a model that shows the
line of causality between behaviour and structural conditions (Chan 1999b: 117). A theory of
police culture must, therefore, situate culture in the political and social context of policing
(Chan 1997: 67). 
This work aims to engage with the interpersonal and personal tensions and unresolved ethical
problems that are variously shared by many individuals in the police environment. Chan is
attempting to reconcile discussions of police culture through describing the different
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subgroups. Positions in police organisations are highly structured; individuals compete for
positions which are structured around power relations. Chan attempts to reconcile the
discussions of culture by employing separate descriptions of knowledge, language and
behaviours. However, applying Bourdieu’s distinction between ‘habitus’ and ‘field’ to
policing, it is important to emphasise that culture does not exist in a vacuum (Waddington
1999: 295). 
Instead, daily police activity involves everyday tensions based around ethical decision-making
which may be exacerbated or endowed with greater significance by intense scrutiny from
outside the organisation — from the media or the community or from politicians and external
advisers. The ‘disposition’ of the individuals who are the subject of this thesis are also aware of
the intense periods of personal and group isolation that inquiries cause in the work environment.
Police take seriously the ‘moral’ and public discussion of the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ behaviour of
individual officers. They internalise these criticisms and judgements and these can produce the
underlying feeling of disquiet or discontent that can lead to whistle-blowing, especially as the
responsibility of individuals as leaders within the organisation is less often highlighted. 
Chan (1996) identified the existence of different languages and different sub-cultures,
addressing the fact that public opinion, informed by media analyses, views police culture as a
singular, uniformed group identity. This opinion is very important as it affects how the police
are scrutinised from outside by external observers. It is easy to label ‘police culture’ as a
‘culture of corruption’ without discerning the different divisions within this culture. It is easy
to talk about a conspiratorial idea of the police organisation as a group of criminals bound
together by a ‘code of silence’ that shelters a ‘brotherhood’ of ‘dark forces’without considering
the peculiar operational needs of this culture. The political overview tends to concentrate on
the traditional need to keep the community safe and the inability of a culture of corruption to
do this. Importantly, in her analysis Chan moved past these one-dimensional simplicities and,
in doing so, she also introduced the issue of management reform. 
Traditionally the task of management can be considered as the reorganisation of individuals’
behaviour in relation to the physical means and resources to achieve the desired goal (Pugh
1999: 11). Management is thus concerned with the manner in which a working organisation is
structured to achieve optimum outcomes. When describing the culture of the police work
environment, academics traditionally observe how structures of networks may present a
defense against public scrutiny but they could also emphasise the necessity of team unity to
reduce the dangers of police work that will result in personal injury, sick leave, work
performance issues, or low morale. A typical suggestion might be the external consultant’s
proposition that the organisation encourage a positive work environment by the application of
a reward system. 
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Theorists, or other non-police observers tend to view the surface of the police organisation’s
practices, but they are aware that they are ‘crossing a boundary into unfamiliar territory’ when
they comment and talk about it. On the contrary, police officers understand corruption on an
experiential level as ‘being party to a practice that they do not necessarily want to be a part’
for they are aware of a deeply personal conflict of interest — excluding, of course, those
officers who engage in corruption without any insight into the moral dilemmas. Outsiders have
a limited understanding of the machinations of police work practices; the sorts of things that
become ‘commonplace and unnoticed’ to those who are engaged in them for a long time
(Anthony 1994: 52). For example, police observe and chat about how ‘they got a free meal,
when they worked there, or she is his god daughter she seems to have got a great promotion,
or did you know that superintendent … did not report that ... there has been no official
complaint made so nothing has happened, that is the way they like it.’Within police culture it
is commonplace for suspicions to be voiced about alleged incidents of corruption. There are
also known acts of corruption that are less overtly discussed but are generally known about,
particularly when they reoccur. 
So while police culture has been described and criticised by outside observers, it is observed
differently from inside, as Anthony suggests:
It is in the nature of a culture to be unperceived by those who share it and difficult
to penetrate by those who do not (1994: 52).
Much of the literature on policing organisations describe police behaviour in generic
terms such as ‘codes of mateship’; ‘police feel more comfortable’; ‘police share 
the experience’; ‘police comply with commands’; ‘police and adhere to group norms’
(Bull  et al. 1983: 72). Chan (1997) challenges these homogeneous codes or attributes by
introducing the notion of a series of sub-cultures, existing within a broader police culture
which may be described according to the different types of work done, such as traffic
police. In each description of the different ways of police, networks and separate sub
cultures there are different forms of gain. For example, detectives may involve
themselves in the practice of “noble cause corruption” to gain a guilty plea, apparently
“for the benefit of the community”. Conversely, highway patrol officers may gain money
by coercing a bribe. The executive may gain promotions for their colleagues or avoid
public exposure of corrupt behaviour in the organisation by not reporting that activity to
an outside organisation and preventing others from disclosing the act. 
Chan (1997) also clarifies that:
Understanding police culture involves explanations that can be derived from
structural and cultural organisation of police work. Police practices reflects the
current priorities and values built into our laws and institutions (Chan 1997: 11).
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The research candidate found Chan’s work to be extremely perceptive. It is also true at one
level that corruption is always specific to the circumstances in which it appears and worth
noting that most non-police theorists and academics emphasise traditional management
practices rather than looking at deeper explanations involving decision-making within police
cultures. In contrast, Chan (1997) suggests we need to understand the deep structures of
decision-making and not just traditional management practices. 
But the power that police lawfully have also comes with the discretion to use or not use that
power. For instance, police can make decisions not only about how to apply the rule of law;
they can decide not to apply that rule and thereby deliver an advantage to the officer or
offender. This behaviour can be advantageous to the officer — for example, they may increase
their economic capital through corrupt means. However, the advantage gained may not only
be financial. It can also be symbolic — perhaps social or cultural. Whatever view is taken on
the definition of corruption, ultimately it has to be tested against legislation. It also must be
acknowledged that the process of corruption does not just concern a small and disconnected
number of problematic individuals; it is a systematic process. This thesis presents police as
people who struggle with their personal beliefs and their work location in an ethically
demanding environment. 
C.Wright Mills has reminded us that: 
Perhaps the most fruitful distinction with which the sociological imagination
works is between ‘the personal troubles of the milieu and the public issues of social
structure’. This distinction is an essential tool of the sociological imagination and
a feature of all classic work in social science (1970: 14). 
Mills’ comments introduce the important issue of the relationship between the public issues
of social structures and personal troubles. General management principles can be assessed
in reference to theoretical issues but at the conceptual heart of the equation must also be a
consideration of the way private life affects work. Such considerations must have a central
part in the management of reform. So while oversight is needed to examine the internal
workings of the organisation, it must also acknowledge the external pressures this
produces. In ‘Governing Police Practice’, Chan (1999a) acknowledges the importance of
the concept of habitus as well as field through the temporal dimension as ‘two modes of the
existence of history’, or, better yet, ‘two realisations of historical action’ (1999a: 124). The
relationship between habitus and field comprises ‘conditioning and cognitive construction’.
Conditioning occurs as field structures habitus, while the habitus constructs or constitutes
the field as a meaningful world. This activity of practical construction, even of practical
reflection, actually serves to obstruct ordinary notions of thought, consciousness and
knowledge (1999a: 121).
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Chan (1996) introduced the analogy that officers who have learned ‘a feel for the game’ —
gained cultural knowledge — are not restricted as to the number of ‘moves’ — modes of
practice — they can make. The specialised nature of police thinking gives the notion of habitus
its power. As my research progressed, I became more aware of the dimensional power of the
concept of habitus and of how internal dilemmas result in ethical dilemmas, conflict, or the
learning of new attributes which also become parts of an individuals’ personal dispositions.
Habitus, on the other hand, is closer to what has earlier been described as cultural
knowledge. It is a system of ‘dispositions’ which integrate past experience and
enable individuals to cope with a diversity of unforeseen situations (Bourdieu and
Wacquant 1992: 18).
Chan’s use of Bourdieu’s concepts of habitus and field offered researchers a broader and, in
places, a more specific way to explain how ideas, beliefs and behaviours become accepted
props in any organisation. I have extended the discussion to develop the arguments into other
important areas such as symbolic capital, how an individual comes to ascribe notions of power
to another individual and that individual’s group, and the doxa, the fundamental unthought
beliefs that, taken as commonsense, are seen as self-evident and universal truths. The
development of a doxic relationship between the habitus and the field construct an individual’s
opinions within that particular field. The term field, as used in this thesis, represents the area
of policing. 
Two fields are identified for analysis in this study: first, the field represented by the police
executive and its links to the community being served; and second, the field represented by the
operational arenas, for example, the Local Area Commands, specific task forces and highway
patrols. The term habitus, as used in this thesis, describes the internal feelings, thoughts and
behaviours of individual officers, concerning an individual’s disposition and his or her
embodiment as a police officer at the level of a police officer’s role in a local police station. In
this thesis it is suggested that the dominant doxa of policing is ‘command and control’— that
is, the inter-relationship between field and habitus is the dominant philosophy of command and
control. For Bourdieu the concepts of field, habitus and doxa are dynamic, representing
relationships of power, conflict, action and non-action.
In this thesis Bourdieu’s conceptual work will be employed to examine police corruption in
terms of the accumulation not only of economic gain or capital but also of other specific forms
of symbolic capital, for example social or cultural gain or advancement. Individual police
officers can acquire very significant social gains by connecting with influential people who can
facilitate the obtaining of promotion, status, and power through their connections with others.
Symbolic gains can also consist of being recognised as an operational police officer with a
great capacity for doing highly praised police work — for example, having the status of elite
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investigator will enable that officer to use his/her power to influence the decisions of peers and
lower ranked officers. The most recognised form of gain, of course, is economic gain, which
consist of financial reward obtained by means of knowing and practising corrupt practices.
Furthermore, police corruption leads to the acquisition of either a personal or public
advantage. I draw on Bourdieu’s concept of ‘field’ to refer to the set of personal (habitus) and
public (social field) relationships that form the cultural world of policing. Concrete examples,
will be offered later in the chapter. 
2.3: Bourdieu and Police Culture
Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992: 49) states that the sociologist’s role is to ‘denaturalise and to
de-fatalise the social world’. In this instance that social world is both the ‘field’ of a police
officer’s work environment and the exercise of that power (the perpetuation of a system of
domination) internally and externally to the work place, i.e. the New South Wales Police
Service as a whole. By analysing these relationships it should be possible to do more than
describe the complexity that makes up police culture, potentially having an impact on the
organisation’s ability to ‘escape’ from its history of inquiries and crises. 
Chan’s argument highlights the relevance of relationships and policing in that:
Bourdieu’s theory can be used to understand and recognise the interpretive and
active role played by police officers in relating police skills to the social and
political context of policing (1996: 115).
This expands the concept embodied in the police literature which condemns the relationship
existing between police and describes this as a culture of corruption, without discussing the
‘moral agency’ of what is possible between police (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 50). Decision
making and police operational decision making is learnt from experience and education in the
field. However, non-operational decision making relies on intuition and morality, forms of
‘knowledge’ rarely open to the formal training provided inside police educational units. 
The fact that I have regularly discussed the powerful relationships within the work
environment with my fellow police practitioners means that my connection with the research
becomes one that is not simply ‘neutral, detached, apolitical or uncontroversial’ (Bourdieu and
Wacquant 1992: 51). Bourdieu has noted the way internal struggles can rarely remain
independent from their object of study. 
Examining the field and habitus adds to an understanding of the way police practitioners’
relationships operate with each other at all levels. Managers/leaders can identify with this
group, be a part of the group or be separate from it. Bourdieu’s discussion of a dominant class
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or dominant authority can be used to illustrate the manner in which hierarchical systems
dominate both the core values and discourses of organisational cultures, and the individuals
within that culture. Bourdieu’s work reviews the impact of the public sphere on the private: 
It is the potent instrument of self-knowledge through the intimate knowledge of the
other (Wacquant 2004: 403).
I have followed his example in writing the results section, Chapter 4, where the public review
of police work is set against the interview material, thereby engaging with the public/private
dichotomy. Importantly, though, by applying Bourdieu’s ideas to the material gathered here, it
becomes possible to expand the notion of the private in relation to policing into a new analysis
of police culture which represents a departure from the more general discussions and a direct
engagement with the very ‘dispositions’ of police officers. The analysis can move from the
macro to the micro; from the public to the private, from theory to practice. 
Bourdieu’s theory has been extremely useful in analysing the empirical material, such as the
interview material, the work performance statistical data and the documentation of intellectual
policy directions, providing the theoretical framework for my analysis. Particularly important
is the notion that the field generates and reinforces a certain habitus, and that this habitus in
turn reinforces and sustains the social field. The nature of the important relationships and
embodied dispositions that are continually forged, maintained and perpetuated within the ‘field
of policing’ must be understood before systemic corruption can be successfully addressed.
This also leads to an understanding that there is no universality to the concept of ‘culture’.
Instead, what is offered is an analysis of the structure of relationships, history, power and
finally the possibility of their transformation (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 89).
The field of policing is described here as comprising the powers ascribed to police through
government legislation in conjunction with the informal rules governing police behaviour. Two
forms of management are described, one formal and the other informal, which also constitute
part of police culture. One of the most powerful aspects of the concept of habitus is that it is
not only subjectively constructed, but also objectively put into practice. In this way, the habitus
is useful to social scientists trying to bridge the gap between subjective and objective
sociological theories. But more importantly these theoretical discussions lead to the possibility
of examining previous struggles in an effort to transform the current structural relationships.
The struggle will involve contradictions, tensions, and the relations of force which will
constitute subsequent transformations (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 91).
Variations in power groupings can destabilise hierarchical structures. The movement of
symbolic capital between different levels of expertise appears to introduce levers within the
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informal organisational structure. The formal relationships within the police organisation are
hierarchical. However, these relationships are still open to manipulation by the command
model of leadership that remains firmly in place. In fact these rules cover the covert nature of
relationships which can place individuals in the hierarchy against the formal rules of
engagement. This ‘bending the rules’ is then observed by officers close to those in senior
positions (peers, subordinates and supervisors) and their internal angst increases, effecting the
individual and the group, as the covert relationships modify the rules and regulations. 
Bending the rules/corruption can have a negative impact resulting in the deterioration of that
individual’s commitment to the organisation. Therefore, another very important point made by
Bourdieu is that individuals within cultures need to have a ‘capacity for goodwill,’ and,
furthermore, ‘a willingness to be instructed’ (Carles 2001). The individuals who obey and
conform to survive within a culture are those who will be rewarded. 
2.3.1: Habitus and Crisis
If an officer does not trust that environment or questions its values, the field in which s/he
works becomes a place of conflict. Below is a list of the main concepts reviewed by Goldsmith
(2005) that pinpoint where the cognitive struggle begins for the operational police officer who,
frustrated within the organisation, will become the trigger for a crisis to occur within the police
force. The list includes neglect, indifference, incompetence, venality (petty corruption),
extortion, discrimination, inconsistency, intimidation, excessive force and finally brutality
(Goldsmith 2005: 454-457). When a police officer experiences a set of values and behaviours
at work that may differ from those that characterise his/her private social lives, as most
working people do, there is no place for discourse around these conflicts. On the other hand,
despite the limiting nature of the police field and the fixed nature of habitus, individuals are
dynamic, open to change and to different ways of interpreting the world. 
It is therefore possible that the ideas of change, reform or doing police work differently are a
private consideration for many officers, even if, as members of the Service, they actively resist
reform. Police officers have individual attributes and personal preferences for choosing certain
courses of action. At the same time, however, they are strongly linked to the field of practice
and when they are challenged, a form of conflict — cognitive dissonance — takes place
(Gordon 2003: 144). Individuals faced with a range of dilemmas have the choice of whether
or not they seek guidance from others in the hope that an alternative exists. When an individual
is confused, organisational and personal goals also tend to become confused. 
Chan’s (1996) analysis describes this ‘top down’, hierarchical system that is accepted as the
culture of the police service, a system that does not leave much space for conflict and power
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relations within informal structures. Officers do, however, express observations and opinions
in conflict with directions received from above:
[They] muddle through, improvise, and make things up as they go along … police
stories provide officers with tools they can use to get them through the business of
police work without minimising the fact that this still requires individual initiative
and daring (Shearing and Erickson 1991: 490).
Corruption as a practice is both a public and private activity. It is an intensely secretive, covert
set of relations, occurring in language, behaviour and joint activities, and is maintained by
external contacts. The activity is also part of the public and private world of the police
environment. 
2.3.2: The Field of Policing
A field is a concept that is revealed through analysis and application. In this work the concept
of field is interpreted as how individuals interact within the social fields of policing.
Individuals have their own beliefs, values and work practices that are moulded by their social
field. However, the emphasis is not on the individual but the network of people in the social
field (Reed-Danahay 2005: 104). Each person’s beliefs and values generate behaviour (Reed-
Danahay 2005: 64) and the practice of corruption occurs within the social field of policing.
Reed-Danahay writes:
Social fields are sites of struggle over strong interests of capital, social capital, and
symbolic capital (2005: 115).
The concept of a field with individuals who are participants in corruption leads to an analysis
of the social field as a site for corruption as a police work practice. In Bourdieu’s analysis,
when examining a social field it can be described by the ‘logic of their [the police] practices’
(Reed-Danahay 2005: 13). The acquired disposition towards corruption becomes ‘mobilised’
within the social field of policing. Bourdieu (1977) rejects the sociological concept of
functionalism, arguing that social forms are not generally determined by the need for survival
or integration. The field and the habitus can (and do) vary substantially over time and
geographical boundaries. These forms are not based on functional determinants but on
seemingly arbitrary social constructions. This suggests that social, economic and cultural
capital all contribute to the existence of schemata. In situations where social capital and
cultural capital are accepted as absolute, the assumptions behind the organisation are not
challenged. Power structures remain unchanged and allow the continuation of symbolic
violence with no possibility for effective cultural change. Within the police community,
heroism is discussed and valued amongst police. For criminal groups, obtaining cash and
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methods of acquiring it are a core value and discourse. When discussing profit and capital gain
Horarik locates profit within the field by stating:
The profit is not an outcome of embodied dispositions acquired in the field of
business but a product of engagement with this field of playing its particular game.
Habitus only enables people to spontaneously and unconsciously orient themselves
to the field, to its demands and stakes of relevance, but they still have to play the
game, strategise, and so on to derive benefits which make participation in the field
meaningful (2006: 50). 
Understanding the social field and the notion of playing the game over time successfully does
require a process of identification. In the Police Service, this translates into a hierarchical
structure in which status and class are ascribed by rank and income. Officers are granted
authority in connection with their position and are regarded as people who will fix or
determine the outcome of any given situation. With the granting of this status, they often
choose to impose a set of values on those around them. 
Officers who are in senior positions tend to perpetuate a culture that rewards them by adhering
to and supporting the traditional military aspects of a male-dominated workplace. This places
officers who are not aligned with this accepted tradition outside the dominant culture, a
marginalisation that manifests itself in a variety of ways. Shifts can be allocated based on when
one wants to work and with whom; people can be denied access to important information;
officers can be denied the necessary tools, experience and networks for promotion; false
reports of misconduct and corruption can occur; and officers are isolated and deprived of peer
support, among other forms of persecution. 
In the course of their work, police come into contact with people and other police officers
whose actions they are empowered to determine or dictate. At times this power creates conflict
within individuals, particularly when it appears that it is being exercised to allow such
unprofessional behaviours as work avoidance and a failure to cater to the diversity of needs
both within the Service and in the wider community.
The relationships between the policing field and habitus have developed historically. The field,
which Bourdieu also refers to as a ‘game’, refers to a picture of historically developed patterns
of communication and acting. The habitus describes the ‘incorporated history’ of the
individual (Reed-Danahay 2005: 133). The field and habitus are complementary concepts. You
cannot have one without the other since habitus is not just the internalisation of culture but the
internalisation of the patterns of culture. The discussions in this thesis move from the structure
of the personal to the structure of the organisational culture and then return to issues of
personal decision making. The main issues discussed are how individuals operate within the
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police culture and specifically how the ‘habitus’ connects with the ‘field’ within Bourdieu’s
theoretical conception. Reed-Danahay writes: 
For Bourdieu, emotion and feeling are part of the habitus which is both structured
by and helps structure, systems of power and domination. The ways in which
dispositions that lead to various ‘emotional reactions are inculcated in the body are
in ways that are beyond the conscious control of the individual’ (2005: 102).
2.3.3: Economic Capital within Police Culture
Most definitions of capital acquisition see this in terms of money. Corruption is criminal because
it deceives the public. Organisations are harmed as well as the public and the distribution of
benefits from society to recipients is distorted. Garnham and Williams assert: 
Economic capital is more liquid and more easily transferable from generation to
generation, making it particularly useful in continuing the process of reproducing
class legitimacy and domination over time. Cultural capital can be converted into
economic capital, just as economic capital can be converted into cultural capital,
and however, these conversions happen at different rates of exchange (1990: 203). 
In policing, the social field offers opportunities for economic gain as part of policing activity.
Competition within the social field also increases the attractiveness of economic gain as a way
to gain power within the social field. An example reported in the written media:
Roger Rogerson exemplifies such a situation: he was known to discuss past years
when he could get as much as $1000 from individual criminals and is on record
talking about getting ten per cent of contracts (The Daily Telegraph, 5 June,
1999: 84). 
2.3.4: Symbolic Capital within Police Culture
Even more interesting, however, is the acquisition of symbolic capital. This functions in
policing in the sense that the more operationally experienced and the more dangerous the area
of expertise, the higher the level of symbolic capital granted. There is a need to differentiate
between different forms of cultural capital within the wider community, the Police Service and
criminal groups. However, a closer look at criminal relationships is not offered within this
research. 
The concept of symbolic capital is separate from the notion of a particular field. A field is the
structure of a group, its formal entity, and symbolic capital is a group of practices that are
recognised as important within discourse and behaviour. Waddington (1999) argues that
discourse gives meaning and identity to police and police work. The concept of ‘cultural
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capital’ refers to a behaviour, ritual or practice valued by the majority — for example, do the
right thing; do things by the book; do not trust outsiders. This ‘majority’ may be an individual
who is part of a set of individuals; or individuals within a common group; or a group with a
common purpose. This definition is useful in all social scientific disciplines as a means by
which the origin of a group’s core values might be understood. It can specifically be applied
to police interests in corrupt behaviour as it links corrupt practices to different types of gains,
some of which are not economic. It is also worth mentioning briefly some other forms of
symbolic capital, for example those associated with being perceived as an outsider, by being
the honest police officer. On the other hand, for the person who collaborates in a culture of
corruption such an activity can result in a feeling of shame.
Another aspect of symbolic gain occurs when detectives are recognised for their character
within a social field. Not everyone capitalises on this, but a good example would be Detective
Superintendent Robert Inkster handing back to the force his own accolades, describing as
essential the work of the entire policing team and saying that press comments ignored the
contribution of countless other police officers. He went on to say: 
An individual can’t do and achieve all those things credited to me, and I don’t take
that credit (The Daily Telegraph, 24 August, 2004: 19). 
Superintendent Inkster, a respected, experienced detective who joined the NSW police in 1966
and retired in 2004, is well known for his hard line against criminals as well as for high figures
of arrests by his task force, both regularly reported in the media. In accepting the role as Task
Force Gain’s commander, Inkster delayed his retirement (The Daily Telegraph, 24 August,
2004: 19). He was prepared to forego the economic and personal benefits of that retirement to
assist in fighting crime. 
Bourdieu’s analysis clearly describes the competition between individuals within a social field
as being directly attributed to the need for economic gain, in the form of property, goods, cash,
food and alcohol. Police can compete for relationships that deliver such profits within the
social field. However, the reporting of such corrupt acts manifests itself when authority figures
‘diffuse’ information as a process of domination. The process of diffusion creates an
opportunity to keep systems in place that support the ‘acquisition of gains’ (Carles: 2001). An
example of diffusion is to make a complaint that you are being dealt unfairly by the internal
police system of review. 
‘Systemic’ police corruption can be defined as corruption that is accepted as a way of life for
those in the Police Service, and which a significant proportion of its membership either
practises or tolerates at some point during their police careers. A core belief of police work is
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that police, as part of their office, should protect property. However, there are accounts, criminal
convictions and many complaints linked to the misappropriation and theft by police of property.
Police officers come from diverse socio-economic, cultural and social backgrounds. The Police
Service is not a workplace field that embraces those diversities; however, the different police
environments do provide rules and structures that any officer can embrace. The shared
knowledge of the organisation may not allow the manager to set standards or behave
independently from the group s/he manages. Managers set the tone of the organisation and can
influence the prevailing culture. A very significant aspect of this work relates to the previous
discussion concerning the private and public lives of police officers, as habitus overlaps into
more fields in a police person’s life than in most other occupations. 
According to Bourdieu, social capital is made up of ‘satisfactions of interest with the prestige
or respect, which almost universally reward actions motivated by respect for the rule’ (1990a:
109). Leaders, the police, criminals and all others afforded this public level of respect, obtain
social capital. Social capital is similar to economic and cultural capital in that each is
‘recognised as having value and can be traded and exchanged for desired outcomes in their
own field’ (Webb et al. 2002: 109). It can be loosely defined as one’s network, as well as the
means by which one is able to access that network for support, protection or approval. This
access is particularly important when one is a member of the policing field. When social
capital is gained from situations, people and places, it becomes very difficult to change
individual or group actions. In situations where the social and cultural capital is absolute, the
assumptions behind the organisation are not challenged. The power structures remain
unchanged and allow the continuation of symbolic violence, with no possibility for effective
cultural change. As evidenced previously, in this work it is suggested that it is through
influencing the habitus as well as the field that change can be effected.
Symbolic capital can be ascribed by people to other individuals and sometimes this is
highlighted in the media reports. Other police often regard an individual at the centre of power
of the organisation as being possessed of great symbolic capital. They may try to use this
knowledge or cultural capital for themselves to compromise that person’s power, to obey their
directions, or to challenge their position in the organisation. Individual officers who respond
to an officer with symbolic power can find their own personal moral values challenged or
enhanced. The detectives as a group have a work role and hence an identity that clearly
distinguishes them from other police officers. The recognition of the detectives’ role as
significant and different from that of other police is an example of symbolic capital. For
example, the print media reports as follows: 
Elite detective squads face the axe in the most dramatic shake-up of the New South
Wales police force in more than a decade. Hundreds of specialist investigators may
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receive orders to pack and move within weeks if regional crime squads and State
task forces are disbanded as planned (The Daily Telegraph, 5 June 1999: 5). 
The move to radically restructure the Police Service caused alarm among many senior police
and anti-violence lobby groups who feared specialist expertise would be lost in the quagmire
of general duties, with almost all detectives expected to return to uniform. Under the plan
adopted by the New South Wales Police’s State Executive Group in the North West, North,
South and South West, regional crime squads were to be dissolved. For example:
An unknown percentage of the detectives specialising in the investigation of
arson, homicide, drugs, armed hold-ups and intelligence-gathering would be
dispatched to district offices to form the core of small serious crime teams. These
officers — some of whom have spent more than a decade investigating particular
types of crime — would be expected to respond on demand from individual
police stations to any major incident within the district (Sunday Telegraph, 
14 April, 1994: 17).
In the terms of this theoretical analysis the ‘social field’ of the detectives mentioned in the above
discussion had reached the public domain and the external contact with the media established
the strength behind the symbolic capital of the detectives as a different section of the operational
police environment. The above citations come from public discussion in the media of decisions
made by police administrators that appear to be challenged by the working detectives. The
private social field is becoming an item of capital in itself. Private police management decisions
become public, then the strength of the ‘field’s’ ability to access support becomes apparent. This
is an example of Bourdieu’s description of how sub-cultures start to influence the social field. 
Two opposing examples of the possession of symbolic capital will now be discussed. They are the
case of Roger Rogerson, a former, now disgraced New South Wales detective serving in the 1970s,
and Chief Superintendent Bob Inkster, a highly regarded investigative detective, who retired in
2004. In 2004, Roger Rogerson was described as a highly intelligent family man who had great
pressure placed on his command to arrest identified serious criminals. A local journalist recorded:
He had the skills, intelligence, resources and authority over the people with whom
he worked and those he policed, to obtain good results. He had a reputation as a
superstar detective and junior staff that did not know him …. Wondered what he
would be like before he arrived. For 23 years he was the epitome of what
Australia wanted from its police force (The Daily Telegraph, 5 May, 1999: 84).
As an example of the effects of the wealth of symbolic capital, Rogerson was covered in the
print media as an identity worthy of note, despite his concurrent and long-standing identification
as a corrupt officer. For example:
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‘Rogerson’s middle name, Caleb, means Bold One. Fortune favours the bold
and for 20 years Rogerson has ridden confidently through storms of allegations’
(The Daily Telegraph, 5 May, 1999: 84). 
Serving officers in 2004 were talking about and recalling the activities of an officer of a period
nearly 30 years previously. This is an example of symbolic capital as a practical concept of
recognising cultural icons. Another holder of symbolic capital, but one, who administered his
power in a very different manner, was Robert Inkster. The symbolic capital he represented was
again reported in the written media:
Bob Inkster, the gruff, no-nonsense detective, widely known as The Snake —
because of the low profile he enjoyed — has distinguished himself by working on
some of the nation’s most infamous crimes involving the hardest, toughest
criminals (The Daily Telegraph, 27 August, 2004: 19). 
Bob Inkster commented that he:
also mourned the loss of honest, strategic risk-taking among police and the fact
that police have become gun shy when dealing with criminals due to fear of having
complaints laid against them (The Daily Telegraph, 24 August, 2004: 19). 
Police are almost frightened to have contact with serious criminals when the policing
environment is under extreme review — following a royal commission, for example. Instead
the focus turns to data and paperwork, creating flow charts and recording arrest rates, which is
meant to demonstrate effective policing. Major crime and its complexities are made invisible
both to the public and the internal police environment to avoid allegations of impropriety and
corruption, unless there is a political imperative where there was a high immediate risk to the
community and serving police officers. 
An example of this can be seen in Operation Gain, established in response to homicides
occurring in the Lebanese community. In this example, it could be seen that stopping crime in
the Lebanese community would gain cultural capital within the social field of policing. For
example, high arrest rates for drugs and property crime in the gangs associated with Lebanese
culture is regarded as successful policing. That symbolic capital, when analysed, can on
occasion be seen to be founded on questionable principles. Measured against police
corruption, symbolic capital as an influence on discourse and behaviour can be exercised
unchecked by persons of authority and status. I will now explain how economic capital relates
to police activity. 
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2.3.5: Cultural Capital
Bourdieu’s interest in culture centres on aspects such as intellectual and artistic activity and the
works produced by it; and development and enlightenment of the intellect through special
training and development (Lawley 1994: 5). I am not suggesting that Bourdieu’s approach is
about individualisation as he:
Rejects the subjectivist approach because it fails to take into account the close
connection between the objective structures of a culture, which include the values,
ideas, desires and narratives produced by and characteristic of, cultural institutions
such as the family, religious groups, education systems and government bodies, on
the one hand and the specific tendencies, activities, values and dispositions of
individuals on the others (Webb et al. 2002: 33)
Bourdieu has been adopted as the main theorist in this work because his theoretical
approach emphasises the notion of ‘field’ not culture, and looks at how culture is
structured through the nature of relations within a field. Moi (1991) quotes Bourdieu as
defining the field in this way:
A space in which a game takes place; a field of objective relations, between
individuals or institutions that are competing for the same stake; that stake is the
amassing of capital, in order to ensure the reproduction of the individual or
institution’s class (Moi 1991: 1021).
Moi’s thinking inspired me to relate my subjective and objective view to the actual
structure of police practice. This thesis places the individual as a core member in the
discussion of culture, utilising Bourdieu’s suggestions that a field is where: 
... social agents utilise the ‘feel for the game’ or the practical sense. He
contrasted the field in a game with the notion of social fields – the products of
a long slow process of automation and are therefore so to speak, games in
themselves and one is born into the game, with the game ... The field as a
concept is a relational ... one that seeks substances or essences in individuals or
groups and which foregrounds the individual ... A field of power refers to
situations in which people with a lot of cultural capital are able to dominate in
a field (Reed-Danahay 2005: 134). 
Culture can be understood by its elements, values, norms of behaviours, structures such as
institutions, and historical artefacts belonging to that culture’s past. A high level of cultural
capital means that someone has a level of knowledge about those elements that empowers their
ability to survive and live within that culture. So, in relation to police work, if as an officer you
have a good working knowledge of the language, work practices and behaviours within the
police work environment then you possess cultural capital. 
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2.3.6: Developing a Theory of Police Culture
Using an analysis of field and habitus a pattern of inclusion and exclusion can be seen to exist
in police or organisational culture. This thesis will apply Bourdieu’s work to the practice of
policing in New South Wales, arguing that there is an interrelationship between the habitus and
the social field. Chan’s (1997) work refers to language as an important element with which to
capture descriptive detail and she discusses at length Sackmans’ work (Chan 1997: 72-73).
Bourdieu’s model of analysis encompasses the recognitions of workers attributes such as:
Gender, ethnicity, and linguistic domination as well as social class, and points to a
powerful re-thinking of the culture concept as either ‘in the mind’ or exterior to the
individual (Reed-Danahay 2005: 127).
Chan (1996, 1997) has explained how cultures are sustained but added to this analysis are the
notions of embodiment, emotion, and feeling – issues that the concept of culture has not
always incorporated (Reed-Danahay 2005: 127). 
For example, the acquisition of cultural capital might be illustrated by a French family who
instructs their children in the French language spoken in academic circles.These children will
move into the academic French environment with an acquired cultural skill. In policing, if you
acquire cultural capital that is a scarce resource, such as powerful familial or social networks,
then your knowledge of the police environment is enhanced prior to and during your work
history. Bourdieu’s ideas about cultural capital can be applied to studies of cultures described
as criminal. Cultural capital is acquired by police but it can also be acquired within criminal
circles. For example, leaders of gangs are held in a position of high status by the group within
which they operate. The criminal social field has its own values, norms and histories within
which its members recognise a leader, whether formally or informally. What is the nature of
criminal cultural capital, criminal economic capital and criminal symbolic capital? Would
these frameworks, when applied to organisations such as the mafia, function as they do when
applied to a police service? Corporate organisations might also exhibit examples of symbolic
capital located in the social corporate field. These ideas offer an expanded research area in
relation to police corruption. It is possible, via the legitimate power of a police officer, to
influence the flow of economic capital, exchange of information about drug use, supply of
drugs, acquisition of benefits by deception, fraud and receipt of goods in custody. An
individual grows and develops unaware that they are complying with a field. 
The culture of police work is one that exemplifies characters who dominate and use their
power within the organisation to continue corrupt practices. This research work highlights
aspects of police corruption as being partly economic, social, cultural and political
phenomenons. A person, a new recruit who is willing to do good for the community and then
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is faced with challenging modes of decision making, becomes immediately confused and may
be viewed as an enemy of police who sustain corrupt decision making. Junior police, or police
who have a value system that is not flexible in its application of honest principles, are viewed
as not being part of the team that supports the leaders’ positions of power and ‘flexible’
decision making practises (Kustaryov 2003: 3). 
Police work is described as a distinctive culture and hence its corrupt practices are also
distinctive, linked to the power relationships within the networks of police work. Culture is
central to the behaviour of groups of people and in this research it is defined as the ‘social
field’ of policing. It is important to obtain an in-depth understanding of what constitutes
Bourdieu’s (1977) concept of ‘culture’. Bourdieu describes patterns, traits and products as
important in helping the researcher explain the social relations, attitudes and understanding of
the ‘social field’ of inquiry (1977: 12). Police culture, like others encompassed by Bourdieu’s
definition, is about social behavioural patterns, beliefs and the products of human work and
thought. The individual within the police group is defined as the ‘habitus’ and their actions as
the disposition and ‘embodied’ behaviours of police officers. 
While culture is an important part of Bourdieu’s work, he concentrates on the individual
observed in a social setting. The individual’s thoughts, behaviours and moral positions are, in
Bourdieu’s terms, a person’s embodied disposition. This theoretical approach leads the
researcher to examine the core values of the individual located within a social field. This has
lead to the following questions: Are the core values of police work found in historical practices?
Do an individual’s values within the police field compare to their values in the community? Are
an individual’s core values maintained in the social field of policing? Watson argues: 
When individuals draw on their personal moral perspectives, their decisions will
depend on the circumstances within which they are placed (2003: 18). 
Bourdieu’s theories allow us a closer look at the culture of an organisation and to
conceptualise it as a series of embedded assumptions made about human nature and human
relationships. By applying the theory of Bourdieu on a micro level it is possible to tease out
the role of the individual police officer. The reform periods I have studied were characterised
by fierce debates about how to change the police organisation and personal crises for many
police officers who may, as a result, become imprisoned, commit suicide, take sick leave,
resign, and or prematurely retire. These issues highlight the personal nature of the effects of
inquiries. I am not suggesting that all, or even many, of those in crisis were corrupt officers
but rather that a high proportion of officers were seriously affected by the highly critical
stance of the community. At the same time, the police force experienced the pressure of
political demands for change and speedy reform, which became the primary focus of the
media on a daily basis for a long period. 
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During the course of this literature review I have examined some of the issues involved in
changes in police culture, such as reform, change, culture and leadership, although they have
been reviewed from literature that is more remote from the police environment and which is
usually located within the study of sociology. I have focused heavily on the ‘personal
feelings, beliefs and experiences’ of individuals engaged in police work, utilising Bourdieu’s
concept of the ‘habitus’. Extrapolating from Bourdieu, it was insufficient just to record the
behaviour of individual police, the relationship between the individual and the field of
policing had to be explored as well, and then this relationship studied in the context of the
command and control leadership style employed throughout the police force. This becomes
crucial to the analysis to be presented in the results and discussion chapters. Bourdieu’s
(1977) theoretical position does not sidestep generic cultural ideas but offers an avenue into
the deeper layers of police practice. As Heifetz suggests:
We can trace the richness, creativity, and complexity of our cultures and
organisations to our ability as individuals to carry on an internal debate among a
variety of voices, including the one we call our own (2000: 62). 
This research does not replicate Chan’s (1996) research or arguments but builds much
further along the conceptual plane that Bourdieu (1977) offered. Chan (1997) also referred
to relationships between the individual and the social field within which they work as
essential to developing deeper explanations. Chan’s (1996) work on changing police culture
draws on the work of Bourdieu and this thesis develops a deeper appreciation of Chan’s
work, particularly regarding the role of ‘the habitus’ and the ‘field’. Bourdieu’s approach
examines how the personal ‘habitus’ interrelates with ‘the field’. These complementary
elements lead to the title of the thesis; Bourdieu’s descriptions of power relations as the
‘nature of the game’. 
Bourdieu’s concept of cultural capital is presented within his framework of a ‘general theory
of the economy of practices’ (1990b: 122). Bourdieu’s theoretical approach to the way
individuals operate within symbolic cultural systems provides a platform from which reform
or change can be encouraged. By accurately describing what happens within policing,
specifically how the individual police officer’s habitus contributes to the corrupt decision to
place personal gain ahead of ethical and moral considerations, we can ask, is this what we
want? Posing this question is the first step towards achieving change. Bourdieu’s theory of
capital ties it to the continuing struggle between the dominating and dominated. Within the
police world, that is the hierarchy of formal and informal networks within the ‘field’. The
dominating individual within a cultural group can ensure his or her own legitimacy and
survival by acquiring symbolic cultural, economic and social capital. The system described
in this research relies on the theory of symbolic cultural capital in particular, which helps to
51
THE NATURE OF THE GAME — NSW POLICE REFORM 1996-2004  •  CHAPTER TWO SETTING THE SCENE
explain how police corruption develops over time. For example, symbolic cultural capital
occurs when the police field develops enduring or short term relationships with the criminal
world. The culture, group activities and the individuals that make up the team are what
constitute the ‘nature of the game’. The game in the above example is the connections
between the police and those policed, i.e. the criminal. It is worth noting that the
mechanisms of police corruption are similar to the workings of criminal organisations such
as the mafia as both rely on networks of relationships that seek various forms of gain.
Robbins and Muverji consider aspects of the roles of an organisation’s cultures, stating that
an organisation’s cultures informally support a group’s cultures:
[They] support a group’s objectives or goals, establishing an overall strategy for
achieving these goals, and developing a comprehensive hierarchy of plans to
integrate and coordinate activities. A culture is concerned, with the ends (what is
to be done) as well as with means (as how it is to be done) (1990: 7). 
Bourdieu’s strength is his recognition of personal dispositions and their relationship with the
social field within which people work. Chan (1996) applies these concepts to police work,
but I have drawn on the specific nature of power relations involved in understanding
corruption and the acquisition of ‘gains’. The gains referred to in this thesis are symbolic,
cultural, social and economic. In practical policing terms, the gains may be status,
promotion, financial advantages, property and helpful networks. In simple terms, corruption
is the activity of unfairly manipulating gains. It is this emphasis on the individual’s interests
that is Bourdieu’s greatest contributor to understanding police corruption. 
The affiliation process between police–the connections between individuals —  is
essential to the work task being accomplished successfully. This development of
connection is crucial to the social field of policing. This social field is hierarchical in
structure, and multi-layered. There is also a dependence with external relationships as
well. And yet the social field of policing is also a fertile ground for the development of
corruption. Similar layers and inequalities exist in other fields, including criminal fields.
For example, there are different relationships involving economic exchange within the
police. Police are formally prohibited from lending each other money. They are not
supposed to have gambling, drug and alcohol problems — all activities based on
economics that can involve corrupt activity. These activities occur as part of many
different relationships inside and outside the policing field. Sometimes these exchanges
involve distinctly different social, cultural or economic groups. 
Bourdieu’s work provides important insight into the endemic nature of police corruption and
the cyclical nature of corruption enquiries. The recurrent nature of corruption inquiries
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indicates that the problems of corruption have never been adequately addressed in the past.
Various inquiries have had evidence of:
gratuities and improper associations; substance abuse; fraudulent practices;
assaults and abuse of police powers; compromise or favourable treatment; theft
and extortion; protection of the drug trade; protection of club and vice operators;
protection for gaming and betting interests; drug trafficking; interference with
internal investigations and the code of silence and other circumstance suggestive
of corruption (Wood 1997a: 83).
Drawing on Bourdieu’s theories, I argue that corruption is connected within the networks of
power, politics, and the field of policing. The public view holds corrupt conduct is less likely
to flourish where the managers set high standards and lead by example as well as help other
officers understand and accept the values of the organisation (ICAC 1994: 41). Opportunities
for corrupt conduct can be reduced by good administration and management (ICAC 1994: 41).
Yet it is too simple to say that ‘bad managers are surprised by corruption’ (Bracey 1989: 170). 
The historical patterns of policing have included command management not only of
operational settings but also of human resource issues. In this research it will be argued that
the conscious/unconscious adoption of military styles of management has influenced
contemporary policing in that social practice, common cultures, and ‘shared body of
knowledge’ demonstrate: 
A successful socialisation process that will get agents to act as accomplices in their
own destiny (Bourdieu cited in Reed-Danahay 2005: 52). 
2.3.7: Symbolic Violence in Police Practice
The command and control style of management often results in individuals either consciously
or unconsciously behaving in ways they feel that they should not behave. Leaders who behave
in the command manner are often subtly or directly manifesting a form of symbolic violence.
Forms of violence include individuals being treated as ‘inferior, denied resources, limited in
their social and (professional) mobility’ (Gordon 2003: 142). Gordon also suggests that power
is historically constituted in people’s knowledge of their world. This knowledge is imbued
with structures of control constituted by the outcomes of a prevailing web of power relations.
Escape from these power relations is limited and officers have resorted to retirement,
resignation, sick leave and even suicide as a direct result of the dysfunctional nature of their
work place. 
Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic violence is useful in developing an understanding of how the
doxa of command and control promotes deviant, corrupt or overly compliant behaviour in the
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police organisation. Webb et al. (2002: 114) explains the power of symbolic violence as follows: 
Violence is symbolic because it is not directly physical, but its effect is just as
significant because it enables certain groups occupying privileged positions to
maintain dominance over others. In some situations, symbolic violence has been,
and still is, ‘the natural order of things’ (Webb et al. 2002: 24).
When leaders cannot motivate compliance with the ‘social field’, or in fact compliance is
demanded in spite of complex differences between officers, then command and control
management will be used to ‘motivate’ compliance. Symbolic violence is a useful concept for
examining the interrelationships between police, police structures, social relationships
between members and the nature of the connections between members and the community. A
useful hypothetical example is the conflict an officer might face when confronted by an off-
duty colleague breaking the law: the officer’s habitus would dictate taking the correct legal
measures to apprehend and charge the colleague, while the conditions of the field — the
danger and camaraderie, the poor treatment of whistle-blowers — would encourage the officer
to ignore the offence, thereby engaging in corruption. Bourdieu’s analysis accounts for
conflict, power relations and information flowing within different informal structures.
It is clear that how people think, their environment, routine and relations with others all need
to be understood in an analysis of the important issue of police corruption. The more this
process of symbolic violence is hidden from sight and left unchallenged, the more powerful it
is in reproducing class dominance. For this reason Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic violence is
crucial in this analysis. Symbolic violence occurs when an individual acts against his or her
core beliefs, often because he or she is encouraged or ordered to do so. The direction (formal,
informal, conscious or unconscious) to act against those core beliefs occurs within the field.
As core beliefs exist within the habitus, the pattern of violence or symbolic violence occurs
when an individual attempts to maintain core values and discourse within the field and that
person’s habitus is changed by the field. The habitus becomes moulded, and as Chan (1996)
has recognised, sub-cultures can form but they do so directly as a result of a competition for
capital, be it symbolic, economic, social or cultural. 
Are individuals within policing in a state of conscious anxiety about competing moral
decisions? Are individuals unconsciously complying with a system of authority that is corrupt?
Is the police community complying unwittingly with the system in the belief that the cycle of
inquiries is creating change? One of the objectives of this thesis is to recognise the importance
of individual decision making within existing networks and processes. Bourdieu’s discussion
of the concepts of habitus and field assist in describing the location of an individual police
officer within the environment and point to confirmation of Heiftzer’s suggestions concerning
a type of specific leadership — adaptive leadership (see Appendix M).
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Where the literature on policing explores the issues of theory, policy and practice the
theoretical approach adopted in this work focuses on and exposes the ‘public-private, political-
personal dualisms’, mentioned above as the macro-micro dualism (Watson 2003: 2).
Importantly, the discussion moves from the general to the specific and explores the
relationships between these. In this way this thesis achieves a significant interdependence
between the managerial discourse and the personal stories of police work, an approach that
until now has been rarely highlighted. 
If an individual officer’s disposition within that social field sits comfortably within the police
world then the perpetuation of symbolic violence continues when that person’s unconscious
values are in opposition to and ignored by ‘the game’ within which they are located. For
example, if the ‘field’ is motivated to command police resources in a racist manner then the
‘habitus’ of the individual officer will struggle with personal conflict.
Internal conflict between the personal and the public becomes paramount in the public and
private life of the individual. Fulop and Rifkin (1997: 59) examine individual fear in
organisations which are trying to change. It describes a process by which one expresses fear
and then sees that fear interpreted and re-expressed by others. This thesis records examples,
first-person stories of individual experiences, and accounts of respondents’ fears and the
manifestation of those fears in their current work life, as does Fulop and Rifkin’s work. They
explore and analyse fear, emphasising workers’ fear of change in the conditions that
maintain their economic life.
Police who are not disposed to accept their part in the game, who can
consciously recognise the social field of corruption, will then feel a constant
conflict (Horarik 2006: 217). 
As reform involves accepting that the profits of policing have to be given away
(changed/reformed/stopped) in response to political imperatives as well as community
demands, it requires an acknowledgement that personal economic gain from any form of
corrupt behaviour is unacceptable to all serving police officers and that it is unacceptable,
indeed criminal, for a police officer to engage in this type of activity. Despite economic
considerations in resources and management, it is necessary to have open dialogue within the
team about gambling, or any other personal crisis that may influence an officer’s morale.
The fear of exposure deserves closer scrutiny to determine why it might be in opposition to
learning. Schneider and Shriffin’s (1977) psychological, cultural, literary and historical
exploration of shame and associated fears of exposure and disconnection become relevant
here. This concept of exposure is reminiscent of Garfinkel’s (1956) famous article, ‘Conditions
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of Successful Degradation Ceremonies’, with the focus on threats to identify via exposure and
issues of shame, guilt and disconnection. Feher, Heller and Markus’ (1983) book, Dictatorship
Over Needs, covers similar concepts, especially in terms of surveillance in a totalitarian state.
Schein (1993) also discusses these issues in terms of preserving ‘face’ and its effect on learning
in organisations.
Schneider and Shriffin explain that shame ‘reveals the limits of the self’. One sees one’s self
as lacking (1977: xxi). Schneider and Shriffin (1977: 22) talk of ‘disruption, disorientation,
and painful self-consciousness’, and he quotes Sartre in Being and Nothingness (1943) as
saying, ‘Shame is by nature recognition. I recognise that I am as the other sees me.’ Schneider
and Shriffin offer that with this sense of shame, disgrace sets in and the ‘ordering of one’s
world disintegrates’ (Schneider 1977: 22). This disgrace–shame (Schneider and Shriffin 1977:
21) has further, relational facets. Schneider and Shriffin (1977: 26) explain that one senses a
threat of disapproval and ostracism, a fear of contempt and, deeper than that, a fear of
abandonment (Fulop and Rifkin 1997: 21-2).
Such discussions of fear, its revelation and its role in policing and learning about change are
rarely connected either in the literature or in practice. As Fulop and Rifkin comment:
One issue that attracted many authors towards making this connection is the
noticeable absence from Senge’s popular book, The Fifth Discipline (1990), of
a discussion of emotions such as fear, anger, hatred, lust, envy and vengeance.
In trying to begin to fill this void, the authors selected to focus here on the
representation of fear because it is that representation, and not the original
stimulus or resulting emotion, which seems to play the more significant role in
collective learning. In other words, in collective learning, the impact of the
interpersonal representation and interpretation process seems to outweigh the
impact of the intra-personal feeling and revealing to one’s self (Fulop and
Rifkin 1997: 61). 
This thesis considers that a conflict of interest is also an important facet of the problem of
corruption. Self-disclosure of the practice of corruption is necessary to stop the cycle and
yet doing so will cause fear and confusion in the general public and will change the public
opinion of police. These two related factors are in opposition with each other; one is about
revealing, and the other is about hiding. The current management process does not allow
discussion to take place about the link between these two elements. Academics, as
observers, do not manage to uncover these elements as they are outside their field of
inquiry. Being out of the game they can only observe its outer manifestations. Insiders on
the other hand have difficulty distinguishing the elements of corruption when they can be
presented as a daily accepted, and apparently integral and logical, part of police practice. 
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2.4: Implications for Management Reform
Organisational structures are necessary for a central authority to provide the constraints that
permit an organisation to survive. Organisational structure is to some extent affected by the
need for a dominant group to control those it dominates. The purpose of organisational
structure is to ensure the efficient use of resources within a framework of accountability and
control. In some instances, however, the process of doing so may create a culture of fear that
makes it resistant rather than responsive to change. Relationships between individuals who
perceive they have joint futures will assume the form of a strong and enduring union of self-
interest. Bourdieu calls this behaviour ‘docile’ (Carles 2001), seeing culture and social field as
a ‘reproduction of inequality through acceptance’ (Carles 2001). As workers comprising a
social field, the police officers’ interest is in maintaining a position of stability. In Bourdieu’s
words ‘this is the right thing to do, means, that it is the right thing to do for the ‘agent’ (Carles
2001: 33). 
This is borne out in the following examples of police workers being told that ‘nothing you say
will make any difference’, or advised to ‘keep your mouth closed and do not cause any
trouble’, or threatened that ‘if you know what is good for you, you will keep your trap shut’.
So control is exhibited between close personal working relationships, and private thoughts.
Furthermore, the leaders are seen to be in control of the outcomes of any potential change and
that is usually observed as a transfer, resignation, sick report or some form of punitive human
resource management process. It is important to examine and contrast the differing structures
of the Police Service before and after Commissioner Ryan’s tenure as this will demonstrate any
changes to the ‘field’. It is hoped that this process may also illustrate that looking at shared
understandings of the field as a total example of culture or sub-cultures, rather than as a
structure, is an inflexible approach. 
A culture will typically encourage the development of types of behaviour that lead to success
within the organisation. In the case of policing, the main such behaviour is ‘domination’;
particularly domination that is effective because the person or people being dominated are
unaware of it. Police culture stands at the threshold of the criminal justice system, effectively
controlling the enforcement of criminal law. Individual officers have the discretion and
opportunity to exercise extensive authority over all citizens and are in principle bound to apply
the law in a just and ethical manner. Police officers may act within principles that are universal
and abstract but their working lives are founded in the reality of daily experiences which
involve moral dilemmas. 
Waddington (1999) goes further by suggesting that the lack of comparison within cultures
leads academic postulations about culture to reflect more on academia than on the
organisations being studied (Waddington 1999: 292). Corruption is in the arena of analysis that
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can and must include the intimate relationship between the organisation and individuals,
despite the fact that researching this intimate level of an organisation is difficult. The
individuals involved in police corruption are also involved in corruption within police
relationships and the external environment. Waddington observes that:
Faced with all this diversity, it seems that sub-culture — as a set of shared artefacts
— almost disappears entirely (1999: 290). 
In reference to this research it would seem that the acts of corruption are not different within
the different sub-cultures of policing. Instead the reintegration of the importance of economics
and individuals behaviour in the pursuit of illegal gain is tied with the study of culture. If
culture is generational, it is not sufficient that reform or culture is alone tackled as if the culture
is static and therefore unchangeable. Knowledge and awareness of how to sustain changes for
the long-term future must acknowledge the conflict, power relations and the information flows
within the informal structures. When core values are discussed, the abuse of power can be
ascribed to deviant or inverted values. 
Generally, the practice of command and control is the standard means of controlling police
organisations and although alternative management styles are occasionally adopted at a
surface level — usually imported as abstractions from non-policing industries — the
hierarchical structures remain with the Police Commissioner giving orders and those beneath
following and forwarding these down the line as a disciplined para-military group. One
example of this was the flirtation with Total Quality Management in the early 1990s, a
fashionable approach in the industrial management movement in Japan and the United States
of America that was introduced into the NSW police force at that time and disappeared from
the lexicon soon after. Much management theory is too general and descriptive for a
satisfactory application to policing and, when the main problem is one of ongoing corruption,
it is specific and current work practices that have to be examined and this must take place
within the peculiar requirements of effective operational policing.
This thesis argues that the command and control management structure is a major factor in
perpetuating the cycle of corruption within policing organisations, a fact that is testified by the
regular reoccurrence of corruption inquiries not only in New South Wales but in other
organisations from New York to Northern Ireland. The Wood Royal Commission pointed to
failures in the police executive but reform took the shape of strengthening not reassessing and
restructuring. The replacement to Tony Lauer as Police Commissioner was Peter Ryan, another
leadership figure wielding even greater politicised powers to command and control. Given the
cyclic nature of police corruption, it becomes necessary to examine possible causes and
contributing factors with existing police structures and practices. This thesis studies the nature
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of police work in all its complexity, both inside a police organisation but also outside police
officers, in terms of links with the community. 
Police officers belong to specific groups — for example, they might be traffic police or
detectives or officers in the Aboriginal liaison section. Within each group individual officers
are regarded as being included with other members of that group. However, anyone who is not
part of that group is excluded — for example, traffic police are excluded from the detective
group. What is important to understand is that it is the nature of police work itself that provides
the opportunity for power and the mechanisms of domination that allow the corrupt ‘gains’ to
be obtained. Subgroups are largely irrelevant, for example, a general-duties officer may be
included in the general-duties group, but excluded by those in the traffic section. As a
consequence, the location of symbolic culture changes in its interpretation but still occurs in
an individual’s private life and public working life. Corruption occurs in all police groups and
subgroups and Bourdieu’s important contribution is that he develops from his logic of practice
that as capital is accumulated it can be transformed to other forms of capital. 
This, for example, would apply to policing in the case where a leader, who is regarded as highly
important, makes influential decisions that are unethical in relation to promoting his colleagues.
Despite this these favours will add symbolic and possibly economic capital to his personal ‘gain’.
Another example may be the actions of a highly regarded detective who involves himself and
others in the sale of illegal drugs. He or she has converted their symbolic cultural capital (from
being a detective) into economic gain (the money made in selling drugs). The Commissioner is
included in the organisation as a whole and is the leader of the wider organisation, but he is not
regarded as included in the separate groups. An individual’s social capital is determined by the
size of their relationship network; the sum of its cumulated resources (both cultural and
economic) ;and how successfully (quickly) the individual can set them in motion. According to
Bourdieu, social networks must be continuously maintained and fostered over time in order for
them to be called upon quickly in the future (Bourdieu 1996: 30-37). 
This pattern of social networking and putting relationships quickly into motion is easily
understood and applicable to the framework of command policing. There is an historic reality to
this pattern of either belonging or not belonging. One reason that John Avery was appointed as
Commissioner was because he was seen as an outsider — he came from the traffic area, as
opposed to the larger and more influential Criminal Investigation Branch. Commissioner Avery’s
appointment was meant to strengthen the command and control model by breaking up the existing
culture within the ranks of detectives and, thereby, making the Police Service more honest. Given
the nature of the social field of policing, however, all this would have meant is that the cultural
capital specific to a particular field, for example the detectives, would still have experienced a
direct gain. Tony Lauer, the next Commissioner, was drawn from the ranks of detectives. 
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Bourdieu comments that in order to observe an individual ‘You have to understand what the
person is not doing’ (Carles 2001: 37). This is particularly relevant to the individual’s choices
around following the law. It is essential to understand when legislation directing police behaviour
includes Section 316 of the NSW Crimes Act 1900. This Act states that it is an offence to conceal
a serious criminal offence. The question remains, however, are police disclosing all acts of police
corruption, particularly at the highest levels of office? By law, police must self disclose facts and
evidence of police corruption. Clause 20 of the regulation Police Service Act 1990 places with
the individual police officer the clear obligation that a serving officer must report any act of
corruption. The inflexibility of law is one thing, however, and practice is another. The community
responds to the corruption but is never aware of the subtleties of field and habitus.
Ideally, the social field becomes connected to the community in an interrelationship that is
functional and contains open dialogue. The next step, however, is to discover the role of the
habitus in the relationships between the fields. The power to make and implement decisions
changes as one moves up and down between existing levels within the hierarchy, depending
on the power of the individual involved. In 1994 the decision-making role was decentralised
or ‘forced downwards’ to a broader spread of executives. The executives had difficulty coping
with their new responsibilities to such an extent that decision-making responsibilities were
reclaimed by the Commissioner, creating resentment in the executive team, especially as it
seemed to close future decentralising initiatives.
Reform is more likely to be successful if police officers are connected to professionals who
understand some of the complexities of policing and the networks of progressive police leaders
(regional, national and international). During the reform period and with Assistant
Commissioner Terry Collins support, Dr Hilary Byrne Armstrong and Dr Peter Melser (2002)
made an important contribution to the New South Wales Police Service with the creation of a
program called E-Coach, a small-step approach to changing police culture. The focus of 
E-Coach was behavioural reform and it aimed to enhance professionalism and ethical decision
making in everyday operational policing. In the longer term, however, its aim to build
sustainable cultural reform through cumulative small steps taken by officers within their
everyday policing environment were thwarted by the limitations of its trial (Armstrong 2002: 1).
Having spent several days as an observer on the program during its initial implementation in the
Hunter region, it was clear that its possibilities had not been exploited before it was
discontinued. As Assistant Commissioner T. Collins had recognised the benefits of educating
the younger and operational officers in his command, the program. Unfortunately, the program
was predominantly pitched at the lower ranks in the organisation and the executive, who also
needed to learn about alternatives in cultural change programs, was excluded. Another reform
proposal was the Witness Support Policy in which the police organisation attempted to create a
situation where police informants marginalised by reporting corruption can be protected. 
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Major structural change cannot be forced upon an organisation from above as it involves the
careful adjustment of the unconscious to the conscious world to inform new patterns of
behaviour. According to Hilary Byrne Armstrong, change is ‘learnt walking in the shoes of
another’. For Bourdieu, however, cultural change is possible through changes in the field or in
the habitus, although no explicit theory of change is outlined. What needs to change is the
unconscious system of thought and behaviour that applies both to reform and corruption. People
should also be asked: How could you change your attitudes? Could you change your attitudes
through effecting other personal changes? Does changing the structure of the field create
change? For example, would rotating people through different types of police work assist in
producing change? This thesis suggests that changing structures alone does not assist in
producing reform. Rather, it is actual behaviour, the decision making process that shapes it, that
must be changed. Only if that two-fold approach is taken can reform succeed.
Armstrong and Melser (2002) examined the issue of ethics in the workplace. They wrote that
enabling and supportive ethical professionalism exhibits well-developed communication
skills, recognition by the boss, support for interventions, and fair treatment. The ability to
give constructive feedback openly is also essential. Conversely, ethics in the workplace are
undermined by working environments in which teams are not cohesive for various reasons
— for example, there is rudeness and unfriendliness or employees feel isolation from the
team. The authors argue that managers are integral to this negative situation when they
override, dismiss, patronise employees, look for mistakes, use punishment instead of
encouraging learning and exercise discrimination, unfairness, favouritism and cronyism.
Armstrong and Melser maintain that: 
[O]fficers in the lower status levels see command & control culture as
undermining ethical conduct. This occurs in at least two ways, simple obedience
to commands removes the responsibility that underlies ethical action. It is
arguable whether simple compliance can be ethical, although it can be judged
unethical when the actions taken are judged unethical (2002: 32). 
While encouraging in its approach, E-Coach was not used by the executive as a learning
tool for different hierarchical groups in the organisation, so while operational officers were
committed, financial resources assigned to the project were limited. The E-Coach program
was the first real attempt by the department to address the personal meaning of reform
rather than respond to the political demand for immediate reform. As such it is an important
precursor for the sort of reform argued for here. Significantly, it could potentially address
the problem of the cycle of corruption and inquiries so damaging to the NSW police force.
Unfortunately, the impetus for change has mainly come from the political and social
environment. Couper and Lobitz (1991) contend that leadership is constantly working to
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improve existing systems and processes, and to develop solutions through participation and
joint consultation (1991: 47). Imber (1989: 154) wrote that whatever the level of action, the
effective management and deployment of resources is not only important but also crucial for
the continued success of the Police Service. Bayley argues:
It seems natural to seek the cognitive analogues of organisational belief, as some
of this work does. What is more interesting, however, is that this line of work
seeks explicitly to join the psychology of individual cognition with the
organisational setting that provides much of the cognitive field. When studies of
formal structure dominated organisational research, there were few obvious
opportunities for developing the social psychology of organisations, and the
distance between organisational sociologists and organisational psychologists
grew, through the study of organisational culture, that distance may be
diminished (1990: 473).
It is necessary to get a better understanding of the impact of command and control style
management within this particular command management organisation to be able to provide
a critical analysis of the shortcomings of this type of management. This research highlights
that the stress experienced by individuals facing workplace changes may come from internal
dilemmas that are not only derived from the workplace but also from their private lives.
Small everyday tensions may well be exacerbated or endowed with greater significance or
intensity as a result of the demanding work or personal circumstances of the police officer
(Watson 2003: 12). 
There can be no doubt that the work environment of a policing organisation at times can be
extremely stressful — from moment to moment it requires that members variously care for,
protect, and defend both themselves and their colleagues as well as the those they investigate,
arrest and detain. At yet other times, police must endure long periods of boredom, and story
telling of past police incidents amongst officers assists them to make meaning of their
working lives (Waddington 1999: 287). Butler (1984: 227) argued for the need for
comprehensive planning when reacting to any change. It is also important to establish the
structure and procedures when implementing an action plan and to structure education and
training to facilitate the understanding of these changes. The ability to manage change and
innovation is a key and crucial skill for present-day leadership, whether leaders are in the
public or the private sector (Etter 1995: 275). Etter predicted that an independent or civilian
body would take over the police administration, and she argues that:
… policing can no longer afford to fumble along to wait for a crisis to spur it into
action or have the form of any change dictated by external agencies or forces.
Change needs to be planned, change that is proactive and purposeful, rather than
just reactive measures to ensure survival (1995: 255).
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How can change be implemented? DiBella and Nevis (1998) offers several important
suggestions. First is the need to focus on learning methods to improve what is already being
done as well as focusing on the underlying assumptions of current practices. DiBella and
Nevis refer to this as ‘learning investment’ and delineates it as ‘personnel and money
allocations to develop knowledge and skill over time’ (DiBella and Nevis 1998: 374).
Second, the organisation must be aware that both individual and group learning methods are
required. ‘Both individual and group development is necessary, and it might help to look at
them as stylistic choices, as opposed to seeking them in normative terms’ (DiBella and Nevis
1998: 372). Third, learning practices specifically need to be evaluated and developed in
order to produce the capacity for organisational learning. These, DiBella and Nevis argue,
must recognise the distinctions between ‘unlearning what they know and do, [and] how they
learn’. This is commonly regarded as the need to unlearn before learning can take place.
Moreover, managers must assess how present capabilities bring about or inhibit learning.
The question DiBella and Nevis posit in this regard is whether barriers to improved
performance exist because of what is being learned as opposed to the question of the way
learning takes place. Finally, DiBella and Nevis maintain that as there are many ways and
reasons for individuals to learn, so too are there for organisations. There is a need to
‘understand the relativity of these organisational characteristics and the relationship between
learning orientations and other organisational processes … Further research in these areas
would contribute to developing a pluralistic (rather than normative), view of organisational
learning capability’ (DiBella and Nevis 1998: 377–8). 
It is difficult to understand how general management principles of learning can lead to change
when examples of symbolic violence, as delineated by Bourdieu, also exist within the
organisation. Here, the focus is on the ways in which symbolic violence occurs when people
feel directed in a manner that creates cognitive dissonance within their habitus. Bourdieu’s
discussion of a dominant class or domineering authority leads to an understanding of how
‘command and control’ dominates the core values and discourse of organisational cultures
(Webb et al. 2002:96). Understanding this theory provides a useful way to analyse the
empirical material gathered in this research. The social field of the police officer involves
stress, difficult work conditions, demands from the community and other pressures.
Researchers external to the police have examined these factors (Bailey 1989; Reiner 1992),
however, unlike these previous studies, this thesis has been proposed and undertaken by a
serving police officer and underlines the conditions under which officers’work is pivotal to the
analysis. 
Describing community relations, Das stated that policing has benefited from police
partnership with the community, and indeed, that it has already transcended the constraints
of a military model (1986: 251). However, the way in which police decisions are made needs
63
THE NATURE OF THE GAME — NSW POLICE REFORM 1996-2004  •  CHAPTER TWO SETTING THE SCENE
to accord with the acceptable standards of the society in which they are implemented
(Bunyard 1978a: 312). Finnane (1994a: 155) went further, stating that the potential to
deliver improvements in policing is limited by the reality of the profound institutional
conservatism of police forces. Hilmer and Donaldson (1996: 21–44) warned that some
organisations following modern management principles and structures have found them to
be inefficient, and they are now turning back to more hierarchical structures. The thesis also
argues that changing the command and control style management is important but that a
certain level of hierarchy is important for the police force to function at an optimal level. 
Stoner et al. (1985) stated that an organisation’s communication channels influence
variables such as group performance, leader emergence, and group member motivation and
satisfaction. Overcoming barriers to effective organisational communication requires that
managers recognise the difficulties inherent in the communication process. They also need
to make information explicit, and to remain sensitive as to how a particular communication
may affect its receiver. According to Moore and Stephens, police commanders must, for both
ethical and practical purposes, regularly engage with their political environments, a contact
which aims to maintain the balance of knowledge and understanding which is required when
making operational decisions (1991: 40). This is exemplified by Commissioner Ryan’s
relationship with politicians. In his first year, he did not respond well to the pressures of
being a political person. Ryan’s ability to influence outcomes by his personal media profile
made it more difficult for police and community and political expectations to be clearly
delineated. The roles of police must be well delineated for, as stated by Brown, ‘they will
take on multiple roles such as planner, problem solver, community activist, community
organiser and community leader (1991: 21).
Links with community members, journalists, politicians, and others put pressure on police
programs. External pressure can create confusion in the leadership about future directions.
Police may maintain that they know what they are doing and then government pressure — in
fact, direct ministerial pressure — can create different agendas. This occurs at a local level, in
regional areas, and then on a state level. Police organisations and their cultures cannot be
understood without the dynamics impacting on policing being taken into account. In fact, public
and political pressure actively contribute to the ongoing nature of the cycle of corruption.
It is all too easy to attribute resistance to change as the fear of innovation; this is far too
simplistic an explanation. In Chapters Four and Five this thesis will present a different view
of the reforms that were forced upon the New South Wales Police Service during the
aftermath of the Wood Royal Commission, discussing the individual police officer’s internal
dilemmas when working in an organisation that challenges their moral values or in fact
supports an officer’s moral position that financial gain is more important than serving the
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community honestly. The nature of the game will be described and the sense that this is one
of the acquisitions of gains which can take the form of symbolic cultural importance rather
than simply financial gain will be explained in practice. However, as these chapters deal
extensively with the huge amounts of data collected for this research, it is to an examination
of this thesis data and methodology that must first be described in Chapter Three.
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CHAPTER THREE
Methodology
This chapter details the methodology used for my evaluation of corruption in the New South
Wales Police Service; the way this is perpetuated by the cycle of corruption; and the
implications this has for attempts to bring about reform based on the recommendations of the
Wood Royal Commission (1997a; 1997b). The heart of this chapter reveals how I, as a
researcher, was able to examine issues within the Police Service by gathering information from
within the operational work place. As I was employed as an operational general duties officer
and plain clothes officer investigating police corruption in relation to the organised gaming
industry, I was able to observe  first-hand not only the underlying existence of corruption but
also the ‘crisis or trigger’ that led to the Wood Royal Commission and the perpetuation of this
‘trigger’ in the years after the Royal Commission when the Police Service was undergoing
apparently radical reform. This helped me to question whether the Wood Royal Commission
had effected, or could possibly have effected, any real change in the New South Wales Police
Service.
Although the research approach was specifically designed to avoid listing and assessing each
of the Commission’s recommendations and the police organisation's response to each one, it
addressed these recommendations by measuring their total effect. To facilitate this I conducted
120 interviews with 20 police officers over a five year period, both at Police Headquarters and
at a number of different police stations. The methods employed were as unobtrusive as
possible and were directed at the interviewee’s participation in the reform process. I was not
especially concerned with gender issues (the majority of the workforce being male), but
primarily with the hierarchical structures of policing. The hierarchical structures are
traditionally and intrinsically bound up with ideas connected to masculine decision making,
but this thesis does not examine this issue. I wanted to understand why corruption was a
perennial problem: one that reoccurred and reoccurred, as part of a system and as a part of a
process of enduring networks.
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During the research process, my personal experiences and those of many of my colleagues
suggested that there was a cyclical pattern to inquiries and that nothing really changed within
the organisation. I wanted to know why this appeared to be true or discover if it was true: why
does nothing change in response to Royal Commissions and inquiries? 
The views of those in upper-level, information-wealthy positions were recorded during my
research. Any criticism that these views come from an entrenched, privileged and
conditioned position is partially answered by recognising that this viewpoint has a unique
value that is not often found in academic research. By recording this type of information
and the experiences of the individuals in these roles, this research has reached into a level
of executive response to police reform not recorded elsewhere. 
By using a priori concepts generated from extant literature to guide an inductive study, the
research framework of this study draws both on deductive (testing theory in practice) and
inductive (theory emerging from practice) theory-building approaches (Langley 1999). In
this way, the framework takes steps towards bridging the gap between theory and practice;
tensions in existing theory guide the analysis of the adopted theory in practice. 
The emergent theory will be grounded in the tensions and paradoxes between theory and
practice; in this case, the theory and practice of dispersed leadership and power. Such an
approach prevents the researcher from drowning in a sea of data, and also focuses the
research on empirical evidence that reflects the effects of the theoretical tensions and
paradoxes. The thesis will review a mixed methods approach and identify that issues of
confidentiality were important within the qualitative investigation. A qualitative approach
is distinct in that the nature of the inquiry demanded strict adherence to methodological
practices that protected the confidentiality of participants to a high degree. In particular this
research does not disclose, for example, the personal attributes of those interviewed. The
difficult relationship between information sources can be described thus:
the conventions of quantitative research require clear, explicit reporting of
data and procedures. That is expected so that (a) the reader will be confident
of, and can verify, reported conclusions; (b) secondary analysis of the data is
possible; (c) the study could in principle be replicated; and (d) fraud or mis-
conduct, if it exists, will be more traceable… In our view the same needs are
present for qualitative studies (Huberman and Miles 1994: 439). 
The use of multiple methodologies allowed me to do as Shearing (1991) offers:
To re-think the idea of a ‘generative program’, take up the hints and suggestions
that the rule-based paradigm has stifled, and give more specificity to concepts
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like ‘style’ and ‘strategy’. Finally, we might be able to discover something more
of what is meant by ‘analogous reasoning’ and how it might provide the key to
understanding how people produce activity through the knowledge that ‘classic
metaphysicians’ called ‘the domain of practical reason’ (1991: 489).
The research began by collecting evidence in several areas. Firstly, the relevant literature
was reviewed in order to understand more about key concepts such as culture, reform,
change, leadership and learning. Given that the literature was often general in its
descriptions and not police specific, I then moved to reading the past Royal Commissions
and inquiries into corruption with the NSW Police. 
From this collection of data I began looking at data available from the NSW Police
Association about the history of the police organisation and commentary in the media about
past Inquiries and Commissions. A short summary of other data collection follows. I
collected over one thousand print media articles from the period of late 1995 to 2004 using
reform and police culture, or police change as key words to include the article in the media
collection. The articles were categorised into key subject areas such as; leadership, reform,
corruption, police structure and miscellaneous. There was also a collection of police
documents: policy, work agreements, correspondence and summaries of internal documents
concerning reform analysed. I also carried out one hundred and twenty internal and a small
proportion of external stakeholder interviews during the period immediately following the
Royal Commission. 
The statistical data was collected over a five-year period in different areas: (1) arrest data;
(2) conviction rates; (3) complaint data; (4) community surveys and (5) police surveys. I
also gathered data from the New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research. This
was chiefly broken down according to type of crime or department, rather than, for example,
1ocation. The statistics were included in order to examine some examples of police activity
during this period of reform.
When reading past Royal Commission reports, it became clear that there were different
components to the trigger. No matter what the components of the triggers were for past
Royal Commissions, the general potential for and practice of corruption within the service
have remained unchanged. A cycle of specific dissatisfaction, prompting an attempt at
investigation and reform, followed by little real progress, creating another similar pocket of
disillusionment, became evident. 
Philosophically, the research questions were broad in their approach to the examination of
organisational change and therefore required an inductive process of inquiry. The following
observation describes this process of discovery:
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In all these cases, however, inductive and deductive analyses are mixed.
When a theme, hypothesis or pattern is identified inductively, the
researcher moves into a verification mode, trying to confirm or qualify the
findings (Huberman & Miles 1994: 431).
The Wood Royal Commission offered an opportunity for an operational police officer to
analyse the police organisation’s response and results to the external demands for reform. The
findings will illuminate some of the responses of the NSW Police to these pressures. The
research focuses on the period following the Wood Royal Commission, between 1996 and
2003. The study records some major decisions, both formal and informal. It includes
interviews with the executive as well as with interested commentators, some of whom were in
a position to influence the reform process. I worked at the Rocks Police Station for at least
twenty-four hours per week and then supplemented these hours to a full-time load
investigating at police headquarters. I have not in this thesis attempted self-revelation or
even self-commentary as part of the reflexivity that was part of the ethnographic endeavour 
(Coffey and Atkinson 1996: 18).
I interviewed senior executive police, operational police, and employees in organisations with
responsibilities for reviewing the NSW Police organisation. I asked questions that examined
the practical and theoretical aspects of policing along with the political influences on policing.
There was an enormous amount of time given by the executive of the police service who
participated in the interview process. It was essential for the leaders in the organisation to be
interviewed as they had the responsibility of implementing change. 
3.1: Ethical Considerations
I asked each interview participant to sign a Participant Consent Form regarding their
participation in the research, which, among other things, guaranteed their anonymity. The
participants also received a Participant Information Statement indicating the contact details for
the University’s Human Research Ethics Committee if those interviewed had any queries at
any time concerning the research procedures. I did attempt to balance the need to clarify a
respondent’s position in the police service with the interviewees need for confidentiality. 
I also presented a copy of a letter from the NSW Police Association and the Commissioner’s
letter of endorsement. This was a standard procedure within the organisation when research
was being carried out; in a way that procedure explained the independence as well as the
organisations support for the research, and again assured the anonymity of the responses. 
The methodological process needs to include a declaration of the relationship between the
researcher and the field of research as the ‘personal embeddedness of the ethnographic
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research tasks’ can influence the procedures undertaken during the research process (Coffey
and Atkinson 1996: 20). I was able to carry out this research because I was a known entity in
the work environment. I was not viewed as separate from the environment being researched
and this gave me unprecedented access. However, the:
Denial of self has been received as epistemological necessity. At the same time
fieldwork has been taken as a setting and a context for personal growth (Coffey
and Atkinson 1996: 21).
Early in the process I understood that I was engaged in research in a way that Lofland (1984: 17)
describes as ‘studying up’ rather than ‘studying down’. The ongoing power relations between
me and those researched was a conscious part of the process at all levels. Working with my
colleagues, interviewing my colleagues, working with police executives, researching police
executives and finally interviewing influential external commentators on the police
organisation was a constant reminder of the fact that ‘[p]ower differentiation in fieldwork is
concerned with status on a number of levels’ (Coffey and Atkinson 1996: 71).
3.2: Methods and Practice
This research focuses on the need to understand policing and also relate theory as an
explanation of that practice. While I was aware of many practices and theory, the demand for
‘accuracy’, when gathering data, led to combining qualitative and quantitative methods
(Gordon 2003: 179). Examining behaviour that involves corruption is difficult and therefore,
it was essential that the methods applied contributed to valid results. It was necessary to avoid
organisational influences to gather data that only provided a positive story for the benefit of
the employer. 
The focus on accuracy has interpretative implications notably that the areas identified for
research are of particular significance to a large state run organisation (Gunter et al. 1979 :9).
It was important that the interviews must be interpreted accurately and then the statistical data
contribute to an accurate assessment of the situation being studied. The document analysis
undertaken included historical legal and media reports, all of which contributed to the
interpretative analysis. Quantitative methods are used in the sampling and data collection
procedures to systematise interpretation (Gunter et al. 1979: 179). 
As early as the 1950s ethnographers, action researchers, narratologists and other theorists were
calling for the gap between researchers, their subjects and readers to be bridged. More recently,
Clegg and Hardy (1996), Garrick and Rhodes (2000) and Boje (2001) have suggested that
academic writers cannot continue to promulgate their opinion of how things ‘should’ be from
an assumed position of intellectual superiority (Gordon 2003: 178). The NSW police
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organisation sought understanding and also wanted to gain an understanding about this part of
its history. I tried to avoid taking a personal or political view or adopting an attitude taken by
the community. Instead, the alternatives presented are: 
(1) Inductions based on statements made by the individual or group or (2)
inductions based on inferences from the actions of the individual or group (Lenski
1966: 36). 
The work utilises an inductive approach when examining the police world. The initial question
I was grappling with was broad, such as; how does a police organisation respond to a major
review resulting from a crisis situation? At the conclusion and during the process of the
production of results, I applied deductive logic. 
3.3: Methods and Theory
The desire to render the process of qualitative research visible and the associated debate on
validity in qualitative research are certainly connected to the growth of qualitative research
projects, increasing competitiveness in the academic sector, and an emphasis on
accountability, productivity and ethical practice (Holbrook and Butcher 1996: 59).
In summary, contemporary debates and arguments on theory-building in organisational studies
appear to call for writers to adopt research frameworks that will incorporate multiple
viewpoints and reflexive practices, research frameworks that adopt a ‘both/and’ approach to
provide a richer, more balanced account of research settings. These alternative research
frameworks will not privilege a paradigmatic view of how things ‘ought’ to be, but will focus
on how things ‘actually’ are. Accordingly, the research framework developed here attempts to
adopt a both/and approach by drawing on qualitative and quantitative methods, as well as
inductive and deductive methods. It also takes steps towards bridging the gap between theory
and practice (Gordon 2003:175–176).
Can qualitative studies establish causal relationships at all? That possibility is often attacked
from both the right — ‘Only controlled quantitative experiments can do that’ and the left
(‘causality is an unworkable concept in human behaviour — people are not billiard balls’).
The position we take here, is that qualitative studies (see van Maanen 1990) are especially
well suited to finding causal relationships; they can look directly at the local processes
underlying a temporal series of events and states, showing how these led to specific
outcomes, and ruling out rival hypotheses. In effect, we get inside the black box; we can
understand not just that a particular thing happened, but how and why it happened
(Huberman and Miles 1994: 434). 
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My position as a researcher is also that of a police practitioner and student, which meant I was
motivated to try to analyse police practice and to collect data likely to increase and enrich
perception of how police change may occur. As a result, the interview material started from
general questions that led me to start building a theoretical direction. Then, as the theory
developed and contributed in a more complex way to the thesis work, I developed a deductive
process that helped me contribute theoretical suggestions for changes in police management
practice. In the light of the fast-changing nature of business environments (Clegg 1990; Weick
1995), it seemed appropriate to emphasise how the work and research contexts shift; I suggest
that a study of how people theorise in practice would be beneficial. The work of Weick (1995)
one could argue that ‘sense-making’ is a form of practical theorising. When people attempt to
make sense of things, they are theorising. 
This was the central insight that Clegg took from ethno-methodology in his 1975 book Power,
Rule and Domination, when he referred to ‘theorising power’ as something done not just by
professional theorists, but also by lay people. Irrespective of whether one values abstract
theory or views sense-making as practical theorising, it seems safe to say that in the turbulent
business environments of today, management researchers could learn from placing a greater
emphasis on the ways in which contexts shift. To achieve this, however, they would need to
adopt more reflexive approaches to their research work, and it is the reflexive work of
Bourdieu that offers the greater explanation of the personal within cultures rather than just the
description of work place behaviour. 
In Chapter Two it was argued that mainstream management literature is far from reflexive;
quite the contrary, it espouses versions of how things ‘should’ be. As an alternative, Clegg and
Hardy (1996) suggest that no one viewpoint deserves privilege over another, and that to make
such a claim would require one to adopt a sovereign position of power and assume intellectual
superiority. In a cultural sense, this would also be ethnocentric (Haugaard 1997).
Ethnocentricity is increasingly seen as dysfunctional in today’s global business world. Clegg
and Hardy (1996) also add that, in a world made up of diverse religious, cultural and political
viewpoints, researchers need to become more reflexive, to dismantle their paradigmatic
boundaries and converse with other viewpoints (Gordon 2003: 174).
Well-defined objectives are necessary to produce useful and valid measures of performance.
Consistency in reporting the adopted measures is also desirable but was difficult to maintain.
It is certain that future researchers in this area will encounter similar actors, in similar
circumstances, who will still report difficulties with the issues of leadership, corruption and
power relationships etc. This study has sought to create a textured and comprehensive picture
of attempts at reform, rather than approximating a conclusion by reducing complex matters
and attitudes to simplistic conclusions. 
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This meant that the research work was constantly developing. The following section reviews
the aims of this dissertation, linking it to the methods employed and my endeavours to meet
those aims. It will describe changes in direction necessitated by the emergence of new
information during the research period. An outline of the processes by which data were
collected, collated and substantiated will follow and such techniques will be supported by
reference to relevant theorists and a discussion of relevant methodological issues. 
The methods used informed the conclusions that address the very inner workings of individual
police officers dispositions while illuminating the reform process from several points of view.
Combining qualitative and quantitative techniques meant that the credibility of the findings
was developed as the theory informed the results and the results informed the practice of
policing. The techniques exposed by Knafl and Breitmayer (1991) and used here provide a
more complete picture of the phenomenon under study, a technique Eisner (1991: 55) termed
‘structural corroboration’. 
Today, it is accepted that to produce a result, it may be necessary for a number of causes or
conditions to be present (Preece 1994:35). Even relatively straightforward events can have
complex causes and in the aim of reforming police, many events led to its instigation and its
failure to occur. We cannot expect to find simple causes for complicated social phenomena
(Preece 1994:37). It is important to acknowledge the limitations of this research to clearly
delineate causal relationships between associations of patterns of behaviours or reported
statements/opinions (Kellehear 1993: 37). 
I also support my analyses with relevant references to the literature. Correct qualitative
methodology is summarised as follows: 
The careful retention occurred in easily retrievable form, of all study materials,
from raw field notes, through data displays and final report text. The solution,
however, rests on another: a reflexive stance to the conduct of the study that
assumes regular, ongoing, self-conscious documentation of successive versions of
coding schemes, of conceptual arguments among project staff, of analysis -
successful and dead ends (Huberman and Miles 1994: 439). 
During the collation and interpretation process, certain standards, expectations and conformity
to social mores and political constraints were identified. There is an advantage to making
lateral comparisons — for example, between police management and general management
standards — although obtaining common criteria for quality performance is difficult.
Investigating ethical decision-making presented methodological difficulties. Police thinking or
acting corruptly is not an issue that interviewees discuss easily. One best appreciates the
significance of this issue when police officers finally realise that they have been carrying out
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corrupt behaviours and then are empowered to want to change. They are then faced with how
to do that in an organisation that condones an approach that hides corruption.
Methodologically this means that complex answers are given to questions, or no relevant
answers are supplied, or interviewee confidentiality becomes extremely important. Parlett and
Hamilton (1977) and Stake (1983) encourage an eclectic approach to data-gathering, using
more than one method. This enhances the validity of the results (Cronbach, et al., 1980; Guba
and Lincoln 1981; Parlett and Hamilton 1977; Patton 1990; Stake 1983). This methodology,
relying on a variety of sources for data, is congruent with the approach of Cronbach, et al.
(1980), who suggest that a diversity of evidence justifies a broad conclusion. This criterion of
member checking is described by Guba and Lincoln (1981: 239) as the single most crucial
technique for establishing credibility. Credibility was therefore built by an independent
assessment of the data. 
Local knowledge may be recognised as a form of knowledge that is culturally, practically and
contextually significant, and exists independently of, and at the extremity of, a broader social
system. Haugaard’s (1997) interpretation of, ‘practical consciousness’ resonates with
Foucault’s term ‘local knowledge’ (cited in Gordon 2003: 186). 
3.4: Interviewing Methods and Identifying Habitus
Intensive interviewing in this case involved ‘repeated and prolonged contact,’ which involved
listening to details of people’s private as well as public lives (Lofland 1984: 13). Some of the
questions were intended to ‘elicit from the interviewee rich, detailed materials that can be used
in qualitative analysis (Lofland 1984: 12). This was a process of discovery rather than a matter
of determining a foregone conclusion. Guba and Lincoln (1981: 237) describe this as a
substantial involvement which is sufficient to establish rapport and trust. The researcher needs
to be immersed in the context and culture of the organisation. This criterion was met through
the use of a full-time operational and academic police officer as the evaluator.
I interviewed ten executive police members including the present and one past Commissioner
of the NSW Police. I also interviewed employees of the Police Integrity Commission. I
interviewed ten operational general duties police officers of different rank, and three detectives
in Command positions. I carried out one-off interviews with three unsworn and highly placed
administrative personal. Finally, I interviewed two people working in the employment of the
NSW Police Association. I spoke to two consultants who were employed to assist in the reform
process during the years 1996 and 1998. (Except for the last two interviews, all conversations
were recorded on tape). Twenty five in all were transcribed and twenty of those twenty five
were included in the NVIVO analysis process. The people interviewed were all in positions
that could influence the direction of the police organisation except for the operational police.
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The general duties police and detectives were interviewed primarily to gain an insight into how
the Wood Royal Commission had affected their personal lives while working for the police
organisation. 
Working as an operational officer meant that the researcher stayed in contact with the policing
field during the research. The use of story telling as a way of making sense of what is occurring
in the workplace is essential for the method of gaining the reconstruction of the scenario and
the human thought at the time of the event being discussed (Goleman 2000). Officers were
listened to and their opinions about what was happening during the reform period were also
recorded. The researcher’s field notes, made on a tape-recorder, contained personal
experiences and opinions. People’s comments were only recorded in formal interviews where
consent had been given. 
The audio-taped interviews were transcribed. Each tape was reviewed and any common
meaning or idea running through the data was noted. The next step was to review the tapes for
a particular emotion, fact or idea that could be important to the process of reform. In some
cases, an important relationship or outcome for the process of change was indicated by only a
single sentence. This resulted in a summary of that tape being included in the analysis.
The use of qualitative data meant that sentences and words that reflected decision-making
qualities like empowerment had to be coded. In addition, sentences that completely ignored the
question also had to be regarded as significant. The interviews were recorded, transcribed and
then coded. The process is two-dimensional and interpretation of the responses revealed the
cognitive dissonance and internal conflict that employees experienced about their organisation.
The interviews gave people ‘voice’, a ‘voice’ tested by returning to the same or similar questions
about particular themes. I tested the reliability of the answers by seeking corroboration:
interviews were compared in an attempt to find similar issues, rather than just accepting each
answer as a legitimate attempt at ‘a right answer’. Police are practised at answering questions in
a courtroom situation and, as I was from the police workplace, I was able to ease the interviewees
into explaining how they understand their organisation. The thesis records the views of officers
who are used to containing their voices. This research work gave police at all levels and
opportunity to share their experiences of change with someone inside their organisation who was
also being subjected to external/internal demands. I found it difficult when general duties officers
expressed a desire that this research endeavour would change what was happening to them. I could
not state that speaking to me would make a difference to future outcomes. 
The various sections of this work record the historical antecedents, codes of order and
disciplined practices that make up the New South Wales Police Service. The traditions from
which the Service is built are derived from this information. These historical records also
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reveal tensions that prior inquiries have caused. It is from the analysis of the historical
documents that suggestions for future strategies for reform are derived. 
The interviews in the field move between levels of data. The data began as descriptive and then
as complexities developed the questions changed, asking for more specific detail. For instance,
in the first interview, questions are general and relate to the field of policing, such as ‘What do
you consider the word reform means for your organisation?’The interviewee would talk about
her/his general experience of police culture, often in very colloquial language such as ‘We
stick together when the going gets tough’. But as the questions become more detailed I began
to get answers like ‘We have all seen this happen before’, ‘It will pass’ and ‘We will get
through it’ These answers reflected either a tiredness with the interview process or an
unwillingness to engage with the reform process. My interpretation was that it was not so
much interview fatigue as reform fatigue. Those interviewed start to express more details
about the interactions within the workplace.
3.5: Reflexivity
There was an inevitable and unavoidable risk of bias in this approach. To try to avoid personal
bias, I tried to be reflexive in my assessment of whether reform took place; I found important
the process of: 
Reflexivity, that is, part and parcel of ethnographic research while avoiding
sinking into a self absorption that negates the possibility of any knowledge other
than self knowledge (Guba and Lincoln 1981: 199).
Guba and Lincoln (1981) describe the criteria necessary to support the rigour of a study, which
they claim are parallel to those used in conventional research. These criteria are credibility,
transferability, dependability and conformability. These terms apply to the interviews
conducted. Although the attributes of those interviewed do not appear in this work, their
credibility is sustained in their length of commitment to the research and the organisation with
which they worked or were involved. 
Guba and Lincoln (1981) provide the following explanations to clarify the similarities between
the concepts of traditional research and the criteria used in this methodology. The criterion of
internal reliability is considered to be parallel to the criterion of credibility (Guba and Lincoln
1981: 236). External validity is parallel to the criterion of transferability and reliability. These
factors are also considered by Guba and Lincoln to be the parallel of dependability.
Objectivity, although not the aim of this methodology, is, in some ways, similar to the question
of whether the research can be confirmed (Guba and Lincoln 1981: 242). Confirmation means
the extent to which others can verify conclusions. 
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Objectivity allows for clear observation. The researcher has attempted to be objective;
however, to be absolutely objective is not possible, particularly when you are researching your
own work environment. Great care must be taken to observe, identify, measure and identify
one’s own responses during the research process (Preece 1994: 38). 
This process of examining data and my own role retrospectively was crucial in that: 
a turning back on oneself, a process of self-reference: in the context of social
research, reflexivity at its most immediately obvious level refers to the ways in
which the products of research are affected by the personnel and process of doing
research (Guba and Lincoln 1981: 4).
I have included interview data in my research as it is impossible to accurately assess police
organisations solely via statistical graphs. Interviews with police in the organisation and
observers outside the organisation allowed discussion at a deeper level than would normally
occur regarding significant areas such as culture, reform and police corruption. Print media
reports have not been used extensively, as they represent only a part of the external view of the
reform process. However, it would be a weakness in the research to fail to refer to them at least
in terms of media reporting of the Wood Royal Commission. 
The qualitative data involved analysing tapes where words associated with positive
management were clearly absent. The absence of words of encouragement reflected evidence
of those words not being part of a police officer’s internal language. The attempt to
empirically identify the concept of habitus(individual disposition) was challenging and
resulted in identifying themes of punitive management rather than positive comments.
However, there were two relevant sources of data: personal experience and interviews that
identified issues such as work avoidance, work security and the regard in which senior
officers were held. The work of Morse (1999) is referred to here to assist in describing the
methodology used. The interviews highlighted the story line and functions of the individual.
Personal experiences were recorded on tape-recorder and later transcribed. I transcribed my
thoughts as a method of engaging in reflective thought on the specific issue of what was the
effect of my position in the field and how was it affecting the research process? These
discussions concerned the potential conflict between my actions as an employed police officer
and my report on police corruption. My employment conditions place my actions under the
Police Regulation Act and I had to obey my legal obligations under the Act, as otherwise I
could be subjected to disciplinary processes (Inspector Robert Martin, Internal Affairs, was my
reporting officer for this specific process).
The interviews followed a semi-structured format. Each began with a general discussion of the
interviewees’ policing history, where they were positioned at the beginning of the Royal
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Commission and their views of police corruption at that time. The interviewees were then
asked to comment on the difficulties or problem areas in their present position and on their
possible influence on the reform process and on the development of a changing organisation.
The interviews were conducted over a period of five years. As a relationship of trust was
established, the interviews developed in content, type of questions and depth. They became
more relaxed, and the context of the discussions broadened to encompass very complex
problems. Finally, the interviews were used to test the relevance and explanatory power of the
models proposed. 
The subjects were positioned at the executive level of the NSW police service. They were
directly responsible for implementing reform strategies within the organisation. They were
accountable to the police minister and parliament. They consented to interviews over a five-
year period. They were interviewed four times per year for approximately one hour at a time.
Each time the person was recorded on a tape machine and the researcher had prepared notes
prior to the interview from the previous interview to check responses. The researcher also took
notes during the interview to highlight important points throughout the interview and prompt
the responder to answer the actual question. 
Other interviewees were highly placed in government and public institutions. Their work was
directly related to influencing change within the NSW police organisation at the time, during
and post the Wood Royal Commission. Their positions were political, powerful and
influential. They were guaranteed anonymity, which was maintained during the research
process for all respondents. These interviews took place once a year usually for at least one
to one and a half hours.
3.6: Limitations to the Interviewing Process
It was imperative to ‘manage the self in order to conduct fieldwork successfully’ (Coffey and
Atkinson 1996: 5). I consulted with another police worker/observer within the organisation on
issues such as confidentiality and the possibility of that confidentiality being broken. This
consultation occurred during data collection and data analysis. The person assisted as the
levels of analysis deepened in process and meaning. The officer knew the participants being
interviewed but did not know whose interviews they were reading. At various points I asked
the reviewer to attempt to identify the person recorded according to the content of their
interview and in all cases, although the reviewer was convinced they knew whose comments
they were reading, they were incorrect every time. Member checking enables stakeholders
(police interviewed) to correct errors in fact or interpretation to provide additional information,
to agree that the evaluator is accurately representing stakeholder views and to confirm the
findings without their position in the organisation being revealed. 
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I did not check with the participants whether I had accurately recorded their comments
while I was taping the interviews, because the questions were repeated over time which
meant that their answers could be authenticated. However, as we know, what people say
and what they do is not necessarily the same thing. This research encountered the difficulty
that some of the participants’ actions cannot be available for public analysis. So I have
relied heavily on documentation to produce greater knowledge about the police world. The
documents also contributed to the development of the results and conclusions drawn from
the data, when integrated.
Sometimes the examples presented in the results section were exceptional; for example, the
exact quote from Peter Ryan would not usually be presented, but then also some recorded
comments were unexpected, such as an executive member openly discussing desiring the
Commissioner’s position in the organisation. Morse (1999) offers legitimacy to the unexpected
being recorded in the narrative of those interviewed and how powerful these narrations can be
(Morse 1999: 4). At a particularly stressful time there would be themes like: ‘They are out to
get me’, or ‘The crocodiles are waiting to bite’. Over time, however, the interviews ‘funnel’
from the general to the specific (Morse 1999: 4). I analysed the multiple interviews and
selected a sample of the most relevant (twenty five interviews) for the results section. 
Evaluating the interview tapes involved an extensive examination of the information gathered;
however, the evaluation does go into areas described by Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992) as
appreciation, which are, by his definition, acts of ‘camaraderie’. This idea means that the
actual working practices involved in describing work rules etc are not included in the interview
data. Nor does it reveal what police do (action), nor does it look at people’s perception of how
the processes of police work are done such as technology attributes, but thoughts on such
affects as fear and innovation are recorded. 
The next step was to slowly bring the questions around to specific examples of the
interviewees’ experience of corruption and reform, and sometimes of ‘worst case’ or ‘best
practice’ scenarios. Specifically coded words or themes would draw out the elements
common to the respondents’ experiences. For example, the absence of certain words, such as
‘reward’, ‘positive’, ‘encouraging’ and ‘mentoring’ indicated these were not in general use
across the management strata of the police community. So, as the analysis moves from the
general to the specific, the methods also enabled me to identify the field and apply the
concepts to the habitus.
The people interviewed were upper-level managers, whose personal attributes, background,
formal education and specific training for the job were known to the researcher. This study
involves participants’ past and continuing experience, educational and personal development
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and managerial skills, methods, style and leadership ability. While these police professionals
are viewed as relatively autonomous, they do have ancillary staff and expert backup. The
police commanders are viewed as individuals, although as managers/commanders they operate
as part of a hierarchy. 
At this point I must also declare that there were people who were very well placed, based on
their work experience, to comment on policing and reform that were also guaranteed
confidentiality. These people asked that their tape-recorded conversations be used but not
directly quoted at any time and destroyed after a period of time that they determined. There
was also a very sensitive issue concerning three people who were interviewed and whose
recorded conversations contained serious allegations which had to be dealt with formally. 
There were also deliberate attempts by some individuals to interfere with the location of the
tapes and reveal their content during the research process. There were also elements of
personal vilification towards me as the research took place but that was not from interviewees,
at any time. I was regarded as carrying out an important piece of work, my interviews were
scheduled so that they did not take place when the respondents were extremely busy and the
personal assistants made sure that the respondents did, as requested, have their points of view
and experiences recorded. I received a high level of cooperation from those being interviewed.
This view is supported by the level of time and commitment respondents gave to the interview
process. Perhaps it was inversely proportional to the level of disdain that I experienced from
persons not engaged in the process because they were not at the highest level of decision
making. However, as I was working as a general duties operational Senior Constable and then
as an Acting Inspector for twelve months, I also interviewed general duties and investigative
officers that were working at that level in the organisation. 
Initially, I had 120 tapes of recorded interviews. As the interviews and theory became more
concise, the focus on specific interviews narrowed to the relationship between the individual
officers and the command management system. As the key indicator of command and control
kept reoccurring it became increasingly clear, that a streamlining of the empirical data was
possible so the interview number included in the final presentation of the thesis was dropped
to twenty-two tapes. The tapes that were often one hour in length and repeated with the same
respondent over several years, recorded reflective and purposeful comments rather than just
reactions to events. 
Content analysis of the interview material involved deciding on certain categories from the
questions, the sample of recordings, and the selected time period of the sampling. All these
factors contributed to an observation of police that hinged on their personal reports of what
was happening to them as individuals and as workers in the police organisation (Kellehear
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1993: 36). Those people I interviewed had comprehensive narratives and the ‘merging of
stories facilitate [d] the development of a generalized story’ (Morse 1999: 8). There were at
times emotional responses wherein police committed to a course of action would very
forcefully argue in support of it. For instance, an interviewee slammed the table and stood up
and over the researcher to make sure the point made had been understood. On other occasions
a story led to vulnerability or sadness, reflected in increased gaps and omissions in the tapes,
hence the coding for non-responsive answers. 
Each person interviewed had a different level of sophistication or understanding about the
organisation in which s/he worked. No attempt was made to inform or change that view. The
aim was to record their perspectives and beliefs as well as their actions in response to those
beliefs. I attempted to record without engaging or in any way influencing the outcomes of the
interviews, no matter what the relative position held by the respondent was. There were
occasions when it became apparent that an answer was politically motivated. Data was not
discarded if the respondent’s purpose was doubtful. Instead, it was put aside for later use if
required (Morse 1999: 8).
3.7: Document Analysis and Identification of the Social Field
The field studied for this thesis is the police work environment and, within that field, I am
interested in the individuals engaged in police work and how that work as a dynamic
occupation interacts with the public/private domain. Documents for analysis were provided by
different sections of the Police Service.
Documents examined included, each strategic policy written during the period of 1996 to
2001. The ministerial updates that went from the reform group to the Police Minister’s office
on a monthly basis were reviewed through the period of 1997 to 1999. Executive officers
occasionally supplied me with documents that were confidential that they thought should be
included in the data collection process. For example, a work contract agreement. 
I examined all previous Royal Commission reports. I also looked at the police responses to
those Royal Commission reports. I examined any evidence available in newspapers, journal
articles or parliamentary reports (Hansard) on past Royal Commissions and Inquiries. At the
time the NSW Police Headquarters, which was were I was located, had a library holding
some of the material. Royal Commissions, Inquiries, Hansard and government documents
relating to past inquiries are referred to in Appendices G and H. New South Wales Policy
Documents are referred to in Appendix I. Strategic Statements, Annual Reports, Police
Integrity Reports, Royal Commission Findings and Ombudsman Reports were utilised for
official police responses to the Wood Royal Commission. Internal police documentation was
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a source of the formal internal response of the Police Service both to corruption and to
reform recommendations and their implementation. Rather than relying solely on the
interview material, official documentary evidence of decisions made by the Executive, in
particular, was available for assessment. 
These documents made available official information about, and analyses of, the reform
process for comparison with the interviews and statistics. The documents were read and
evaluated against the conceptual framework provided in the Wood Royal Commission’s
agenda for reform. They were also examined in the light of the inconsistency between the
documents and the agenda of change. I analysed the documents and asked the question: How
does the theory behind this document relate to policing practice? It was necessary to judge
whether reforming changes had actually occurred and whether these changes were significant.
Financial data covering budgeting, staffing decisions and the support offered to various
departments were obtained through discussions with the financial sections of the Police
Service. As with the impact of media coverage discussed in the following section, the
emphasis on financial restrictions became more relevant as time passed. The allegations of
political interference or lack of political support were frequent and often tied to financial
situations. Consequently, it was necessary to consider such data. Financial details were
provided by an internal section of the police service (see Appendix J).
3.8: Statistics and the Location of the Field
Statistical graphs have been included to represent how external evaluators such as the
Bureau of Crime Statistics and government bodies assess traditional police organisations. As
later detailed in the statistics of work performance, these are also used internally by police
as major indicators of whether police are doing the work they are supposed to be doing. The
statistics appearing in this thesis are descriptive and simply offer patterns of work activity.
The work may be affected by seasons, or political considerations or budget restraints.
However, often governments will utilise statistics to justify the way they allocate police
resources and police departments and governments will say the problem has been addressed.
In some cases, outside stakeholders will use the statistics as a way to offer a two-dimensional
view about complex issues, for example, about police corruption, although the statistical data
is not reliable. Instead, the data has been extrapolated by those within the Service as a
simplified statistical representation of police work.
Statistical data covering the years 1997 to 2004 inclusive were obtained with the assistance of
the senior police statistician, Mr James Baldwin. This collection led to an analysis of recorded
operational responses to the Wood Royal Commission. The statistical data presented was useful,
82
THE NATURE OF THE GAME — NSW POLICE REFORM 1996-2004  •  CHAPTER THREE  METHODOLOGY
as it exemplified the means by which police, the Bureau of Crime Statistics, government and
various other organisations assess police services, as well as providing clear evidence when
combined with data from other sources. The statistics also contributed to the development and
direction of the research. As the interviews, documentation and statistics were interwoven in
analysis, a multi-dimensional picture of the reform process emerged. Examples of information
that contributed to this picture were the number of police employed, and in what divisions, during
and after the Wood Royal Commission, and details regarding the procedures then in place for
formal performance assessment procedures. The levels of corruption recorded within the
Department and the levels of community support for reform were examined at the same time. 
It is important to note that the internal departmental statistical data is not sophisticated, but
purely descriptive. It is the type of data used by government departments to assess police
performance rather than being used as one tool analysis of performance. The community does
rely on the statistical data to account for police operational performance. This dissertation does
not detail or rely solely on these types of data. Although useful, statistical data needs the
balancing influence of interview responses to reveal the complexities of police life,
particularly when issues such as police corruption are examined. 
3.9: Media coverage and Community Responses
Commissioner Ryan had provided me with written permission to obtain any data I needed for
the research within the Service. However, it was a constant battle to obtain data and nearly
impossible to get any assistance in retrieving historical data. Documentation giving me
approval was ignored and at one stage I was reported to senior police as acting inappropriately,
given my rank in the organisation. 
I was already having difficulty obtaining data except, during the interview process. The
importance of the collection of data other than interview material was important. For instance,
the media would often be mentioned during the interviews. I then embarked on collecting over
1,000 print media articles for the study. These print articles tended to fall into certain
categories such as: Commissioner Ryan, police reform, police and culture. The articles were
collected between 1997 and 2001. The collection, beginning at the same time as the other areas
of research, became equally important as issues developed in the interviews. The main sources
were newspapers from New South Wales, especially The Daily Telegraph and The Sydney
Morning Herald. 
The relationship between the police organisation and the media is not one that can be
controlled or manipulated in a particular direction. However, the power of the media to distract
leaders, or the ability of commentators to influence decision making are included in small
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sections to highlight a point. The media is unlikely in its relationship with the police to cause
the police to act in a certain way, except in instances when the media assists in solving a crime.
Nevertheless, the media was a constant source of comment by the executive, and the period
was clearly characterised by an intensive media focus on the workings of the Police Service.
The media comments became relevant when an interviewee would mark as important an event
which had either been printed prior to the interview, or was written up in the media after the
interview had been given. 
Although in the scope of this thesis the media analysis could not be exhaustive, it nevertheless
assessed the influence (positive or negative) that this external scrutiny had upon the organisation.
Even if no definite conclusion could be reached regarding the exact causal relationship between
the media and the reform process, this was an important perspective to consider.
3.10: Interviewing and NVivo Software Tools
The first level of analysis pertained to just the interview-sourced data, and employed the NVivo
QSR software. The NVivo computer software enhances the interpretation process, enabling
both quantitative and qualitative search tools to analyse the data. NVivo is a useful qualitative
tool that allows the researcher to identify key concepts, and to assist in the analysis of the data.
The identified areas in this study were mentions of corruption, change, reform, morale and
leadership. These were the primary categories into which data were sorted for analysis. 
Field notes and tape recordings of the interviews were transcribed and loaded into NVivo.
This software provides a range of tools for handling data records and information about
these records, browsing and annotating text, visually coding text as well as accurately and
swiftly gaining access to data records. NVivo also has tools that allow the researcher to
record and link ideas about the data and to search and explore patterns in those data. The
software is designed to remove the rigid divisions between data and interpretation, providing
numerous ways of interconnecting parts of a research project (Richards 2000, cited in
Gordon 2003: 221). NVivo allows the researcher to create databases in a Project, Record and
Nodal tree-structure. All the interview and field note transcripts become the files that make
up a ‘project’; each transcript is recognised as a ‘record’; and each record is coded as ‘nodes’
and ‘sub nodes’. By way of further clarification, each interview and field note transcript has
its own record name and set of distinguishing attributes, for example, date, type of
interaction (interview, meeting, observation, etc.) and position title (the position of the
participating officer/s) (Gordon 2003: 222).
The raw data was open-coded, which means that each paragraph of a transcribed text is
allocated or referenced with codes. These are categorised with respect to a node which
becomes a part of the project’s overarching database node-tree-structure (see Figure 3.1). The
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reference codes selected to become the nodes and sub-nodes of each record need to resonate
with the rationale for the research and methodological framework (Gordon 2003: 222). The
way these referenced codes were selected will be discussed later.
Another question raised is whether research will be improved by the use of software. Most
commentators conclude that it is too early to judge. So far the most positive answer is that the
software improves validity, particularly what might be described as interpretative and
theoretical validity as well as universality, although such claims would have very little appeal
to those qualitative researchers who reject the notion of validity outright (Holbrook and
Butcher 1996: 58).
The following Figure 3.1 shows the nodes and sub-nodes that were used to code the interviews.
These nodes were developed after a series of initial interviews had taken place and themes were
already becoming apparent through the conversations. The coding process was also used to
identify situations in which interviewees did not answer a question. This does not mean that s/he
actually refused to answer but would ignore the question and engage in discourse that avoided
the question asked. In the node structure, discourse and resistance to discourse are noted. 
The nodes listed below detail some of the sets of categories of people interviewed. The police
and their actions were identified in several categories. These groups contained subjects who were
commissioned and non-commissioned. Some subjects were highly placed individuals who were
closely associated with the Royal Commission and the Police Integrity Commission. Community
members included senior political and public servants directly involved in police reform during
the period of the research. The majority of media commentators were inside the police service.
The code indicating the way people behaved was exclusively based on interviews with senior
executive police. A sample of fifteen senior officers was interviewed several times over a five-
year period. The coding involving the supervision of police and policing activities occurred
mostly among the operational police interviewed. 
The recording and coding of police structures and systems was based on interviews within the
senior executive ranks, in particular the top five positions within the police service at that time.
Comments that attracted these codes specifically mentioned the influence of police statistics
as one example, or perhaps the culture as a system of bad or good as another example. 
Nvivo provides the technological support to identify key themes in large amounts of interview
material. As mentioned key themes underlying the work were identified and formed a
foundation to the initial coding system which developed over time. Following is a figure that
depicts the ‘coding tree’ implemented via the Nvivo technology. 
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Figure 3.1: All Nodes in Set
Created: 11/02/1998
Modified: 26/03/2000
Number of Notes: 200
(1)(1) Discourse
(1 1) discourse/resistance
(2)(2) Actors
(2 1) actions/sergeants
(2 2) actors/headquarters
(2 5) actors/media
(2 9) actors/community
(3) Ways of acting
(3 1) ways of acting/encouraging
(3 2) ways of acting/supporting
(3 3) ways of acting/blocking
(3 4) ways of acting/resistance
(3 5) ways of acting/ethical
(3 6) ways of acting/forcing
(4) Activity
(4 1) activity/supervision
(4 2) activity/policing
(5) System
(5 1) system/structure
(5 2) system/role
(5 3) system/culture
(5 4) system/statistics
(9) Issues
(9 1) issues/corruption
(9 2) issues/change
(9 3) issues/reform
(9 7) issues/morale
(9 8) issues/leadership
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3.11: Limitations
Although the objectives for reforming the police service are written down and documented,
it is difficult to make a clear assessment of whether change has actually occurred in (police)
practice. Documentation provided by the Police Service was often a statement of where it
wanted to be rather than of where it actually was. The Service’s analysis detailed what
professional leaders considered consensual, ideal, good or acceptable practice. Sometimes
these practices involved identifying conformity to professional norms and standards of
practice, although these practices did not necessarily lead to reform. 
I was tested by realising that honesty and accuracy in reporting my data was crucial even
though I had a long, personal commitment to the organisation. I needed to understand that
an honest appraisal of the organisation was important and possible because of an historic
connection to the issues. In other words, from my extended period of contact with the place
studied, my credibility was based on not being ‘different’ from those researched. It was this
credibility as an operational officer and academic that supported the Commissioner’s
decisions that allowed the research to continue. 
The purpose of the evaluation was to assess whether change in policing practice had
occurred or was occurring, an assessment made from several different areas. It was assumed
that the executives and administrators interviewed were professional people who had the
insight and ability to contribute to the change process, or at least that they were in a position
of power from which they could make changes or influence outcomes. It was assumed that
they were policing experts, at least in terms of the New South Wales Police Service.
3.12: Issues Specific to the Research Context
The responsibility for reform appeared to be placed with the senior leaders and they were
expected to make noticeable and measurable changes. Official approval for this research
was forthcoming on the basis that the work may help assist accountability for the police
executive as they attempted reform. The approach adopted was to cover several of the
elements that make up internal and external police work such as; the personal, the private,
policy and public scrutiny. In undertaking the research, I ambitiously looked at several
methods to obtain reliable and valid information, including simply observing behaviours
and responses to questions. The acknowledgement of the views of a number of key
stakeholders was intended to enhance the credibility of the findings. However, it was
important to understand that:
One of the major sources of error in questionnaires and interviews [is that the
interviewer] believes what respondents say they do or does not believe what the
respondents say they do (Kellehear 1993: 6). 
87
THE NATURE OF THE GAME — NSW POLICE REFORM 1996-2004  •  CHAPTER THREE  METHODOLOGY
As mentioned in the previous chapter, two audiences had to be catered to: first, my
employer, the NSW Police and, second, the requirements of the examiners of the thesis.
The theoretical concepts were tested in the field. Police officers had the capacity to
understand and engage with the notion of ‘habitus’. Their contributions to the discussions
were very responsive to the inherent notions of dispositions and private dilemmas. The
results were obtained by synthesising the key issues and main themes in those discussions.
The research had many practical issues and as I explain the data collection methods it must
also be noted that I was required to formally report to the Commissioner as a separate
exercise from my work on this thesis. The data collected had implications for contemporary
policing practice as the thesis work developed. 
I encountered serious ethical issues as I moved physically, intellectually and legally
between different police environments. Confidentiality, anonymity, fears of discovery of
data, personal safety, and covert activity all became part of the research activity. I had a
high level of responsibility to those interviewed, to the organisation I worked for and to
myself in terms of my own personal beliefs. Also, my relationship with those interviewed
could at times involve a passionate plea particularly from the general duties police for the
research to make a difference to difficulties in the workplace. I felt commiteed to my work
and my research. The process of reflection was important.
Qualitative research, because it is more likely to be reflexively exploring
everyday/every night lives must continually confront questions of the nature
and assumptions of the knowledge we are producing, and who we are producing
it (Watson 2003: 21).
The chief possible limitation of the research was that the original data would be distorted
by analysis and collation; however, I avoided this as much as possible. When I wrote up the
thesis I deliberately refrained from including quotes from participants as the only way of
giving police a voice in this research. Police as readers of the research are familiar with
comments about their workplace and the thesis argument was not only reliant on directly
quoting participants. However, there are some direct quotes presented in the results chapter
where the quotes exemplify an argument that answers any of the questions initially asked
in chapter one. However, I have not relied on direct quoting in presenting this thesis. Lay
observers as the thesis developed were interested in the words of the police officers
interviewed. Rather, the themes in the quotes have contributed to the development of
understanding of reactions, actions, social structures and systems that contribute to the
theory application. I also avoided including quotes except in the results chapter to prevent
disrupting the flow of the research presentation; however, the quotes appearing in the
results chapter are included when they represent a general theme that points to a specific
finding. Watson (2003) argues: 
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The written record must reflect the aims and intentions of the study as must all
other aspects of the research (2003: 36). 
I attempted to limit the variables possible in each interview and tried to standardise the
approach as strictly as possible. This was also attempted in any repeated interviewing of
the same participant, the aim of which was not to generate new material but to confirm
material the participants had previously provided. This process again was limited by
applying a selective approach to the qualitative data as the research did result in an
abundance of data. However, ethical considerations mixed with responsibilities to my
employer and the research processes have resulted in an explorative development of this
work. My location in the context of the research was a distinct advantage. I was part of and
trusted by participants in this period of reform and turmoil. I understood really intimate
‘group meanings’ (Kellehear 1993: 8). As Watson (2003) suggests above, the written record
provides the greater net for retrieving important information. 
3.13: Conclusion
This study includes an evaluation of social conditions, opinions and attitudes. It has been
my aim to use experience, observe objectively and be capable of identifying the important
relevant explanation of social change. Having weighed the evidence and considered the
alternatives, evaluators and primary stakeholders make their sampling decisions,
sometimes painfully, but always recognising that there are no perfect designs. The
sampling strategy must be selected to fit the purpose of the study, the resources available,
the questions being asked and the constraints faced. This also holds true for the sample size
(Patton 1990: 183). 
Qualitative indicators were linked to the quantitative data, except that instead of being
numerical they were social patterns – themes in decision-making. They revealed patterns
of problem-solving through a series of extensive interviewing techniques. This research
does not deal in certainties. It addresses human dynamics, decision-making and the failure
to make decisions. Policing work has no certainties; it is dynamic, conflicting and
changing. At the same time there is an honest recognition that I am subjective about aspects
of the subject matter, as at this point I have worked for the organisation for twenty-three
years. As a result of my location in it this research is a mix of quantitative and rich
qualitative research as a method to avoid biased results. The different approaches ensure
that the findings are not based on a single, cursory exploration, but rather on a sustained
and critical appraisal, the requirement of which was met through the process of the use of
several research approaches. Methodological uses of multiple types of data, which may be
qualitative and quantitative, are useful to address the same research problem (Banik 1993;
Morse 1991). In the process of this research I used qualitative and quantitative methods at
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the same time (Field and Morse 1985). During the research process, however, it became
clear that the methods employed were providing results that informed the theory and
supported Bourdieu’s notion that the field and the habitus were interdependent.
In order to incorporate insights into research practice, individual ethnographers in the field
and out of it must seek to develop forms of research that fully acknowledge and utilise
subjective experience as an intrinsic part of research (Guba and Lincoln 1981: 5).
Gordon (2003) states:
A number of secondary methodological issues are considered in this research;
such as how to deal with the qualitative/quantitative dichotomy, the
‘interpretative leap’ the research requires, and why theoretical sampling
procedures are employed (Gordon 2003: 168).
The ‘interpretative leap’ mentioned above was, in this case, the conclusion that little or no
meaningful progress had been made in eradicating corruption from the New South Wales
Police Service. Qualitative (anecdotal, personal interview responses and media coverage)
and quantitative (statistics and the public record) data and information combined in a
sometimes difficult partnership to support this proposition. I can again refer to the print
media who acknowledged the cyclical nature that needed to be explored: 
Astounding revelations this week have shown that despite all the reforms since
the Wood Royal Commission a new generation of corrupt cops has emerged
(Sydney Morning Herald 13th October 2001 p.51).
The results presented in Chapter 4 were obtained by corroboration during the interviews
and by drawing connections between the empirical and qualitative material. It is important
for the researcher to acknowledge that certain observations may be in error and that
accounts of the same event may vary from individual to individual (Preece 1994: 38). 
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CHAPTER FOUR
Responding to the Inquiry: Restoring Command and Reasserting Control
4.1: Introduction
Using the data collected during this research, this chapter will describe the way in which the
police executive tried to address the issues raised during the Wood Royal Commission and
how this process was dealt with both personally and as an institution by police officers at all
levels of the hierarchical structure of the police organisation. Unfortunately, as will be seen,
this executive response had little to do with major management reform and everything to do
with reinforcing control at those points at which the police performance had been found to be
failing. Reform was, therefore, piecemeal to say the least, with responses targeted towards
those key areas that had presented ‘soft targets’ for the judiciary, the media and the angry
community. Throughout this chapter and the next the interview material collected for this
research will be used extensively to demonstrate how police at different levels of the hierarchy
viewed and experienced this reform process and their responses to these fundamentally
punitive reforms that were seemingly being thrust upon them by the force of circumstances,
changing their working lives in important, if ineffectual and often even obstructive ways. In
the process the organisation not only retained but also exacerbated its problem areas and
policing itself became less efficient and certainly a lot more stressful. This chapter, therefore,
draws a picture of the purely technical response of a police organisation in crisis; a response
fuelled primarily by urgency and necessity and, therefore, incapable of producing truly
meaningful change. 
As the opening salvos of the Wood Royal Commission were relayed with great detail in the
media, the executive of the New South Wales Police Service went into damage control mode.
In a highly political comment giving apparent support to the need for reform the NSW Police
Association President stated at the time of the Wood Royal Commission that this inquiry ‘into
police corruption has exposed current police practices and the need for their reform, restoring
community confidence in the police and the role of the police’ (Alexander and Burgess 
1999: 383). Simultaneously, the association also moved to have its members come under
Federal awards to escape the Commissioner’s powers. Even as he spoke the battle lines were
being drawn between the police organisation and the rest of the community, especially the
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clearly very powerful rival forces of the judiciary and the highly politicised whistle-blowers
expounding at length through the media to a horrified audience. The police service shut down
and tightened internal control to repel the enemy but they had no option but to fight a defensive
campaign. With open-ness demanded by the media, the executive’s public response was
designed to showcase a willingness for accountability and compliancy with judicial findings
but within the beleaguered organisation secrecy and suspicion dominated and grew
commensurately as the inquiry unfolded its saga of dreadful condemnation. 
This was a situation hardly conducive to the rational measured response that could have
resulted in very necessary reforms. Instead technical and essentially cosmetic change was
introduced in the form of an order passed down through the hierarchy. Command lines were
strengthened in a desperate attempt to secure loose cannons to prevent any new outbreaks of
whistle-blowing. And periodic ritual sacrifices were offered and eagerly accepted by a media
that wanted retribution. 
Government will continue with a plan to put state’s top 40 police officers on
monthly contracts as they become renewable, pending the outcome of the Wood
Royal Commission (The Herald Sun, 28 December, 1995: 17). 
The sacrifices were clearly necessary and as the inquiry continued suspicion joined dread at
every level of the hierarchy. The fact that even the Police Commissioner Tony Lauer, who had
tendered an acrimonious resignation in January 1996, could be caught up in the fallout from
the judicial process, was not a prospect that bred complacency. As the head of this now
extremely controversial organisation since the retirement of Commissioner John Avery in
1991, Lauer‘s predicament was made untenable during revelations about the Criminal
Investigation Branch which was being widely alleged to be riddled with corruption. In an
effort to restore public confidence in the police organisation the New South Wales Labor
Government decided to appoint a new commissioner who had no chance of being embroiled
in the unfolding drama and Peter Ryan was recruited from England, arriving with a reform
agenda that was welcomed by the media and dreaded by the hierarchy in equal measure. 
The purge that resulted from this new appointment created panic in an already fearful chain of
command. Police executive performance appraisals, contracts of employment and employment
security became dependent on the ability to avoid being contaminated by connections with
anyone who had any possibility of allegations being made against them. In this highly
politicised environment the politically ‘sound’ survived, regardless of whether or not they had
any demonstrated level of management or operational ability. It was felt that Commissioner
Ryan’s first decisions were based on eliminating police who were identified as loyal ‘mates’
to the outgoing Commissioner and removing anyone who might become a political liability. In
this process several senior officers were effectively ‘sacked’ when their work contracts were
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not renewed. The sackings and resignations of officers who had served in the force for decades
and were alleged to be ‘corrupt’ was treated as a victory in the media.
Assistant Commissioner Ray Donaldson became the highest placed victim of the
Wood Royal Commission into police corruption when it was announced his
contract would not be renewed (The Australian, 13 February, 1996: 4). 
Although the number of police remaining within command structures apparently stayed fairly
static, in most cases it was lower than the numbers estimated as necessary to meet the local
area needs. From 1 July, 1996, the restructuring implemented by Commissioner Ryan resulted
in a flatter management structure. This was a time when many senior staff, were sacked from
their positions, and consequently their belief in job security at the top of the organisation was
shaken. Brown recorded this process:
While not making specific published findings against individuals, the Inquiry
resulted in a significant number of police being dismissed or resigning ... and
cleared the grounds for later dismissals, and possible prosecutions or internal
disciplinary actions (1997: 221).
Despite these actions, however, the crisis refused to be put to rest. In fact, media reports
ensured that it continued to gain momentum in an era supposedly rendered safer by the
appointment of a new Commissioner from outside the existing police service. In the face of
the fresh allegations of corruption still billowing from the media long after the new
commissioner had taken up the appointment it seemed that nothing could stop the outbreak of
fresh allegations and more whistle-blowing.
NSW police are continuing to lie and distort evidence in criminal cases despite the
practice being exposed by the Wood Royal Commission (Sydney Morning Herald,
21 July, 1997: 1).
Five years after the Wood Royal Commission exposed some degree of corruption
in the NSW police force, there is fresh evidence being gathered, some presented
here, which suggests corruption still exists within the force even under the new
Commissioner. There are those who believe some degree of police corruption will
always exist (The Bulletin, 30 October 2001 v.119 n. 6299).
Stealing amounts such as $250,000 (Senior Constable D.Ryan), obtaining benefits
by deception, lying under oath, and fabrication of evidence in order to obtain a
benefit (cited in Police Integrity Commission Report to Parliament on Operation
Sandvalley 2006). 
The media highlighted the idea that corruption was so entrenched as to be virtually
ineradicable and even a ‘further purge of corrupt officers’ (Brown 1997: 222) could not meet
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the stringent demands of a community saturated with sensational media stories. The fact that
senior police were seen to be admitting that there were ‘issues’ officers still needed to address
gave fresh fuel for investigation. If Tony Lauer’s initial attempt at flat denial followed by
cautious admission of the existence of a ‘limited problem’ had met with denunciation, the
admission that there were major problems to be solved, if less controversial, was seen as a
cause for alarm. During a 1996 interview Peter Ryan declared that he was sick of hearing about
things in the past:
I want to draw a line in the sand and get on with it, look forward and upwards and
outwards, and build on what is, not continue to ridicule (3801/08/11/1996).
Unfortunately this was not to be an allowed option for five years after the both the Wood
Report and the advent of the new Police Commissioner there were still problems. And, during
interviews with police executives it became increasingly obvious that external influences on
the police during the reform period was creating a lot of these problems. 
I think there’s a different set of rules being applied. They are much more, in my
mind, conventional than what has traditionally applied here. The Royal
Commission has said in its interim report, and I think it will say again in its final
report, that there is far too strong a connection between the politicians and the
union officials and the administration. The lines have become blurred, such that
inappropriate messages and expectations are sent and delivered
(3801/08/11/1996).
During the early part of Commissioner Ryan’s appointment he tackled the notion of leadership
and the issue of turning the organisation around by directly communicating with the
government about the need for him alone to direct change. As a criminologist, Brown wrote at
the time:
Much of the responsibility for the process of change rests with the new Police
Commissioner, Peter Ryan, who has been given extraordinary powers to remove
officers ... . (1997: 222). 
It is clear that the police organisation was exercising a politicised approach to reform in order
to aid its survival rather than executing a well thought out plan to implement very necessary
change. At this time the Westminster system of the separation of powers between the police,
the judiciary and the government had become blurred within the community. And at the same
time that the organisation was proclaiming open-ness and accountability, it was really closing
its ranks and exerting more control over its officers and distancing itself more and more from
the judiciary as well as the community it was supposed to serve. Executive police were acutely
aware of the extent of these external pressures within the police organisation. In the words of
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one senior officer Commissioner Ryan’s position had fundamentally changed from that
exercised by Tony Lauer.
… what his [Ryan’s] statement says and what he says to the people around the
organisation, subsequently, will fundamentally change the balance of power I
think in terms of the Police Commissioner. It brings with it of course huge
responsibility. In many respects the Government says, ‘Well we’re giving you
everything which you asked for. Now we’ll be sitting watching, just to see how you
use it (confidential).
The pervading atmosphere of hostility where a highly politicised police commissioner clashed
head-on with the police organisation at this time is described by another executive police
officer in the comment that the police service ‘isn’t a democratic institution or benevolent
society created for the benefit of the membership (Confidential).This comment reflects a view
that the leadership and observers within the police executive were not interested in
approaching the issues of reform in any deeper or more complex way than sacking or applying
punitive measures using the shorthand that all of these actions were purely in the interests of
operational efficiency. 
It will also be a strong test for response of the Service, because what has been put
at round tables [at the Royal Commission] what has been put to the Commissioner
as he’s travelled widely is, you know, an identification that … that the performance
by people who have been through assessment centres for executive development
has been genuinely on the lower end of the spectrum … it has been compounded
that people who have done poorly have subsequently received significant
promotions (confidential).
Executive team members and external consultants did not have access to the Commissioner.
The Police Union members were denied any access to the Commissioner for discussions during
the early days of the reform period, a fact causing conflict that was expressed in new rounds of
whistle-blowing and a march on Parliament early in 1997 when police officers rallied and
protested. For the first time I found myself policed by my own colleagues while participating
in the protest march. Police yelled at Parliament House, ‘Send the Pommy home!’
The Wood Royal Commission Report (Volume 2) supported the changing of the internal and
external managerial process currently in place, arguing that this would assist in bringing about
change in the police service. The NSW Police Board, a group that had advised the previous
Commissioner Tony Lauer about appointments, found itself dismantled. 
The Board was signified to wind up on the thirty-first of December and yet they are
still the selectors of those people … so the Commissioner is only looking to try and
make some appointments that collectively and individually will meld together into
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a powerful team and will not be divisive … then the Commissioner wants the
regional heads to go through an assessment centre … in the meantime I want you
to come on board and that will be an interim appointment for 6 or 12 months. And
your job is to help me start to nail down some of the detail … And start to identify
those people who are currently going through the patrol Commander assessment
… and then we have to find a gracious and dignified way for the others to continue
to make a contribution (3801/06/12/1996).
The winding up of the police board may have been direct result of communications between
the Commissioner at the Police Service and Commissioner Wood. With regard to the striking
police during the early part of the Service restructure, the Commissioner stated:
I would lead a march on Parliament House to ensure that the rights of those people
[non-commissioned police] were protected… it is putting in a different right of
appeal. It simply reviews the process and what the decision was based on, and
concludes whether a reasonable person could have reached the conclusion on the
facts as they are, as they stand (22/11/96).
Crucially, particularly in the early years of Ryan’s leadership, officers usually held the view
that Ryan was was hostile towards them.
I am constantly speaking to people who say to me quite critically in a disparaging
way: He doesn’t know what he’s doing, he doesn’t understand what’s happening,
and he doesn’t understand our position. When is he going to tell us what’s
happening? … The workers think they’re lost … not only lost but they’re beaten
with a stick, called the Royal Commission for some time (3804/07/10/97).
One new Commander was viewed as the change agent and Commissioner Ryan had publicly
declared, ‘Leave reform to me, and you get on with the front-line policing ‘ (09/11/1996).
Peter Ryan was under an extraordinary level of pressure during his period in office not only
from the politicians who had approached him to apply for the position in order to produce
results but also from an executive team who wanted to be consulted about the reform process.
Unfortunately he did not trust the executive police team generally. And the Police Association
he did not trust at all:
He saw no particular need to see them, he was very happy for them to be involved
in consultation and negotiation with the Assistant Commissioner, Human
Resources (3407/03/08/1998).
This situation became a breeding ground for discontent — an environment in which disgruntled
officers and whistle-blowers at all levels were nurtured, fuelling the cycle of exposures and
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inquiries; further draconian responses; and more corruption as individual officers struggled to
make sense of the new rules of ‘the game’ and maintain their individual positions within this
new field. These reforms could not create an harmonious organisation in which operational
police could carry out their work efficiently and whistle-blowers continued to cite instances of
corrupt activity to a media receptive to the idea that the ‘culture of corruption’ had been retained
unscathed. So while individual officers were identified as a ‘risk’ to the organisation it was
never considered that the organisation maintaining its current practices was a ‘risk’ to itself. Nor
could this problem be solved by the piecemeal and extremely punitive reform initiatives
designed to appease outside criticism and give the semblance that a ‘new broom’was sweeping
away the corrupt and archaic old structures. Inside the organisation itself fear and stress created
internal divisions that actively blocked the possibilities for breaking the corruption cycle by
destroying any possibility for practical and creative reform. In fact, as will be shown in the next
two sections dealing with the field of policing and the habitus of the individual police officer,
the solidification of the command and control management structure was to strengthen the
weaknesses of the organisation and weaken its strengths during this extremely important period
of internal reform. The effect on the organisation itself was devastating. 
4.2: The Experience of Reform: Changing the Nature of the Game
Routine police work necessarily occurs in an environment of prescribed rules and regulations
but rigidifying these in relation to the work practices of police officers makes effective
policing far more difficult. The nature of the game requires a flexible approach to individual
situations and the exercise of discretion in instances where efficient community policing
warrants this. In the wake of the Wood Royal Commission punitive structural reforms designed
to block possible areas for corrupt activities resulted in widespread alterations to the rules of
the game; changes that were not only resented but also proved ineffective and inefficient. For
example, after the activities of plainclothes detectives had become the subject of serious
allegations, the executive had instantly responded with dismissals and transfers regardless of
the impact such actions would have on operational efficiency. 
Hundreds of Sydney detectives will lose their elite plainclothes status and be
returned to uniformed ranks permanently based on a report from the Wood Royal
Commission that less corruption occurs with uniformed police (Herald Sun,
21 June, 1996: 14).
The criminal investigation squads of the NSW Police Service will be reviewed as
part of further sweeping reforms in the wake of the Wood Royal Commission into
police corruption (The Australian, 5 February, 1997: 2).
Breaking up highly integrated trained teams with a good track record for achieving results
might serve to reduce the ability of corrupt officers to preserve their secrecy but it was clearly
a retrograde step, made worse by the fact that the Qualitative and Strategic Audit of the Reform
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Process (2001) would later conclude that such ‘[c]hanges had failed to achieve a desired and
sustainable shift in culture and behaviours. To make a ‘change’ means to make something
different, to alter or modify. While the reforms clearly made enormous changes in the day-to-
day working lives of the operational police it is doubtful that these same changes were
effective in reducing the possibilities open to corrupt police. Radical change is a change that
is thoroughgoing or extreme; for an organisation to undergo radical change means that it needs
to alter itself to the furthest limit. During the Royal Commission, the community accused the
police of corruption so frequently that it seemed to be too frequent, too personal, although
mostly at random. Often, when trying to control drunken members of the community, police
would be accused of not having any reputable power base. 
One development in response to the demands for reform was the introduction of the
Operational Crime Review. The New York Police had reported Zero Tolerance Policing as an
allegedly very successful strategy and they had developed a statistical process to report the
success of reducing crime. Two employees went overseas to review the Operational Crime
Review process and it was adopted on their return as the answer to the New South Wales
police’s problem of demonstrating apparently radical reform. When I interviewed two
members of the team made responsible for implementing reform, they described the aim of the
Operational Crime Review process to me in glowing terms. 
Operational Crime Review, they’re coming up with innovative ideas on how they
are tackling certain issues. So there’s, there’s a cross pollination of learning taking
place. There’s a focus for the first time on crime being a major issue and what are
we doing about it and how are we going to reduce it. There are ideas coming from
the executive and from others saying, have you thought of this approach?
(3809/23/06/1998).
However, the operational supervisors who entered the process of review found it punitive and
not discursive. One technique was to challenge any failures in reducing statistics concerning
crime in particular areas. Piecemeal reform is unbalanced in itself and problems occur most
often when a program is used in isolation as a type of ‘magic bullet’ to spread organisational
change rapidly throughout the entire corporation. Specific targets based on complex issues
needed problem-solving centres rather than just an oversighting mechanism based on
statistical measures. The response instead was command based and highly supervisory in the
way it addressed technical police responses. 
The creation of the position of duty officer was seen as an integral part of improving policing
at a local level, but the anticipated improvement is not evident in the data. The number of
robberies remained high. Policing activity did not increase as a result of the new duty officer
appointments. There also seemed to be ongoing difficulties with the role of sergeants as
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supervisors, as there was no statistical measure by which to operationally evaluate their
performance. Officers were assigned managing roles even in the operational areas; that is,
sergeants/duty officers do not appear to contribute to the lowering of crime rates. A breakdown
of gender-assigned tasks and charge rates also reveal quite different informal workplace practices
that result in females doing particular types of work such as administrative rather than work
being assigned on a non-gender basis.
One Commander of the review team stated in 1996: 
It is almost like you have a scorpion on the table and you look at all its parts and
then when you push, at one part of the upper body a leg moves in a particular
direction. This is the type of response we are hoping to create (confidential).
As a serving officer, I found the above comment almost offensive, as if operational officers were
being described as insects pests or animals that could be taunted or tamed until they were
manipulated. It was at this stage in the reform process than I began writing this thesis and
collecting information, recording my thoughts and experiences in the form of a diary while
working through this period of extreme change. The following section gives a small summary of
what I experienced. 
At the time I was working in an inner city patrol in a police truck as a senior officer with a junior
officer. This daily contact with the ‘coal face’ of general duties included the pressure to perform at
a certain arrest rate, a work rate that was specifically used to assess statistically and was also used
to compare our work performance with others. Later, when I performed work as duty officer at the
rank of Inspector for twelve months, my team was assessed as working at a statistically lower rate
than most of the other teams. We were not judged on any other longer term strategy other than how
many arrests or computerised entries we had made over a period of weeks. 
My attempts at prevention or problem solving over a longer period of time, or working as a team so
that my junior officers could grow in experience and skill were undervalued. I was specifically asked,
in front of the command team, not to bring to the patrol meetings issues such as sexual harassment,
as these were matters to be dealt with, on my own, within my team. I found these highly-paid
executive strategists’ notions of reform (the research for which had included visits to New York to
see how the process was applied), to be very disconnected from the reality of my workplace. 
My approach as a duty officer in a general duties posting was clearly one of abiding by the work
policies in place at the time. Officers did what they were told to do or they were viewed as
uncooperative, not part of the team and towards the end of the process, trouble makers. There
was little support from any other senior officer — their senior officer’s attitude appeared to be,
‘you are getting paid to do the job so do the work’.
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My team of junior officers, who were bright and keen workers, were reviewed as underperforming,
as they did not produce the desired arrest rate. My performance as a duty officer was never assessed
beyond the numbers of people my constables actually arrested. I found the monthly process of
reviewing the number of arrests made by the team to be demoralising and irrelevant to the definition
of successful policing. It may also have contributed to low morale generally in the police station for
all participants. It became important for the duty officer leading a team to assign a person, usually
an enthusiastic male or a couple of males, to spend shifts locking up shoplifters or writing parking
tickets or entering the most ‘Intel Reports’. 
For example if you had a team leader who was dedicated to increasing their arrest rate etc., then
your team overall would be assessed as successful which would mean you as a leader were
successful. Boredom on night work might result in a competition type arrangement being
organised. Perhaps one officer would bet another officer a lottery ticket that they could write more
traffic infringement notices in regard to the related ‘offence’ for the evening than the other. Or when
the time came to do the paper work for an arrest, an officer would constantly volunteer for the
computer work, which would result in that officer being the arresting officer on more cases. This
person then becomes the one that a duty officer would want on his or her team because the work
load would go up. Also if you applied for a transfer and your work load was regarded as high – for
example, high arrest numbers and intelligence reports submitted, all accompanied by low
complaints - then you had a personal history that looked good. So arrest rates may influence what
opportunities an officer may gain. 
This could ultimately result in a person applying for a transfer to a more congenial police station or
work location. When the personal work statistics were reviewed, if these officers had more arrests
recorded than did the other competitors for an advertised position/promotion, they had a greater
chance of obtaining the transfer. Police performance was dependent on personal opportunity and
reward rather than any strategic type of local policing effort over the long term (1996-2000).
I was subjected to this type of review when I was researching my PhD thesis and I was identified
as an ‘extreme risk’ to the organisation (2003). When I made a formal complaint about this
description being circulated at executive level, I was told that it was the thesis that posed the ‘risk’,
not me. The Commissioner at the time had been briefed regarding the results of the work but two
members of the senior hierarchy (2004) who very concerned about the work suggesting I be
employed ‘on more meaningful work’ (internal memo). 
The ‘informal’ and sometimes covert practices described above are passed down the hierarchy as
the pressure for statistical success increases. This whole process is in fact a distraction from
strategic assessment in problem solving initiatives. For instance, there is no measurement for
preventing crime. There is no success measurement for great customer/community relations. There
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are no measurements for the traditional practices, later described as corrupt, of gaining the
confidence of informants that may result in major arrests. In fact talking to criminals is fraught with
so much internal danger that it is not a practice that can occur without extreme oversight measures
resulting. All participants’ at all local area commands were performing under this type of duress. 
Another clearly observable pattern was that policewomen at the scene of any crime would generally
do the administrative work such as filing details in a notebook, while a male officer would initiate
the arrest report and would be credited for the arrest, increasing the appearance of a ‘successful’
arrest rate. I did ask that the statistics for gender-based work performance be examined and at the
time of doing that assessment (2003–04) this did support the trend I had observed in the operational
environment. However, the findings were not included as part of the Operational Review Process.
No one really wanted to examine gender-based differences in the working environment. It might
create another problem and not contribute to the demands for ‘useful’ statistical information. Useful
information was information that reassured the government and the community that even under the
duress of a Royal Commission police work was being carried out now in an efficient and readily
verifiable manner. 
The process of work performance based on statistical data falls away as you proceed up the ranks.
The ranks of Sergeant and above are not reviewed under such a restricted basis, unless that Sergeant
happens to be working on a police vehicle (as of 2004). The evidence for this result is found in the
formal presentations that review work performance only at particular levels in the commands under
review. There is no review within those discussions of the performance of higher ranks of any
statistical or objective qualitative data. Brown comments:
The Wood Royal Commission was remarkably successful when compared with
recent inquiries such as the ICAC Milloo Inquiry (1994) in revealing extensive
entrenched corruption in a wide range of areas (1997: 221). 
The list of corrupt activities is long, serious in nature and does not highlight any failure of
police to actually carry out their general duties. So a major section of the operational review,
during the years that I was observing it, totally disregarded the recording of complaints
against police, prior observations of corruption or the possibility of the failure of senior
management. Instead the focus was on the operational. The middle supervisory ranks had not
been subjected to this type of intrusive audit or performance evaluation, although the New
York version of zero tolerance policing was in fact aimed at improving the performance of
middle managers.
During the confused period (1996-1998) immediately following the Wood Royal
Commission, in which the Service was being evaluated, leaders in the organisation made
statements about the necessity of the individual accepting or rejecting change.
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I think there are three categories of people: there are the new which is a minority;
there’s the old, really old, which is a minority; then there’s a large group in the
middle trying to make up their mind to get off the existing bus and get on the new
one or stay where they are. And that is part of the process because everybody is
in a decision making sort of area as to which way – life type decisions I think is
what it’s about … (1300/13/08/1996).
Directly after the Wood Royal Commission I collected data from a series of interviews with
police at the executive describing not only the vacillating nature of individuals under stress
to accept change but also spoke positively about ‘turning the police organisation around’ as
‘a captain of a ship, this ship of change’. Then the tone of the interviews changed. Comments
along the lines of ‘you’re actually being as critical as possible, reviewing what you have to
do, but you have not got the resources or the personnel with the skills,’ started to emerge and
it was at this point that the introduction of Operational Crime Reviews commenced. The
impression I gathered was the task was ill defined and therefore too difficult to implement.
The executive began to lose confidence in the ability of the reforms to turn ‘the ship’ around.
The following quotes describe, importantly, the troubled relationship between managers and
the operational police. The first part of the quote was recorded during the early years of
reform and then the second part was recorded from the same interviewee in the later period.
It is important to respect the confidentiality of the senior officer speaking, so there is no
attempt to reveal her/his identity. Two examples of this follow:
Part one: Now for some unknown reason you can send all of the … what goes out,
we send out, and you can send them a message in every week’s Police Service
Weekly since last … but in my conversations I will say: ‘Well tell me, what do you
know about the reform?’ And the feedback is: ‘Well that is why you are here; we
want you to tell us.’ ‘Well have you read all these things?’ ‘Well we’ve seen them
around’ but you know they really like to hear it sort of straight from the horse’s
mouth.
Part Two: There’s still confusion and there’s still concern and there’s still, you
know, people who are somewhat traumatised by the process, but I think that police
have enormous resilience. We seem to be able to fall over and bounce back up
again rather quickly. And I think they are probably coping better than I thought
they would, but I am very mindful of that, that there is confusion and concern. I
think someone described this morning, and it’s a very good analogy, it’s a hornet’s
nest organisation at the moment where every time there’s a noise, a buzz,
everybody comes out and buzzes around and it takes quite a while to settle back
down again. And then something else, so there’s this continual process going on
and in some respects it’s between the old and the new: there’s a sense that
something is happening and no one quite knows what, including me for that
matter, and that’s unnerving for people (13/08/1996).
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Managers are given responsibility for the ‘brainwork’ or the overall organisation of work. The
operational police work can be said to comprise the ‘brawn’ work, the other operational tasks.
This means that officers now who complete tertiary studies may be directed to the hardest,
most repetitive and sometimes dangerous sides of policing while their intellectual skills,
although required for entry, are not utilised. The work performance criteria do not include
intellectual endeavour such as strategic development by the lower operational ranks. General
duties officers do the break-and-enter, car theft, day-to-day policing tasks, while as the
offences become more problematic the division of work is more apparent. Because of work
demands, the individual talents of the police officer are put aside for the generic process of
police work. 
The division of work can be effectively described using recorded statistics and these are
interesting not only when they are first analysed on their own, but also when they are compared
with the information gathered in interviews during part of the data-gathering process. My
evaluation of the service reflects how the measurement of reform has targeted only part of the
services necessary to assess their terms of the core business of policing: crime rate and clear-up
rates. Official crime-rate statistics are an imperfect yardstick. Inaccuracy is affected by a range
of forces that can dilute the figures, such as incomplete messages and book-keeping errors.
Caution needs to be exercised when using police statistics because of their tendency to be
influenced by political and media pressure. However, the data provided by the Australian Bureau
of Statistics (ABS) on crime rates are not subject to the same limitations; they are gathered
separately and used for planning and policing purposes. For the purposes of this chapter, the ABS
data are considered to be adequate. Clear-up rates are directly derived from the operations of
particular state services, and consequently are not ideally comparable. However, they too are
used by those forces for policing and planning purposes and will serve here to provide an overall
picture. The aim, therefore, is to provide the basis for an assessment of Commissioner Ryan’s
reform endeavours. Any assessment of whether or not the reform process has worked by
achieving a particular result (for instance, a reduction in the number of complaints about police)
needs to be considered within the context of the effectiveness of fighting crime.
The following tables and figures show the actual number of sworn police officers during the
years mentioned in the research period to demonstrate the numbers of police involved and
affected during the Wood Royal Commission inquiry. These tables indicate the number of
‘players in the field’. There are always requests for more police despite the fact that the NSW
Police Service is the fifth-largest policing organisation in the western world.
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Table 4.1: Actual Police Numbers 
(Source: SCRCSSP Report on Government Services 2005.
Figure 4.1: Total strength of NSW Police Service
(NSW Police Service Annual Reports, 1995–2003)
Table 4.2: Change in total strength of Police Service
(NSW Police Service Annual Reports 1995–2003)
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Table 4.2 includes the numbers of civilian staff as well as sworn officers. The 1.1 per cent
decrease in administrative staff actually occurred when Police Commissioner Peter Ryan
requested an increase in civilian positions. His policy was to place desk police officers back
into the operational environment as well as improving the administration support available to
police. A sworn officer states:
The Commissioner is saying that you stop saying ‘This is a police job and this is a
civilian job. You say, ‘That’s an important job to do, do you need to discharge
police powers in doing it’. Therefore appoint the best people you can find and
manage it well and do it as efficiently as you can (3801/08/11/1996).
However, the government financial arrangements resulted in a steady decrease in unsworn
support after 2004. The administrative demands in this organisation are very high and so have
been passed back to operational police. When the government made a commitment to recruit
more police officers, civilian numbers were reduced with the result that support services have
been reduced in an already overburdened organisation. This fact is reflected by an officer’s
statement below: 
We still have things to do to keep on top of corruption. There is still corruption
there in a whole variety of forms. We’re expecting a few general duties, the
youngest and least experienced, to carry the service when the rest of the experience
doesn’t seem to be contributing a great deal (3809/29/02/2000).
Table 4.3 depicts the numbers of people being policed during the period 1970–2000. The
population being policed in New South Wales is steadily increasing, and the demands for
more police are usually raised during election years. The demands for greater police
numbers are usually reported with regard to the increased need for safety in the community.
The recording systems change over the years: in the earlier years the population numbers are
recorded as an index figure with a base line of 100% providing the base point. From the year
2003 the actual numbers are recorded as per 100,000 per population. Discussions involving
the demand for increased police numbers must reflect the increase in population numbers
needing police services. For example, an inner Local Area Command such as Redfern has
had phenomenal numbers of developmental flat locations (1998-2005) but no increase in
police strength. 
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Table 4.3: Estimated Residential Population by Calendar Year
(Source: ABS 2001a, Estimated Residential Population, 1970–71 to 1999–00, cat. 
no. 3201.0; ABS 2000c, Projected Population: Series I, 1999–00 to 2050-51,
cat. no. 3222.0 in SCRCSSP 2001)
These following figures record some of the traditional methods of assessing policing
organisations. External and internal reports contain many statistical graphics to report police
activity. This part of the results section records the standard reporting mechanisms concerning
policing post the Wood Royal Commission. The selection of offences was chosen because they
are typical of the community’s, and therefore the police administrators’, interests. Firstly,
break-and-enter, assault and motor-vehicle theft offences, which are the ‘bread and butter’ of
daily police work, are analysed. Two aspects of these offences are relevant here: the difference
or similarities between New South Wales and the other two States we have chosen to compare
them with (Victoria and Queensland); and the fluctuations (or otherwise) in these offences
during the Ryan years.
Figure 4.2 shows the reporting of break-and-enters, that is, the number of incidents of this
offence where police have attended, taken a report and proceeded to investigate the incidents.
They may have solved a percentage and prevented a further percentage from occurring, while
some offences would remain outstanding. 
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Figure 4.2: Break — Enter
(Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics Recorded Crime Australia – 2003)
Clearly, the rates for New South Wales are significantly above those of Victoria and
Queensland. This can be explained by the clear differences in the preceding population charts
(see table 4.3 above). New South Wales, as the most populous state, has around 15,000
reported break-and-enter crimes per year, which is more than twice the number for Victoria
and Queensland. This is hardly surprising, given that the population of New South Wales is
6.464 million, that of Victoria 4.696 million, and Queensland only 3.564 million. Moreover,
and crucially, the crime of break-and-enter is often ‘drug-related’; that is to say, chronic addicts
carry out property offences for cash in order to support their habit.
The following figure 4.3 shows police activity concerning actual numbers of cars stolen. There
is no analysis, at this point, of the number of such offences per population as the data collected
has previously shown actual numbers rather than number of offences per population. 
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Figure 4.3: Motor Vehicle Theft
(Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics Recorded Crime Australia – 2003)
Figure 4.4: Assault
(Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics Recorded Crime Australia – 2003)
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The data indicate that incidents of assault are increasing as population numbers increase and
that a higher rate of more serious assaults occurs. The data are important for consideration, as
they will determine how police are deployed and how community needs are met. Local
politicians, state parliamentarians, lobby groups and the media will utilise these data as a
method to gain police resources or try to influence police deployment. Criminal offences
affected by factors such as changes to the law or regulations; for example, licensing
regulations that highlight removing intoxicated people as important are then interpreted by the
media as related to incidents of violence in a particular area. This in turn will affect how police
supervise licensees’ practices of refusing the service of alcohol. 
Assault figures have been linked to alcohol consumption in the state’s community since the
earliest days when rum was a currency in the European colony. However, the political effects
of restricting hotel hours mean this is a very unpopular response. Instead, police are asked to
enforce licensing regulations for such behaviours as refusing to leave licensed premises. So
when licensing premises come under the review of numerous complaints from the public or
through the media, the tasking assigned to local police increase, reflected in police doing a
‘walk through’ and higher rates of information reports on local hotels. 
It is therefore not possible to argue that the rising number of assaults is due to impaired
policing. Rather (as noted above), the explanation must be sought in other factors affecting
police work that in turn affected the crime level, for example, changes to licensing laws.
Another cause affecting the rising rate of recorded assaults was a change in policy. Due to
complaints to the Ombudsman early in the reform period stating that assaults were not being
properly investigated, a new policy was introduced requiring that all assaults be formally
recorded (1997 onwards). A separate new police policy required that incidents of domestic
violence assaults also be formally responded to. These policies may affect the statistics and
show an increase in reported assaults rather than in actual assaults. 
The continuing upward trend in the number of assaults since the beginning of the study period
is noticeably different from the relative stability of the level of break-and-enters and motor-
vehicle theft offences during corresponding years. This is probably due to car re-birthing rings
and the fact that this offence is restricted by the availability of or is it demand for a particular
type of car. It is also a more secretive/ covert criminal activity. 
The statistical data presented above derives from the period after the Wood Royal Commission
Report. The most relevant aspect of the level of actual offences during Commissioner Ryan’s
tenure is its consistency. While the New South Wales Police Service was embroiled in the
reform process, such disruption is not evident in the statistics. Certainly this did not result in
a crime wave, at least as far as break-and-enter was concerned. In fact the overall pattern for
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New South Wales’ major crime rates is consistent throughout the Ryan period, despite the fact
that reform was touted as a major restructuring proven to achieve increased efficiency. Instead
we have consistent statistical data of police dealing with crime. In other words, police numbers
reflect police activities at a constant rate independent of periods of review, certainly at the level
of policing that involves arresting people. Operational police work at a level that reflects their
capacity to work in the environment in which they are employed. 
The following data in Table 4.4 show how the police assess their own police performance. A
‘clear-up’means that the complaint is written off in the police computerised recording system
(COPS) within a thirty-day period. How is a high clear-up rate achieved with a percentage
drop of incidents? It could be that these cases were written off without actually arresting
anybody; in other words computerised entries are updated to close. The case is closed on the
data entry base but this does not mean there has been an arrest. This sleight of hand can result
with command and control type of management. 
Table 4.4: Outcome of Investigations: 30-day Status
NSW Police Statistics Division
Possibly as a result of changes in the Operational Crime Review audit system, the clear-up rate
for assault decreased between 1999–2000 and 2000–01, followed by a less significant
decrease: the decline between 2000–01 and 2001–02. This decline coincided with an increase
in the number of assault incidents. It is hard to maintain a rising clear-up rate, since, in order
to maintain such an improvement, more police or person hours are needed than previously
were available. The clear-up rate for sexual assault also showed a marked increase. This was
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possibly due to policy changes, which meant that it became more important for police to
investigate this type of offence. There is another reason, however. When command focuses on
clear-up and arrest rates, police will update their personal work data bases, which will then
show a higher conclusion of outstanding or cleared up cases when reviewed by a supervisor
and entered into the computer records. 
This is a process/technical response to a command/unsympathetic management structure.
There were two significant increases in the clear-up rate for sexual assault. It rose from 28%
to 36% between 1996–98 and 1998–99, and an even more substantial increase was recorded,
of 32% to 54%, between 2000–01 and 2001–02. 
The recording of statistical data reduces these complex police incidents and procedures into a
formula that can be politically manipulated to demonstrate success. Clearly this data could be
used to prove successful police work under the current executive team. The clear-up rates for
the offence of murder were particularly low when Peter Ryan arrived as Commissioner and he
was concerned that, compared to English statistics, the numbers of resolved cases was so very
low. He employed the traditional approach of accountability, or reporting to a higher level of
command, and demanded that the clear up rate be addressed. The clear-up rate improved
considerably over the next twelve months as a result of the technical command approach. It is
important to note that these figures refer to a clear-up rate within a period of only one month.
As murders often include protracted inquiries, the statistics will not reflect clear-up rates that
occurred outside this period. As a result of the command very competent homicide police
updated their outstanding cases to ‘no further action’, so the clear-up rate appeared to improve
as directed but to the detriment of effective operational policing. Homicide police are very
experienced senior officers with enormous investigative experience, however, the pressure
applied about performance statistics meant that they reacted by a strategy that avoided further
censure. 
These same specialist squads lost their expertise in the review process, as it became a standard
practice to rotate police in squads when corruption allegations are raised, even if these are not
proven. This practice of rotation began with Commissioner Avery nearly 20 years ago when
the Criminal Investigation Bureau was identified as a site of police corruption. Clearly the
practice of disabling specialist squads is not an effective operational strategy. Nor is it a
deterrent. There are certainly better ways to address corrupt or unprofessional behaviour and
such a strategy only serves to highlight any corruption within the working ranks but not at the
leadership ranks. 
It is essential to recognise that this defensive behaviour, from which the whole organisation
suffered, came about because the command structure responded defensively to the Royal
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Commission and the new, politically appointed Police Commissioner, with an audit that
emphasised competency instead of an approach that emphasised problem solving. What the
Homicide unit needed was support with evidence-gathering techniques and the restored ability
to foster team networking and develop strategic approaches to improve efficiency. Instead they
received commands and demands from the executive team and administration to address the
issues but no organisational planning to make this happen other than as a sleight of hand. The
incredible pressure and punitive oversighting placed on these specialist units to produce high
clear-up rates works to their detriment and there is often no consideration of the type of
workload, including the content of that workload. 
Figure 4.5, showing the statistical evidence for clear-up rates for property crime after the Wood
Royal Commission, tells a similar story. 
Figure 4.5: Clear-up Rates for Property Crime
(Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics Recorded Crime Australia – Victims 2003)
For a property incident to be written off, a person may have been arrested or summonsed, or
no offender may have been identified. A case may also be resolved by mediation, which may
result in the victim deciding not to press charges. The clear-up rate for assault increased from
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53% in 1996–98 to 62% in 1999–2000 (NSW Police Service Annual Report 2001). For motor
vehicle theft, the clear-up period was again set at 30 days. There was a slow increase in the
clear-up rate, although 30 days is a short time to resolve this type of theft. Considering this, it
is plausible that by extending the period to 90 days, a marked increase in the clear-up rate
would result that would also reflect increased police activity, not just updated records. Motor
vehicle theft dropped significantly when the re-birthing task force was at its most effective.
That means there was a higher incidence of motor vehicle theft, and although there was a
higher clear-up rate, the percentage of cases in which the offender was proceeded against
actually declined. The specialist efforts in this area of police work did reflect a high
performance achievement during the post Wood Royal Commission. 
Table 4.5: The Victims of Recorded Crime
(Source: Recorded Crime Australia 2000, ABS)
Table 4.6: Percentage of Reported Victims for Whom Finalisation 
Was Achieved within 30 Days of Report
(Source: Recorded Crime Australia 2000, ABS)
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Table 4.7: Percentage of Victims for Whom Finalisation Was Achieved
within 30 Days of the Report, and the Offender Was Proceeded Against 
(Source: NSW Police Service Annual Report 2001)
The pressure of statistical evaluation is hated by effective police officers because politicised
measurement agendas is not part of the job of ‘bread-and-butter’ policing.
People should have been asking these questions before; knowing exactly when and
where crime was committed; by whom: by repeat offenders; on repeat victims, by
location, hot spots and all that sort of thing. It’s just bread-and-butter policing as
far as I’m concerned (3809/23/06/1998).
A primary function of any police service is the investigation of criminal activity or other
activities requiring police attention, such as motor-vehicle accidents or illegal activities within
the trucking industry. This officer’s comment raises the issue that corruption is linked to the
everyday issues associated with ‘bread-and-butter’ policing. It is therefore not recommended
in these conclusions that statistical reviews of police corruption be the focus of management
of corruption within police organisations. By the very nature of their role, police officers are
in constant contact with those who engage in criminal activities, but the two issues of
performance statistics and corrupt activity need to be understood. As criminal activity is
usually very profitable, the offenders will do anything to maintain this situation, including
offering bribes to police officers in return for protection from investigation at a deep level. 
The nature of corruption varies as well, although the distinctions are not often acknowledged.
For example there is so-called ‘noble cause’ corruption, in which police use evidence to prove
a case in circumstances where that evidence has been collected in an unethical manner. The
officers are involved in proving a case because they believe the person or persons are guilty
rather than just putting the evidence available to the court so that the court can decide guilt of
innocence. Evidence of possible noble cause corruption has appeared more frequently as new
evidence collecting procedures of DNA establish the innocence of gaoled offenders. 
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Part of the reason for presenting statistics for public discussion and internal review derives
from the political pressures on policing. Although these figures just refer to the basic role of
policing, this type of presentation of police performance involves much discussion that is not
useful when looking at policing in an holistic manner. In the words of one senior police
executive, ‘The issues that are going to win votes are getting crime down … and we need good
strategies to analyse some of the issues before they hit the press … (3803/06/03/1996).
Consequently the results are descriptive and, although useful information can be gained, it is
incomplete if it is not placed within the process and complexities of police practice itself.
Pressure from internal and external observers encourages police to be secretive in their work
environment so that they can get on with the time-consuming work of investigation which gets
in the way of the desired statistic gathering. And it is to this inner world of the individual police
officer that this analysis of the experience of reform will now turn.
4.3: The Experience of Reform: The Impact of Reform on the Individual 
Police Officer 
This section of the chapter will take the discussion away from the limited world of statistic
analysis into the qualitative results of the investigation relating to the working police officer.
Only then can the link between statistical evaluation and narrative data be used to reveal the
connections with corrupt police activity. As workers in a semi-military organisation,
operational police must bear the personal brunt of the executive’s failure. As police officers
they take this as a team but as individual human beings they also internalise this emotionally.
As one commentator observed, reform is a deeply personal experience.
They want us to embarrass and be involved ... in a disempowering process of
people who carry high ranks and sit in important management chairs and who
would like to be the controllers of information (1320/10/08/1997)
The executive were suspicious of consultants and people who may have genuinely wanted to
assist the police and offers of assistance or employment by consultants were responded to with
the usual suspicion accorded to outsiders by a tight-knit network. There was a theme
throughout all the interviews that senior officers were the ‘old guard’ looking to re-establish
their power-base. ‘You must come through me,’ subordinates were told. In other words, access
to the organisation was even more strongly than ever controlled via the processes of hierarchy.
The relationship between executive members was based on control, always under threat from
pockets of resistance and loose cannons liable to deviant or rebellious behaviour. Information
was distributed in a form that reinforced the hierarchical model. As one constable reflected:
If a senior officer is in possession of more information than others … he can’t quite
see that if we’re in possession of equal information that we are not equally
powerful and therefore a danger (1340/12/04/1998).
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The idea expressed above also provides an example of how some police regard ‘information’
as symbolic capital — a vital possession within the networks of a power hierarchy but fatal to
the development of teamwork and the ability to learn from others. 
The Royal Commission had clearly indicated in its report that it ‘is persuaded that the Service
will need considerable external assistance to ensure that reform is implemented’ (Vol 11: 177)
but, as the interviews indicate, any external input was regarded in a very defensive manner by
the executive police. Thus the junior officers, who are required to be tertiary-trained, find that
the use of formal knowledge, education and external data in general are often viewed with
suspicion and speedily dismissed with derision. A typical response such officers heard was,
“We do not have time for this lecture, journal article, consultant meeting, or research”.
Occasions for useful work discussion are increasingly limited as stress builds up and
uncertainty reigns. Police do not have time or do not as a practice reflect on the dilemmas
within the work place. Once the old traditional practice of meeting in the pub and having a few
drinks did provide a venue for debriefing. Discussions of a personal nature could be aired, with
the benefit at least of socialising. However, the strains of culture change has slowed that
socialising activity and nothing has been put in its place in terms of providing a safe, friendly,
supportive and emotionally releasing environment. 
So as the Royal Commission gathered momentum in the media and police were being
scrutinised, the pressure increased within the organisation to avoid scrutiny and, as one
executive officer commented, ‘I think we’re going to need a Brambles truck, to bring back all
the briefs (confidential 1997). The ‘briefs’ referred to, are the paper case trail of corrupt police
activity. The Commissioner sacked officers, relocated others and ignored members of the
Executive Team in a manner comparable to blowing a whistle to control a game. Police
defensively placed more responsibility onto leaders within the peer groups at the lower end of
the hierarchy rather than looking outside the organisation for support to assist the inside
working of the police organisation. Abuses of power resulted in extreme oversighting within
the organisation, with multiple auditing processes being implemented and individual officers
suffering under the weight of non-support and suspicion. The community also suffered, as the
punitive measure of zero tolerance policing was introduced in response. 
As a police officer researching police and their location within the community I needed to
understand how police sometimes make choices that resulted in corrupt and unethical decision
making. The concept of the habitus leads to a greater understanding of the workings of
individuals’ thoughts and beliefs and the field analysis leads to a greater understanding of the
relationship between an individual’s beliefs and the environment within which that individual
operates. 
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But if you put people through assessment centres and you pick the very best people
you can, and you monitor how they behave and deal with their people and you
instill a way of dealing with people which is open and honest and that’s a
requirement of their performance, then you start to shift the process. Now none of
that’s quick ... (Confidential 1998). 
As the research progressed and I started to develop a visual representation of the theoretical
concepts I was exploring, the theoretical approach was employed to expand the knowledge and
analysis of police work. One very important theme that kept recurring was the nature of the
twenty-four-hour responsibilities of being a police officer. The concept of ‘habitus’with regard
to operational police can be seen in Figure 4.6, which attempts to reveal its parts empirically. 
Figure 4.6: Habitus: The Individual Police Officer
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During the interview process the inner thoughts, emotions and beliefs of police within the
hierarchy and lower ranks began to open up to me in the interview database. This picture
developed further as discussions with the individual officers were repeated and they described
the themes and concepts that relate to why and how they performed their duties as an officer.
Figure 4.6 shows some of the words that repetitively occurred during discussions with the
researcher. The thoughts, ideas and work practices that police experience, both in their
working and private lives, are represented as a model that approaches some of the elements of
the habitus, or ‘mental habit’ (Lefebrevre 1991: 258), of a police officer. 
So for each word in the figure there is a connection with how that person subjectively lives
those concepts and then how those beliefs are then lived within the ‘social stakes which
determine structure, and perpetuate the field of policing’ (Horarik 2006: 109). What the figure
does not show is that habitus is also embodied; it is in the officer’s physical body, in his/her
stance, behaviour and in the way the police uniform is worn. Literally how police walk and
talk. The behaviour of an officer originates in his/her thinking. Behaviour is linked to thinking
and those two elements are connected to the private/public environment of the police world.
When conflict, frustration and engaging in criminal activity occurs and become part of a
working officer’s life then that officer may behave in a way that permits an internal or external
crisis to occur. In summary, Figure 4.6 depicts the author’s conceptual perspective on the way
Bourdieu’s theoretical framework relates to contemporary policing.
As the trigger or crisis leading to whistle-blowing that can precipitate an official inquiry is
located within the mind of disgruntled police officers, the way in which that emotion of anger,
discomfort and anxiety comes to be in conflict with the social field of policing is an important
concept to understand. If a police officer has acted corruptly at some level or other and another
officer is disgruntled and this emotion is allowed to gather an internal momentum, that officer
may seek an outlet for these emotions by networking with other individuals either inside or
outside the organisation. The crisis for the police organisation begins once the media or a
receptive politician becomes involved and questions are asked in public and the damaging
revelations start to emerge. But, in reality, the crisis has existed for a long time before then.
Managed efficiently, officers will not be able to continue to act corruptly and disgruntled
officers will not necessarily become whistle-blowers as the only vent for their anger. Of course
in a command and control hierarchy management means commanding the officer in question
to remain silent, using authority exercised down the line to stifle a grievance. 
Politically such internal ‘leaks’ are dynamite for a highly politicised police organisation and
the decision to instigate an inquiry launches the police executive once more into damage
control mode, even though it may still be dealing with the after-shocks of the last inquiry. For
example, late in 1998 the following report appeared in the Sydney Morning Herald.
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A powerful ‘brotherhood’ of corrupt officers persists within the NSW Police
Service despite the purge following the Wood Royal Commission, according to
a report by the Police Integrity Commission (Sydney Morning Herald,
21 October, 1998: 1).
The comment apparently originated when disgruntled officers reported an incident to the
oversight body, the Police Integrity Commission, and the media was alerted to this. The
external leak could have come from the officers who actually made the official complaint or
may have emanated from someone who realised they were making a complaint. Either way, a
disgruntled officer who does not trust the internal oversighting mechanism has been involved.
The Ombudsman’s Office has been recording police officers involved in committing drug
offences since 1994. In 1995, during the Royal Commission, there were 231 officers involved
in illicit drug activities. This figure peaked in 1997 as the Wood Royal Commission released
its report. The rate in 2000 was recorded at 128 offences (New South Wales Ombudsman
Annual Reports 1994–2000). 
In one case when discussing whether he had maintained contact with crime figures, a senior
officer stated:
That was in my past life, when I was single … you know I have a family now, times
have change (4526/02/04/2003).
The officer had also experienced a change in roles so the demands in the area of criminal
activity had changed as well. Officers could not further comment on how supervisors might
assist junior officers with similar issues. The officers indicated these issues, which are personal
and important, but when faced with how to resolve them in the work place, senior officers
could not offer a solution. There appeared to be no language with which to talk seriously about
personal or work ethical conflicts. 
When asked about what would happen if s/he knew that a person under her/his command was
involved in certain corrupt or criminal behaviour, another officer who held a responsible
supervisory role in a Local Area Command could not openly discuss how s/he would resolve
the situation. There is a distinct physical reaction in this regard by those who are interviewed
and even when they trust the interviewer they cannot engage in discussing ‘secrets’ in the
private or personal areas of police life. These ‘secrets’, which are often regarded as conflicts,
had occurred in the past but still remained as a cognitive dilemma in the present. Some officers
could not countenance the possibility that there was any confusion in their minds or in the
minds of others about ethical issues. Such cognitive dissonance would be easier to record if
officers could feel they are in an environment in which it is possible to discuss their ethical
dilemmas. This highlights the dilemma often experienced by the whistle-blower and explains
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why, for some individuals, the eventual strain of internal conflict can result in damaging
private and public disclosures. Put simply, individual police do not know whom to trust and
the command and control management style does not encourage open dialogue.
Immediately after the Wood Royal Commission everyone in the police organisation, whether
they were leaders, general duties officers, association members, detectives or other operational
police, were extremely wary about the people with whom they were working. They were
concerned about outside criticism and anxious about the many changes being discussed but
they could find no safe outlet for discuss their disquiet. The reverberations throughout the
organisation involved the conviction that there were whistle-blowers and informers riddling
the work environment and the best strategy for personal security was to keep a distance from
other officers. During this period I had my files searched for tapes and it was rumoured in the
station that I was working for the Wood Inquiry even though the Royal Commission policy
was not to employ New South Wales police to carry out investigations into corruption — a
decision made to prevent the inquiry itself from being corrupted. Nevertheless, police officers
who were transferred from other stations initially were thought to be possible spies for the
Police Integrity Commission. This concern, which verged on paranoia, riddled the whole
organisation, even infecting those leaders in the organisation who was responsible and
accountable for reform itself.
The Commissioner’s confidence provisions would allow us to almost throw the
entire disciplinary process overboard which says that you are managerially dealt
with at every level until such time as you show that you are unfit to be a member
… One of the things the Commissioner is having to wrestle with at the moment is
that the only person with any security in the management of the police service is
him … it makes people very nervous and can flow down (3801/08/11/1996).
This statement highlights the perceived power of the commissioner to mastermind all change; a
power that was emphasised further when the interviewee said, ‘Until my own position becomes a
little more secure, perhaps, I’m not all that good at focusing on the big picture’(3801/08/11/1996).
As the process continued during which senior officers’ contracts were not renewed, senior
executive members looked for a solution. Police left the organisation whistle-blowing: leaking
any form of information to the media to force a public review of issues. In this period this tactic
became a regular practice.
a trusted friend or a relative may be told of the act by one of the participants, and they
may pass the information on to others; eventually the information may reach agents
of social control (the police leaders). In order to foreclose this possibility, codes of
secrecy, punishment for leakage of information and ‘need–to-know’ restrictions on
access to information often develops in deviant groups (Sherman 1978: 19). 
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One of the impacts of inquiries is the ongoing leaking of information to the media as a form
of release. This occurs when an officer believes the organisation is not dealing with an incident
or a crisis correctly. One officer comments that corrupt officers believe: 
That their behaviour ... in those sorts of things is understandable, forgivable in
some fashion ... when in fact ... that is not true (30/08/1998).
To a lesser degree there were officers who were interviewed who were open to discussing a
wide range of ‘possible transgressions’ on the part of police. However, when it came to
discussing what action should be taken in addressing the issues they would withdraw, stating
that they were not sure what headquarters policy was regarding such issues. But the repetitive
pattern of leaking information and whistle-blowing has rarely been observed to change the
patterns of corruption within the police service. 
Some police contain their working environment and their dilemmas within it by focusing on
the operational task they are addressing. When police rely on structured ways of behaving,
they are relying on traditional methods of thinking. Both my observations and my practice as
an operational police officer have enabled me to develop a theoretical model of police practice.
The following figures have been developed from documents and operational police activity to
illustrate the type of black-and-white thinking typical in the professional world of a police
officer. The constructs depicted can be and are applied to complex investigative tasks, and
represent a sample of models that depict the manner of thinking on which career police officers
are reliant. The complexity of the operational officers’ steps and options, although black and
white, still show a level of understanding of the law which is often unrecognised and rarely
attributed to a job regarded by some observers as not significantly challenging. Police repeat
the patterns of thinking and application of police procedures in these tasks and, once this work
becomes repetitive, boredom, work avoidance, and the experience to develop alternative types
of communication come into play, a fact that can allow corrupt activities to develop and
become part of the everyday working environment. 
Reform means that every officer needs to learn to think and consider options that are not
represented in this symbolic black-and-white diagram. Today’s police do consider different
options as part of the process but when these avenues for flexibility are restricted by tighter
rules and regulations, it becomes virtually impossible for an officer to think laterally. And,
although the Wood Report suggested that the police organisation needed a greater acceptance
of diverse and innovative ideas and cultures, the mechanism for these emerging from officers
below the top rungs of the police executive was never considered. The police environment of
command and control does not even offer a range of possibilities for discussion. 
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Figure 4.7: The Practical Habitus: Power–Service–Justice
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Figure 4.8: The Practical Habitus: Power–Service–Justice
Figure 4.9: The Practical Habitus: Power–Service–Justice (contd)
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The diagrams in Figures: 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9 represent the analysis of operational police work
involved in arresting or processing alleged offenders. The processes are complex, numerous
and constantly recurring and they go some way towards describing the complexity of police
life, although they cannot show how each incident requires considerations of duty of care,
ethical decision-making and the discretion to act or not to act. Incidents of this type are
numerous. For example, they occur in traffic work, domestic arguments, noise complaints,
disasters, emergency service work and bomb scares as well as racial, sexual and disability
issues. They also do not show the huge range of inter-racial, multi-cultural and communication
difficulties within the community. At this point, the above list is associated with policing
activities such as arrests, zero tolerance policing, offences that relate to the audit, and
operational crime review process. When police ‘do the right thing’ by working to meet the
action ‘by the book’ demands of current management goals they are not always working within
the more flexible bounds of effective policing. Action ‘by the book’ has sharpened with the
heightened political focus of the police executive, producing results which are not necessarily
in the best interests of the community. 
Command, control and coordination depend on everyone obeying the leader and pulling
together in the same direction whether or not this is the personally preferred direction. In order
to be part of this accepted group behaviour, important rules must be obeyed, such as not
informing on one’s mates and not stepping outside the cohesive group, especially not to inform
of misconduct. In other words, there is an attitude of ‘stick together in emergencies and when
in dire straits’. Pressured for results or bored when the tasks become repetitive, a situation of
work avoidance may develop and this may become the subject of unofficial group rules and
regulations. It could be argued that corruption stems from a cultural ideal that ‘whatever the
situation, mates always stick together’. 
Legislation may outlaw the victimisation of police who report corruption, however
victimisation and harassment take many forms and is not easily controllable in a tight working
environment. An officer who witnesses corruption may have been closely involved
professionally with the offending police officer, whatever his or her rank. Few senior police
officers manage to spend thirty-odd years in a police service without bending the rules. Those
who bend the rules and are watched by others as they move up the rank structure are then
required to appease those who know of their past activities. Thanks to this mateship culture,
and existing work practices, reform may bring technical changes but the exercise of individual
unethical decision making at all levels allows the corrupt behaviour of police to continue.
Throughout their working and personal lives, police will frequently come into contact with
criminals — it is part and parcel of the job. Police have formal contact with criminals at work
and have informal contact and even socialise, or at least converse, with criminals. They may
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have to deal with issues within their own families that also involve criminal activity. An
example of a set of networks is often found in documents recording events within inquiries.
John Hancock is a former NSW police officer. He is a former business associate of
Kevin Ryan as well as being a family friend. Mr Hancock is also associated with
both Daniel [a New South Wales Police officer] and Darren Ryan and SV1[a
Criminal associate]. Mr Hancock was engaged to assist in the recovery of the
$250,000 from SV1 (Operation Sandvalley 2006: 3)
Arrests and the disruption of criminal activity are often the result of information gained from
the community, including the criminal community. The police service has information report
systems, community sources and criminal sources, all of which contribute to arrests. There are
several reasons why criminals pass on information to the police: they may want other criminals
to be arrested to suit their own ends; they may want to be paid for relevant information; or they
may obtain some other benefit by this means — for example, a letter of comfort or support,
better gaol conditions or a plea bargain. It is very rare for criminals to give information unless
this is in exchange for something that will benefit them. In fact, such an unmotivated exchange
virtually never happens. 
The hearings and other inquiries conducted by the Commission revealed that
Daniel Ryan, as well as being involved in various instances of police misconduct,
also appeared to be involved either individually or in conjunction with his
associates in a range of criminal enterprises including tax evasion, giving false
evidence and obtaining financial advantage by making false statements (Operation
Sandvalley 2006: 2). 
Whenever police officers are placed in the position of receiving information, they are in a
position of risk. This risk may affect their work, personal security, and stress levels. When it
occurs in their private lives, it impinges on their time, their personal life and adds conflict
within their personal world. Under a rigid command and control management system, the
above interactions are less open to dialogue and highly scrutinised. Even if police are
scrutinised intrusively, a police officer will often not declare their private interactions for fear
of retribution, and this places the officer at considerable risk. The introduction of the informant
management plan was based on a process of ethical contact between police and criminals but
it is heavily weighed in administrative computer detail. An alternative, ideal scenario would be
if a senior officer suggested to officers that they could actually gain credit and trust by bringing
difficult or sensitive information forward, to his or her notice. The commander, supervisor or
team leader needs to develop a working relationship based on trust, eliminating any concern
that a contact or conversation with a criminal might pose a threat to the junior officer in the
future. This would also reduce the potential for risk not only to that officer but also to the
organisation. As relationships of trust are developed by openness between people over time,
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giving officers and commanders the opportunity for open dialogue would greatly reduce the
potential for corruption or a crisis. 
The fact that a police officer is involved in criminal activity in his or her private life is a very
different matter. Clearly such a police officer should unequivocally be investigated, and if
there is evidence to support arrest, he or she must be arrested. However, it is important that
there is a flexibility in the definition of committing a corrupt act that takes into account the
needs of operational police to maintain contacts with criminals. Royal Commissioner Wood
(1996) discussed the process of policing and an individual’s daily life in the following way.
Corruption has been taken to be deliberate unlawful conduct (whether by act or
omission) on the part of a member of the Police Service, utilising his or her
position, whether on or off duty and regardless of motivation (Wood 1996: 32).
Proven or established criminal activity while working as a police officer must result in arrest.
In cases of consorting with criminals or deliberate unprofessional conduct, the police source-
management system has been introduced. Amajor aspect of this system is its ability to remove
risk from the officer as well as from ongoing investigations. Unfortunately the technology that
is in place to prove informant and police contact is, as already mentioned, cumbersome.
Perhaps the problem is that a technical response to a human behaviour-orientated problem is
not appropriate. One way a leader can avert making any decision is to err on the side of not
causing any conflict within his or her local area of command and decide for example, without
making any inquiries, to accept an officer’s claim that they had discussed an issue with another
supervisor and that there was no conflict of interest. An example is in the liquor industry,
where the officer may claim that they are a wholesaler and not selling direct to the public
(Operation Sandvalley 2006: 59). This requires the leader, who is supervising, to disregard
their knowledge of how associations with criminals work and allow consorting to occur
unsupervised with corruption resulting. 
Police process, systems and leaders dominate an individual’s decisions to the extent that
internal conflict can become distressing. The police officer has to decide whether to become
corrupt, unprofessional, inappropriate, defensive, secretive, join the peer activity, or whistle-
blow. There is no technique or soft option for locating the moral convictions, or habitus, of
individuals in this command-based social field. A person’s habitus changes, field and habitus
can change together. In practical terms, for example, one may be a police officer with all the
right reasons for conducting oneself in the right way, but then find oneself located in the work
place, as a corrupt police officer. This can result in Commissioners of Police making
unprofessional, corrupt and unethical decisions. 
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‘Tactical’ policing involves making decisions about one particular problem. For example,
priorities may aim to (1) stop violent crime; (2) increase public confidence and (3) clear up
outstanding crimes. This does not mean that supervisory practice becomes redundant, but it
means that mature, experienced, timely and open dialogues must take place between officers
within the police organisation. The common complaint amongst officers is that they do not
have enough time for open dialogue: to talk, encourage, mentor or give advice. Effective
leaders would find time to motivate staff in the right direction. In all the interviews undertaken
and the analysis of the data, no words of encouragement or support were identified. The
following comment describes one officer’s frustration:
We knew there was something wrong with the system. It had been talked about
continually. …we were aware of … inefficiencies, managerial problems, weren’t
aware of the – the corruption that was found [can’t decipher] with drug runners in
Kings Cross – but we knew there was a major management crisis within the police
service. We knew that there were – there was a fair degree of, non-performance
within the police service because everyone was watching each other and it was a
very splintered organisation, not serving the public (3511/23/03/1995).
Leadership can be frustrating with too much ‘red tape’ which gets in the way of efficient
policing operations, as one of the executive interviewees explained.
One is going back to basics of policing; reversing the trends in rising crime, and
to do that to, arrest and tackle repeat offenders, target repeat offenders. Second leg
is public satisfaction. Delivering a police service to the community in a
satisfactory way, in a timely way, in a polite way, and one that gives the public a
feeling of professionalism and confidence in policing and it can be done, even on
the telephone. And we fall down there, quite significantly in some places. The next
phase is getting rid of red tape in the organisation. They are doing the job out there
on the street, in the police station, at the offices, I deal with my red tape which is
bad enough, I try and cut through it. We do need to find ways of improving our
administrative systems, to cut out red tape for operational people particularly and
improve systems all round there. And the final one is, and it’s not the least one of
course, of all these, if we put them that way instead of that way (3809/11/09/1996).
This ‘red tape’ increased when the police executive was putting forward Operational Crime
Review as the reform answer without critically evaluating its problems but lack of dialogue
between the executive and those further down the hierarchy only obscured such problems.
Operational Crime Review is a practice that has been dependent on evaluating highly visible
policing as a statistical work performance measure. The process was statistically connected
because the work philosophy is linked to the notion of Zero Tolerance Policing, itself a
measurement system. Certainly this was a ‘quick fix’, being a police operational and
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management philosophy that was imported intact from overseas in 1996 where it had been
introduced by the New York Police Department as a corruption identification strategy following
the Mollen Commission.
Also the way that we’re structuring the organisation, the way we’re monitoring
crime, our OCR (Operational Crime Review) process which is similar, is now almost
as popular as COMPSTAT in New York. People want copies of our operating orders
and instructions across a whole range of activities because they see them as being
the best. I think that’s excellent for the service and it shows the spread, and it’s not
just nationally, it’s internationally (3809/10/12/1999). 
Unfortunately it was probably highly regarded by the police executive mainly because it came
ready-made and could be introduced with a minimum of practical planning, although whether it
had really reduced the incidence of police corruption in New York was not a demonstrable point
given the flexibility that can be applied to statistics. Police leaders were soon concerned that there
was a ‘cunning game plan in existence’ in that officers were using their own supervisors’
emphasis on recording arrest rates and clear-up rates to their own advantage. As reform was
emphasised, so was highly visible policing. It is quite possible that the government’s enthusiasm
also arose from treasury considerations (see Appendix J: The Financial Breakdown of Allocation
Funds during the Wood Royal Commission Period). The gossip among middle managers
speculated that the plan was not to offer redundancies, because that would cost money, but to use
the process of assessment centres to assess officers and assess them as not fit as leaders. 
Operation Crime Review and Zero Tolerance Policing sounded good to the media as well but for
higher-minded reasons. The police were deprived of power and, as they had apparently been
misusing this power, this was a good corruption-busting formula. It sounded good to the general
community because it meant that police officers would have to “get tough on crime”, an always-
popular idea with voters who see crime, even when the indicators are arrest rates, as a policing
failure rather than as operational success. Unfortunately, as has already been shown, both of these
reform initiatives were deeply flawed and, the community was to be the unwitting loser by this
initiative. Contradictorily, arrest rates and statistics were the very measures of the reform itself.
There was a feeling of self-satisfaction at the conclusion of the Wood Royal Commission that the
real character of the police had been exposed and that this was typified by a culture of corruption;
a secretive organisation in which power was misused and officers were as criminal as the
criminals they allegedly were supposed to control. Having little or decreased confidence in the
Police Service is difficult for the general public, as it undermines their respect and trust not only
for the organisation and for each individual police officer but also for the capability of the
organisation to fulfill its brief. If it is felt that the police cannot be trusted this has the potential
to affect the stability of the whole community. The system of law and order has to be seen as
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incorruptible with the police protecting the safety of every person in the community and
providing a security that the society will not be allowed to descend into an anarchy in which the
strong dominate the weak. 
Never before had a Royal Commission been reported so voraciously by the media, which treated
it as a show trial and cheerfully allowed a confused public to equate allegations of corrupt
activities with proof of guilt itself. Day after day the ‘findings’ fronted the news; day after day
fresh allegations were aired and discussed. Although there were later to be very few officers
brought to trial after the Royal Commission had finally published its report, and even fewer
convictions in the trials that followed, the media coverage had ensured that the stated impression
was, unequivocally, that the police organisation was riddled with corruption and, even worse,
generically corrupt. Previously, while individual officers had been identified as ‘bad apples’ in a
Royal Commission, the integrity of organisation as a whole had remained intact. All this changed
with the Wood Royal Commission, a high powered drama that was played out in the media in
highly coloured tones. And the wave of resignations and breakdowns as well as the scattering of
suicides that followed the pressure of this trial-by-media was similarly treated as proof of guilt. 
Against this background the statistical surveys graphed below provide an interesting contrast.
For despite the headlines confidence in the police did not plummet. More than three quarters
of the people polled held that police were to be trusted and were basically honest.
Figure 4.10: Confidence in Police (Steering Committee for the Review of Commonwealth/State
Service Provision (SCRCSSP): Report on Government Services, 2003)
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Figure 4.11: Police Are Honest 
(Source: Steering Committee for the Review of Commonwealth/State Service Provision
(SCRCSSP): Report on Government Services, 2003)
In general, it would appear that the community has held onto a basic belief that police are
honest. The numbers reflecting the opinions of the community about honesty in policing for
New South Wales and Western Australia are very similar to each other and those for
Queensland and South Australia are also similar, therefore figures for Western Australia and
South Australia have been omitted from the graph. The decreases all follow a similar pattern
as they occur at the same time. So they do not decrease just because of a particular crisis in
a particular state. 
The figures for Victoria are not comparable at this point in the data presentation owing
different methods of collation and the Tasmanian data are too small in number to contribute
any trend information of any significance. It seems that, despite the media coverage, the
community wanted to believe that, while there were a few cases of corruption, generally
speaking police are honest and have observed that after the Wood Royal Commission not
many officers were charged or imprisoned. Generally there appears to have been an attitude
that while corruption undoubtedly existed there were only a small number of people involved
in ‘serious’ corruption.
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The Figure below shows the level of complaints directed at police at approximately this same
period. 
Figure 4.12: Complaints per 100 Police 
(Steering Committee for the Review of Commonwealth/State Service Provision 
(SCRCSSP): Report on Government Services, 2002) 
Using complaint data as a way of assessing the degree of corruption in an organisation is very
unreliable as there are the complexities of criminal offences compared to customer complaints.
Criminals frequently make complaints against police after arrests or detention and so therefore
the content of complaints in relationship with police practice is a very difficult one to assess.
In addition to this, anonymous complaints can be generated by police officers within the
organisation for reasons such as resentment, jealousy, promotion opportunities and anger.
When the officer complains simply because of managerial unfairness or ineptness the cycle of
inquiry described in this research continues, since the issue of corruption at its cause is not
being addressed. 
The findings lead us to understand that to make scapegoats of individual officers does not
address the levels of corruption in a police organisation. But at this point the final analysis of
the process of quantitative and qualitative data is the combination of both approaches. When
clear-up rates or some other representation of low police performance in a particular area is
highlighted, for example, using statistical data, then pressure will be applied and police
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performance will be spotlighted. The next step will be a political demand for action. The
following figure explains the process. 
Figure 4.13: Pressure on Commands Causes Corruption
Political pressure and other external and internal pressures for resolution of criminal
investigations can result in serious criminal conduct by police. External and internal pressure
to produce results in investigations can also cause personal health issues to arise and officers
will go on sick report. These symptoms may appear in various ways, such as low morale,
physical and or mental illness, and can be due to ineffective management, lack of education,
inexperienced officers carrying out inappropriately assigned tasks and corrupt behaviour that
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causes mental stress. The topics for police action noted inside the boxes in the diagrams above
delineate the cause and effect of policing. The community demands action in a certain area;
parliament or the government of the day places pressure on the police command; and trying to
meet those demands affects professional police performance. The results of the operational
decision charts indicate that police can be compromised by the nature of the game itself. And
yet, as will be shown in the next section, it is these everyday processes of policing that
command and control reform agendas have failed to consider.
4.4: The Experience of Reform: Nurturing the Cycle of Corruption
There was very early in the process, prior to the arrival of Commissioner Ryan, an attempt
at workplace discussions of how the reform process might take place, as one executive
officer recalls.
We’ve had some focus groups of actual duty officers in actual LACs (Local Area
Commands) deciding what are the functions that … what is the Commissioner’s
perception for the roles and functions of a duty officer that could have been done
even more expediently (Confidential 1997).
But as paranoia built up within the organisation and the by now highly stressed executive team
became focused on quieting political demands rather than considering the functioning of the police
organisation as a whole, such measures were put aside. During the period of the Royal Commission,
the desire for effective leadership by employees is exemplified by the statements below:
Three prime issues that most people want sorted out, transfer and tenure
entitlements, the handling of complaints and promotions … then people would
begin to develop certain confidence in [Ryan] … to bring about some other
changes (3801/05081998).
The statement above indicates the confusion and desire for direction by police in basic
management issues. Commissioner Ryan, as the first police commissioner to be recruited from
overseas, was a personality who featured regularly in media articles — the popular new broom
who was going to clean up the organisation and ruthlessly sweep away it’s rotten core. There
was no thought in any of the reports that there were stressed and innocent officers who were
caught up in this ruthless clean-up. There was no thought that these reforms could be anything
but in the best interests of the organisation. The experience of this period from the inside by
the rank and file and vulnerable management, however, was far different. In talk amongst the
employees to a great degree this was a purge; a reign of terror that left everyone vulnerable to
certain degrees. Comments, of course, were both positive as well as negative and some put
emphasis on the ability of a person being recognised or given the responsibility of changing
and reforming a large organisation. 
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The view from the top, however, was very different. The cartoons appearing at the front of this
thesis highlight the notion of isolation of the Commissioner and the serving officers. The
following quotes represent this notion of a leadership with some charisma, however, they also
point to the isolation of the Commissioner. 
Commissioner Ryan has come in and instilled a lot of confidence in a lot of people,
I think by his style, his leadership. He’s very believable, he’s obviously sincere, he’s
got ideas and he’s going places. The R.C. are very pleased with him, the
government is pleased with him. I think the troops basically are giving him at least
the benefit of the doubt if not a broad endorsement … various players want to see
some definite action soon (3801/13/12/1996).
I have been staggered by his familiarity with the terminology and the language of
this organisation. He’s made an appreciation of people. He’s made an appreciation
of issues. He’s introduced a whole new way of thinking about things in terms of
project management in the organisation. He’s emphasising things like front-line
policing which I think a lot of police officers are happy to hear (3801/13/12/1996).
You don’t have to be a dragon and breathing fire and smoke to be a leader and a
manager. It means someone has to give directions on how things are done, and
others are held accountable both for the directions they give and for the outcome
of that direction … one of the biggest anchors of any cultural change program is
the lack of skills and knowledge of the workforce, see the police service have
always been spoon-fed. Police services in the world want to be spoon-fed. Very few
officers actually behave like a good doctor would and that is to constantly read up
and research on the latest techniques, cures, possibilities, diagnoses so that they
can treat their patient (3809/01022001).
There should be a distance between the Commissioner and the Executive. Is there
going to be the same confidence if there is a change of government? There appears
to be a close alliance between the government and Ryan (3812/02/09/1998).
Leaders want people who are affected by the changes to contribute to the way
those changes are going to be made (3805/12/12/1996).
The Commissioner sent a letter to the Union saying: deal with the heads of human
resources, finance or whatever, on minor issues and that he will meet occasionally
on the more strategic issues and the R.C. … The Commissioner is in a neutral
position where he’s not seen as a creature of any particular government or party
but as a servant of the government of the day and out of party politics … nor is he
a puppet of any particular group or faction (3805/12/01/1996).
The Commissioner has been asked to make organisational and structural reform
… without evidence being made available to help with any decision-making … for
example real evidence and information to put the right people in the right place
(390/06/09/2000).
134
THE NATURE OF THE GAME — NSW POLICE REFORM 1996-2004  •  CHAPTER FOUR RESPONDING TO THE INQUIRY
135
The idea that an individual at the top of a police organisation can, or even should, singly
produce radical organisational change demonstrates Commissioner Ryan’s focus on
command and control as a management practice that could produce results. Unfortunately,
as has been shown, command management practice results in technical change alone. It is
basically a tightening of discipline; a rigidification of rules and regulations that inhibits
efficient policing practice; and a fundamentally destructive force operating on officer
morale. The early focus groups were soon closed down, partly because they were time
consuming and required too much attention directed towards the needs of the organisation
and not enough attention to the specific political demands placed on the organisation to
produce defined results. They also folded because insecure executives were fearful about
external consultants who were working within the organisation already shut down to repel
an outside enemy — the last thing to be welcomed by the organisation was a Trojan Horse
in the image of a consultant. And an added problem was that they were expensive. In most
cases the duty officers who carried them out were unsupervised and were receiving a high
level of salary but there was no training and they were given no real understanding of the
newly created leadership and supervisory roles into which they were being placed. Despite
consultant Peter Crawford’s best efforts, the experiment folded.
Certainly Peter Ryan’s leadership ‘new broom’ swept in many strategic plans and policy
initiatives while it swept out old practices. But it proved easier and less costly to instantly
insert these as cosmetic changes in the technical areas such as computer technology — for
example MapInfo, or imported command plans such as Operation Crime Review and
Zero-Tolerance Policing — than as an holistic, well structured and directed organisational
change that swept away the old hierarchical command structures. If police morale
plummeted as a result of this reform it was not because officers were frightened about
innovative management ideas but because they recognised all too well that this heightened
command and control structure was anything but new. What they lost was flexibility and
operational efficiency as well as the ability to have an input into the organisation and help
to change this from within with team problem solving. And, most of all, they lost security
and the knowledge that they were really a close-knit and supportive group, not just
notionally a ‘team’.
As the structure was being flattened, senior police lost their jobs. Other police were
transferred and restructured into the organisation. As an officer commented:
The big problem is that the big central mass is instead lost … and that central
mass includes almost everybody from Deputy Commissioner to Shift Supervisor.
At this stage the only person between your supervisor and the Commissioner
who has any sort of formal connection to the reform process is the
Commissioner... this is both dangerous and necessary. In order to formulate a
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new view of the world and become committed to it I need to get out of my existing
comfort zone… nobody knows if they have a job … none of those things are clear
and will not become clear for yet for quite some months (3801/06/12/1996).
The notion of creating uncertainty to get people to go is a totally inappropriate
strategy. Now I think a little bit of it, is good to unsettle the organisation, so you
can bring about reform. But I think the fact that it’s gone on now for three or four
months are going to prove to be potentially damaging, unless it’s resolved
(3801/8/11/96).
These statements speak volumes about the attitude behind implementing reforms. Certainly it
is debatable whether reform is facilitated by ‘creating uncertainty’ or keeping people guessing
‘if they have a job’ but it is just as debatable whether it ‘is good to unsettle the organisation’
and keep people out of their ‘existing comfort zone’. Reform passed down in a series of
unexplained edicts with the expectation that these be passively accepted is an insult to any
workforce and a sure catalyst for discontent. Reform without reciprocity and without any
pretence at consultation to understand operational specificities is not good management
practice. Instead of co-operation and enthusiasm such a management will get resentment and
obstinacy. And this is not the same as resistance to new ideas and innovations.
As the figurehead directing operations with government and media backing, Commissioner
Ryan was viewed by many operational police as a British leader coming out to reform the
‘colonials’ — to bring them into line and call them to heel. The community appeared to
embrace the romance of the idea without thinking too deeply about the context. It was soon
apparent that the media had ‘adopted’ Ryan and the community duly supported him. In his
statements, Ryan often spoke and wrote using the first-person pronoun, for example: ‘I will be
looking for commitment’ and ‘I expect to see levels of satisfaction with police services rise’.
Statements opening with words such as ‘I have directed’ were frequently recorded and there
was a distancing apparent in his choice of command words that was reflected in his determined
view of the correctness of the actions he was promulgating by directive.
The thrust of the early reform was to build a more effective management structure,
a slammed down management structure, and a re-formed police response by way
of regions and Local Area Commands so that our span of control wasn’t as narrow
as it had been with loads of tiers of management above it (confidential). 
Reform here is imported, ready-made and the new ‘more effective management structure’ can
be ‘slammed down’ once the ‘loads of tiers of management’ has been eliminated. The
mechanism to carry out these reforms was to increase the ‘span of control’ by force, unyielding
and carefully displayed. Technical equipment was the perceived bridge between the general
and the troops — the ‘support’ that was lacking in communication lines was supposed to be
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compensated by increased technical resources.
It was also to provide supervisors into front-line policing twenty-four hours a day
which we’ve never really had before – I think we had in the darkness of time but
it’s just all got lost – to support officers in doing their job and you push down as
many resources as I could afford. Into the front line, things like computers, phones,
vehicles and other equipment. And quite a lot has gone out there, but of course it’s
never enough – never enough to satisfy everybody. So those were the major
reforms as they affected the front line (confidential). 
There is no sense that there needs to be a shared commitment and a shared responsibility for
reform. It comes direct from above and is distributed to the ‘front line’with as many inanimate
gifts as the commander ‘could afford’. Although ‘of course’ these were ‘never enough to
satisfy everyone’. Disgruntled officers are being nurtured here as well.
The Royal Commission demanded abstractions, or what Ryan called ‘philosophical’ changes,
and seemingly the only interpreter who would translate these changes into practice is Ryan
himself.
The rest of the reforms, and certainly the Royal Commission reforms are – Royal
Commission is very philosophical – there are few things that say, you should do
this, but most of them are ‘the Service ought to explore the possibility of’ or ‘ought
to consider the introduction of’ so they’ve stepped away from saying you should
do, to you should consider the possibility of doing it. Now, all those things affect
the systems of the Service and its organisation, they don’t contribute to front-line
policing, directly. So a young copper out there trying to do their job, or a detective,
can’t pick up many things from the Royal Commission and say, I’m expected to do
this. 
They’re expected to be ethical and act in a non-corrupt way, and treat members of
the public properly and to put files and briefs together and treat prisoners
properly. We know we’re expected to do all that and that came from the Royal
Commission, but the rest of the hundred and eighty four recommendations really
don’t affect them, so what I’m saying is because people were concentrating so
much out in police stations on wondering what the reform was going to do for them
other than give them supervision twenty-four hours a day and all these other things
I’ve already mentioned, that they were beginning to lose the plot of it – of front-
line policing (confidential). 
It is symptomatic of this command and control reform that the leadership could believe
that, in regard to ‘front-line policing’, many of ‘the hundred and eighty four
recommendations really don’t affect’ the operational police. Kept similarly out of the
planning at a significant level the higher level commanders were also asking what these
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abstractions meant: what is cultural change; what is in it for me? 
Not everybody: there’s some damn good work going on out there, very, very good
work. But the information coming back was well what’s in it for us? We don’t seem
to have seen changes … I thought, well we can’t have this, and I’ve got to focus
people’s minds on delivering good, honest, open timely police services out there
and bring down crime at the same time. And on the shirt-tails of all this focus on
let’s do it right out there, bring in other reforms, right (confidential). 
Here, once again, is the “need to know”, or rather the “need not to know” principle of
command management. The technical response is to concentrate on the policing task and
process, rather than the human complexities of the work which are too difficult for lower level
commanders to address. 
So the other reforms that we’re trying to introduce and a whole range of things …
should come in on the back of what the police officers doing the job that they
understand, and that is operational policing (11/09/1996). 
In this parlance, the general plans the strategies and the troops carry these out and obey orders
absolutely. There is no room in a battle for constructive thought from the ranks. 
Unfortunately senior executives did not enjoy the open dialogue that the introduction of an
apparently flattened management structure might suggest. Those interviewed reported a
distance in aspects of their relationship with Commissioner Ryan, although this was
explained away by the pressure of the work and the necessary pace of reform. Reports about
the difficulty of getting access to the Police Commissioner’s office and actually spending
time talking to him were commonplace in the interviews. One executive police officer
commented about problems the executive team was having, and the following comment
reflects a common thread in those conversations:
I have good communication with him. Obviously he a very busy man and there are
occasions when we’d like it to be more frequent, but I work on the premise of need
to know. So if he needs to know, then I make sure I get through the door. But we
have a regular arrangement where we arrange to meet. I work on the same premise
with other region commanders. They’ll tell me if I need to know. If something
occurs and I’ve not got adequate information, then I ask for it (Confidential
10/7/1997).
Clearly ‘need to know’ here has been given a totally different meaning to the secretive “need
not to know” attitude as previously discussed. It assumes that work goes on independently to
a certain extent and that clarification is sometimes required. However, this statement also
reveals the retention of a closed and lineal structure of management and, through this, the
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limitations of this reformed police organisation to co-ordinate strategic planning, with
conversations restricted and time constraints preventing creative dialogue that should have
involved problem-solving or strategic thinking. Instead the quote, from an officer with a wide
span of responsibility, indicates that the basis to their working day is in fact reaction and
control rather than the creative development of new ideas and responses within a team. 
Management reforms like this can never eliminate corruption in the police organisation. Rather
they embody the command control response mechanism that nurtures the whistle-blower,
perpetuating the trigger or catalyst that ensures the cycle of corruption inquiries will continue.
Reform must treat the police organisation as an holistic organism made up of real people
carrying out real work for a real purpose. Management must embody this holism and creatively
steer the very necessary and social work of policing into a new era of efficiency and harmony
with the community it has been set up to serve.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Perpetuating the Cycle: Policing in a ‘Coping Culture’
5.1: Introduction
The Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service came into existence on 
13 May 1994 and the Honourable Justice J. R. T. Wood of the Supreme Court of New South
Wales delivered his final report in May 1997. There is no general statutory power authorising
the Government to call for a Royal Commission as the issue of a letters patent for such a
purpose can only be done by the Governor, who is exercising Vice-Regal powers as the
Queen’s representative in New South Wales. The trigger for the inquiry was John Hatton,
Member of the New South Wales Legislative Assembly (MLA) for the South Coast, who had
two days before spoken at length about allegations of corruption in the police service in the
Legislative Assembly. These were serious allegations, he told the house and his information
had come from concerned officers within the police service itself. 
This House calls upon the Premier, in consultation with the Leader of the
Opposition, to establish a Royal Commission, staffed by personnel other than
serving or former New South Wales Police, to inquire into the operations of the
Police Service (New South Wales Legislative Assembly. Hansard, 11 May,
1994: 2285).
The issue of the Letters Patent made front pages in the press but the idea that serious corruption
existed in the New South Wales Police Service was not a new one, for whistle-blowers had
been talking to investigative journalists and concerned politicians such as John Hatton for
years. Nor was the demand by an independent MP unsupported by others in the Legislative
Assembly. Paul Whelan, at the time the member for Ashfield and later the Police Minister,
roundly condemned the police organisation during the same debate.
The Police Service cannot have any confidence in itself, nor can the public have
any confidence in the Police Service, while allegations of the sort heard from
the honourable member for South Coast and other honourable members of
Parliament today continue to be made in public. That is my primary motivation
in supporting this motion (New South Wales Legislative Assembly. Hansard. 
11 May, 1994: 2339). 
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Over the next two years the media reports of the proceedings of the Wood Royal Commission
would keep the issue on the front pages and, once the final report had been issued in 1996, the
pressure was kept up on the new Police Commissioner to demonstrate results. The story would,
it seemed, never go away. And why should it? For within the Report itself, could be found a
prophecy of perpetuity mingled with a forlorn measure of hope:
Corruption within policing tends to be a cyclical phenomenon. Following a period
of scandal and disclosure, there is commitment and reform which lasts for a time,
and then the cycle begins again. The occasion of this Royal Commission, and the
strength of the present climate for change, provides an opportunity to challenge the
inevitability of that cycle (Wood 1997b: 177).
Corruption in government bodies is, of course, a recurring problem, made worse in relation to
the police force because of the particular power it exercises in its operations. Twelve years
before Commissioner Moffitt had suggested that Parliament should require all levels of
government at prescribed intervals to report to Parliament, in a form understandable to all, on
what they have done in response to the recommendations of Commissions of Inquiry (Moffitt
1985: 71). Or, as Prasser (1994) theorises this:
Inquiries appear to exist at random or, to use architecture parlance, are like a ‘lean-
to or make-do’ structure providing occasional support. The police are accountable
to the community, including the direction people’s lives will take in the future.
Referees, that is, the police, work within existing structures in the community and
in police organisations. The ‘nature of the game’ is to maintain a co-operating,
functioning society that is not confronted by violence, and to uphold a safe
community (1994: 2). 
The conclusion to this is that corruption reoccurs as it is embodied in the ‘nature of the game’
itself and measures to control it have been accepted as a constant task for a democratic
government.  The necessity for this was confirmed by Justice Stewart in 1983.
Organised crime cannot exist without the corruption of Government and public
officials. Corruption is not restricted to police officials, it includes the corruption
of persons employed in Government service, officials of trade unions, officials of
sporting bodies, members of Parliament and the judiciary and any other person
employed in any official capacity in private (Stewart 1983: 677).
In the Legislative Assembly of the Parliament of New South Wales that same year, Nick
Greiner, the Leader of the Opposition, had also made the observation that the issue of
corruption could not be easily resolved.
[T]he only point I make on the matters raised by the Premier is that the very talk
of coordinating committees and of poor government co-ordination shows up the
problem flowing from the concept of successions of Royal Commissions that
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traverse essentially the same ground. They eventually make their reports, it is then
discovered that one is almost back to square one, there is talk of yet another Royal
Commission, and one has to start again from scratch (New South Wales
Legislative Assembly. Hansard. 17 August, 1983: 102).
Amplifying this, Greiner proclaimed his lack of confidence in the efficacy of Royal Commissions:
It is no longer possible to place any confidence in a series of Royal Commissions.
I say that not because of any lack of ability or integrity or anything else on the part
of those who run or service commissions, but simply because organised crime does
not fit readily into a conceptual framework involving a judge and varying judges
over time, starting again from scratch. Six reports covering broadly the same area
have now been issued and the results can best be described as minimal (New South
Wales Legislative Assembly. Hansard. 17 August, 1983: 106).
The ‘results’ of these inquiries might well have been dismissed as ‘minimal’ in terms of
producing a transparent police service that could be certified to be above reproach but the
experience of the ordeal had not had a minimal effect on the police officers themselves.
Continuing police corruption and its constant exposure is a cause of concern amongst serving
police officers as well as of the community. Some examples of the allegedly corrupt activities
include criminal offences such as assault or physical injury; stealing; conspiracy to pervert the
course of justice; and drug offences but they also included alleged offences that encompass
management matters, including providing unauthorised information; failing to exercise proper
supervision; misusing office; using the wrong procedure with warrants; and matters involving
personal conduct,  including rudeness and customer service issues. 
Corruption results in complaints and conflict within all organisations but is seen to be more
serious when it occurs in the police organisation because of the power exercised by this
service. Institutions and individual members of the community such as politicians, members
of the judiciary and welfare groups rely on the police to carry out their duties lawfully.
However when those police activities involve corrupt, unprofessional and unethical activities,
individuals call attention to this through especially designated channels. What is significant is
that both the community and police organisation are observing crises within the service on a
frighteningly regular basis and that these are seen to be generally exposed through media
reports or working involvement rather than through official channels.
The media, in particular, have tended to portray corruption as the dreadful, undermining
activity of an ‘individual’ sheltered by the organisation. As one criminologist recorded:
But it was the ‘crotch-cam’ shots of ‘Chook Fowler’ trousering wads of cash and
uttering endless permutations on the F words, which achieved international media
cult status (Brown 1997: 221). 
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Most exposures of police corruption concentrate on the activity of an individual ‘bent copper’ and
dwell lovingly on images of the evidence of corruption, fleshing these out with re-enactments or
file footage to build up the drama. In a sense this could be said to depict corruption as being separate
from the main culture of the police but, as the images mount up inexorably over time, it is all
members of the organisation itself that carry the blame and internalise community disapproval.
And, as the ‘media helped build a strong momentum for further revelation’ the demand for reform
also builds (Brown 1997: 221). And this, as has been shown, shapes itself around heightened levels
of discipline within the existing levels of command and control management, demanding stronger
leadership intervention and stronger attention to rules and regulations. 
The New South Wales Police Service was invited to make submissions to the Royal
Commission inquiries. On 14 November 1995, Commissioner Tony Lauer sent the following
letter to Justice Wood:
… I wish to refer to a recent press report which suggested that there is reason to
believe that for some within senior command ranks and elsewhere there is still not
a full commitment to the objectives for the Royal Commission and that damage
control remains a first priority. In that regard may I again record my personal
support for the Royal Commission...
The potential to influence policing in this State (via the Commission) will occur
into the next century, I recognise, therefore that it is of the utmost importance that
the Police Service cooperate to ensure that the charter for the future provides the
community with the best possible policing service (Lauer 1995RMS 8050197V). 
In this letter Commissioner Lauer was acknowledging that the organisation needed to look to
itself to resolve the problem. The police response recorded in internal discussion documents
refer particularly to operational crime matters and these became the focus of the ‘reform’
efforts. Statistical data demonstrating the day-to-day operational activities would be made
available in a basic audit or review of what police were actually doing.  But reform should have
been seen as more than just an apparent willingness to submit to external scrutiny.
In contrast to the media view of the guilty individual exposed during the inquiry, this thesis
places corruption and its continuing occurrence within the decision making processes of the
command and control leadership model of management. Leadership in this research includes
any individual involved in making decisions at an operational and management level,
including the police commissioner, the police executive, commanders of police stations and
leaders in operational decision making arenas involved in internal reform. This chapter,
therefore, specifically relocates responsibility for the corruption cycle at the level of command.
For the responsibility for perpetuating a damage control response to external criticism and the
willingness to showcase action rather than undertaking the more difficult task of planning this
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at a meaningful organisational level that includes all officers in the process, makes senior
executives wielding command and control management techniques culpable. When the crisis
passes and the community is reassured through the media that corruption has been dealt with,
allowing policing to return to normal within the police community, the organisation continues
incubating fresh corruption and nurturing the catalysts for corruption exposure in the future. 
And so the cycle continues. It is vital that it is acknowledged that the real avenue for reform
is one of change and that the impetus for total organisational reform at present rests with the
police executive itself. 
5.2: Tactical Response in a ‘Coping Culture’
As experienced operational officers, Police Commissioner Tony Lauer and his successor
Peter Ryan responded speedily, if differently, to the demands for reform, introducing
measures to proclaim various schemes for oversighting, accountability and technical change.
Response is at the centre of efficient policing activities and experienced officers have learnt
to recognise crisis situations and act fast to resolve them as quickly as possible. A technical
response can also be interpreted as resolving an identified internal organisational problem or
one created by external observers. A technical response is made apparent by its reliance on
short, sharp, tactical, statistical and unilateral explanations. Unfortunately, efficient
management is not the same as efficient policing. The crisis here was not a short, sharp
shock and its resolution could not be instantaneous, although clearly the government, the
media and the concerned public were demanding such a result. 
Due to the complexity of organisational life, this tactical response mechanism cannot simply
be applied to effectively restructuring an entire organisation. Rapid damage control
responses to organisation problems  are not good replacements for strategic planning and
decision-making. Quick fixes involving a flurry of ultimately unrelated  reforms If the New
South Wales Police Service as whole did not easily grapple with major change it was
because the changes themselves did not target the problem of corruption within the
organisation. As one officer commented in 1996:
They’ve seen what a mess it’s in and that there’s got to be change and yes, they
want to change. But the question is, have we got the skill to bring about that
change internally (3806/13/05/1996).
The problem, essentially, was will rather than skill and the police executive had no 
long-term strategy to facilitate meaningful change and no political will to plan for this,
develop the management skills, and carry these into effect. The power to carry out
meaningful reform remained tightly curbed. It appears unlikely that the police executive was
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really aware of what the problem really was.
The Commissioner and CET (Commissioner Executive Team) view reform as a
series of projects, owned by members of the CET, rather than an integral part of
the everyday work of the Service. Best practice change management indicators
suggest, however … the devolution of responsibility for reform needs to be
pushed further down the organisation. In our opinion, all members of the Service
are needed to be considered responsible for and actively involved in the delivery
of reform (Hay Group 2000: 221-2). 
Commissioner Ryan was appointed on 30 August 1996 and the collection of statistics to
demonstrate effective reform commenced in the same year. He stated: ‘I intend to make
changes in a measurable and methodical way to cement reforms in place’ (Commissioner
Ryan Executive Team Meeting Internal Meeting). His term as Commissioner was marked by
great uncertainty, as reflected in the taped interviews with the previous Acting
Commissioner and his executive. Commissioner Ryan argued that it would take time to
make the changes and he, and to a lesser extent his team, would make them alone.
Interestingly, this reactive leadership response to the Wood Royal Commission can be seen
to mirror the historical response to other inquiries — see Appendix G. Following on from
his Report into British Prisons in 1992 Judge Stephen Tumin commented that the practical
response to the crisis had demonstrated the existence of what he called a ‘coping culture’. 
It is my belief that much of what we attempted to achieve in the police service as
a whole is something that can be described as a coping culture rather than actually
addressing the issues (Judge Tumin, Home Office Internal Report: 1992).
Although Tumin’s report had focused on the prison system, his findings were widely
discussed as being relevant to the British police organisation as well. Throughout an
extensive period of unsettlement, both the management and staff of the prison, where the
new initiatives in management were carried out, had been credited with the way they had
‘coped with the prevailing circumstances’. According to Judge Tumin (Home Office: 1992)
there was a great deal of pride regarding the staff’s abilities to respond to any demand placed
upon them, and to ‘manage’ the ensuing consequences. This had been recognised by many
as a notable organisational strength. 
But is ‘coping’ enough? Judge Tumin did not really think so as he would have preferred a
measured response towards ‘actually addressing the issues’. It would appear that the Wood
Royal Commission, the Police Executive and the Police Service as a whole, as well as the
media, have also had difficulty in recognising the limitations of ‘coping’ and the locus of
blame for ‘resistance to change’. It is also clear from the results that no one in the police
executive had any interest in undertaking strategic discussions about what a ‘reformed’
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Police Service would look like. Given this fact, it is clearly impossible to turn a vague
abstraction of a reformed Police Service into a fully-functioning organisational reality. 
In the crisis that followed the Wood Report some police officers clearly ‘coped’ with the
reform process better than others. But they were not necessarily coping with change but
using their symbolic capital as a bargaining counter in the purge that followed in the name
of reform. There were individual officers who acted alone or more readily formed groups or
networks in order to gain privileges, status, economic benefits and nepotistic relationships
— officers who knew how ‘to cope’ but had lost sight of the ideal of policing, instead
redirecting their efforts inwards, towards personal gain or survival. ‘Coping’ therefore, is not
necessarily dependent on ability to accept change. 
The following statement is from a general duties officer with university training, feeling the
effects of the Royal Commission and showing a fair degree of distance from the leadership
of the organisation. 
There are duty officers who think that all they do is flick and tick, six station
controllers instead of one. Far from the truth; that is not the job; and it is not
until we can roll out the roles and functions and then roll out a developmental
training package associated with it that they are going to start to realise what
the expectation is of them (1300/25/10/2000).
This officer realised how crucial it is that a police organisation has clear strategic directions
and statements of purpose that create an identity independent of contemporary political
needs. The Royal Commissioner Justice Wood had indicated in discussions that the reform
process would not succeed without the assistance of external experts. However, police
leaders did not welcome external assistance, having shut down to organisation to tighten
lines of command and stifle further whistle-blowing. The police executive did not utilise the
skills offered to them by these professionals; they did not learn from them or give them the
necessary information to allow a new strategic planning to dovetail to the organisation’s
internal peculiarities; they did not make their skills accessible to the lower levels of the
hierarchy and allow the organisation to actively manage reform from within. 
It seemed as if the police management was protecting the organisation from any invasion of
new ideas and, in the process, all but the new police executive were labelled as resistant to
change by outside observers. The operational police were simply seen as ‘not coping’ with
this radical change. Senior police considered ideas geared towards securing the organisation
against outside interference, rather than gaining a knowledge of new skills that could help
them find how this could take place. If the police executive cannot open the organisation to
incorporate external experts or agree to learn from others, then it is very difficult to consider
how reform in the police organisation could possibly take place at all. 
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Command and control management creates both a rule-bound system and a ‘coping culture’
that forces reform from above without giving any real level of thought to the officers who
will have to ‘cope’ with the problems created by the lack of creative planning. While the
NSW Police Service employed rhetoric about moving into a new era of policing suitable
for the twenty-first century, the strengthening of the command and control leadership style
ensures that this will be nothing but rhetoric. This is reinforced by the notion that policing
should be geared towards satisfying the needs of the government, producing instantaneous
responses to a whole range of situations in order to keep the Police Minister in office. 
Since the appointment of Peter Ryan it is the Police Minister who appoints the Police
Commissioner, putting him effectively under the minister’s command. So the Police
Commissioner then needs to act daily as directed and make political decisions rather than
organisational ones. There is also a general understanding that, as the police organisation
serves the community, that community should have an active role in deciding what
constitutes effective policing. Certainly the policing organisation holds its power on trust
from the community and individual police in that organisation are accountable to them, but
the community is also the body being policed and the laws that are being enforced are the
product of the judiciary. This complex political and social relationship existing between the
policing organisation; the individual officers within it; and the government, the judiciary,
and the wider community, is implicated in sustaining the cyclical nature of Royal
Commissions.
5.2.1: Not ‘Coping’: The Making of a Whistleblower
Although Royal Commissions are inquiries that have no right to prosecute any person,
during the procedure wide-sweeping allegations are made and individual officers’
reputations are ruined without trial and without even then need for a trial. Their personal
sense of worth is destroyed and the peer groups of officers under review are implicated in
corruption and, as a consequence, are left feeling extremely despondent and angry. It is
important to understand that injustice to individuals can and does occur during the
progress of an inquiry. Hallett (1982: 183) states the rules of natural justice have been
described as being ‘in a broad sense a procedural matter which is in fact nothing more than
fair play in action’ (Commissioner of Police v Tanos (1958) 98 C.L.R. 383, 396).
Unfortunately, during a Royal Commission in which the media elevates allegations to the
realm of proven fact and creates something that is very like a show trial, ‘fair play in
action’ is clearly untenable.
As morale slumps and individuals are put under severe emotional stress, a few of these
officers will fester within the organisation until they become the trigger for a new set of
revelations and a new Royal Commission. A trigger is a point of crisis or risk to an
THE NATURE OF THE GAME — NSW POLICE REFORM 1996-2004  •  CHAPTER FIVE PERPETUATING THE CYCLE: POLICING IN A ‘COPING CULTURE’
individual that propels that person towards a course of action that directs attention to
problems within their organisation. The history of internal conflict in an individual or, in
some cases, a group of individuals, is usually complex and has many facets, making the
habitus, or mental habit, of the police officer who becomes a whistle-blower, very important
to understand. For a police officer, talking indiscreetly and inappropriately out of school is
a very serious business, revealing someone who could be disgruntled, desperate, frustrated,
emotionally in conflict, anxious or even psychologically disturbed.   In the words of one
interviewee:
… your life is not worth living if you say anything that might put in another
police person for doing the wrong thing … there’s a widely held perception that
your career’s finished if you say anything that might lead to action being taken
against another police officer who’s done the wrong thing (3804/13/05/1996).
Whistle-blowing is therefore not something to be taken lightly and, above all, this can be
someone who passionately wants to create change that will modify the organisation that they
are working within and have no hope that this can take place in any other way. 
Another form of ‘trigger’ can be someone, or again several people, who are outside the
police organisation but have an unresolved issue or issues with the organisation. They might
have a grudge, be indulging in payback, or they might believe they have been unjustly
treated or have received information about an action or series of actions that they feel the
organisation is unwilling to deal with properly. Again, these issues are unresolved and,
apparently,  irresolvable through any other means. These people can also cause a point of
crisis that will precipitate an external inquiry of the Police Service. The concept of the
‘trigger’ is made clear when analysing past Royal Commissions. Basically a ‘trigger’ is very
connected to individuals who become disenfranchised, disillusioned or determined to be
heard. What is important here is that it is the police executive which has failed to address
the risk by not addressing the cause. 
As a general rule, police are willing to report on corrupt practices when they can do so
anonymously. However, having to formalise their complaints discourages many from
informing. Relying on the police to visibly inform on their colleagues as a way of
identifying corrupt officers is not a successful strategy. One officer recorded: 
He or she blew the whistle and look where they finished up … and they often
finish up very badly … they just can’t hack the pace any longer when they see
that they’re being discriminated against … it seems to flow from, that patrol
commanders don’t usually get involved in this sort of thing at the local level …
an official reaction has to be demonstrated … a lot of it is a want of
understanding and a lot of it is this skewed loyalty that’s been skewed and
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absolutely put into the wrong context by those who want to protect themselves
from being found out from corrupt or dishonest behaviour (3804/13/05/1996).
As individuals working within a tight-knit group loyalty is important and this bond is
recognised throughout the organisation. In the words of a senior police leader:
Being professional means that you demand from your peers professional
behaviour rather than people from outside having to enforce it. A profession sets
its own standards by its very nature (3804/01/05/1996).
‘Being professional’ in this sense also implies ‘coping’. Command and control managers
‘demand’ a ‘coping’ response but, with a disgruntled or dissatisfied police officer, there will
be a time when ‘demand’ is no longer enough. In terms of individual members of the police,
one of the elements that clearly created a difficulty in the media was the existence of the
‘code of silence’ which was equated with a decidedly contorted loyalty ethic. Certainly
these conventions of loyalty have enabled corrupt police to expect protection and to feel
able to call on their colleagues whenever any investigation occurs but it is not always a
loyalty ungrudgingly given and is very much the subject of peer pressure, as one officer
from the Police Association explained during an interview.
The Associations find it very hard to come out and stand up and say, we do not
want corrupt police [to expect us to] spend their hard-earned dues on taking
every possible legal point to stop corrupt police being dealt with
(3804/13/05/1998).
This twisted loyalty is also deeply entrenched and is difficult to break, even though it is
misplaced and corrosive to police officers who are not themselves corrupt. Trying to talk
about this aspect of police culture is difficult as it seems to simplify police corruption by
distributing it amongst all officers, causing even further emotional conflict within the
organisation as well as between the organisation and the community, who view this ‘code
of silence’ as a criminal cover-up. 
Ongoing major objectives have been supposedly set up to modify and correct inappropriate
behaviour, involving line commanders being given increased levels of accountability  and
made directly responsible for ensuring acceptable standards of conduct. They are also
supposed to expedite the removal of unsatisfactory officers from the Service. In the words
of Paul Whelan:
You can change behaviour through new legislation or management practices –
such as random alcohol testing, or as 181 dismissals — which I am pleased to
acknowledge have had a positive effect on police culture. But attitudinal change
does not happen overnight — there has to be a willingness to change and it
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takes time (New South Wales Legislative Assembly. Media release. 
12 February, 2001).
However, the senior officers made accountable for this behavioural change are also
individuals whose habitus has been constructed within the field of the police organisation.
They understand the rules of ‘the game’ and share the same unconscious commonsense
beliefs and values of their subordinates — in Bourdieu’s terms they share a similar doxic
relationship between habitus and field. Demanding ‘attitudinal change’ as a reform measure
without an adequate understanding of the complexities of a particular organisational social
relationship inevitably means generic ‘personal development’ courses which cannot work on
the particular nuances of a team relationship within a policing organisation.
Junior officers may trust their supervisors’ reputation, experience, and authority. The police
process has an absence of any workable system to identify corrupt officers or, more
importantly, to deal with and pursue of corruption in the first place. The refusal of many
detectives to submit to the command and direction of uniform officers, particularly Local
Area Commanders, means that the networks that proliferate corrupt practice continues.
Local area Commanders delegate complete responsibility to the Commanders of the
Detectives who are clearly aligned with their subordinates. This thesis suggests that it is not
just the individuals who perform acts of corruption but the very process of oversight itself.
Pressure to perform quickly, keep subordinates in control, and to institute change without
clear strategic purpose can exacerbate corrupt processes.
The results amplify the role of the individual as a crucial part of any reform process. They
show that to scapegoat or arrest an officer does not stop the corrupt behaviour occurring.
Instead, it diverts action away from the problem and this ultimately puts stress on all the
honest police officers in the organisation. It is essential that the police management rethink
the process of decision making and learn how to resolve moral dilemmas and come to an
understanding of the role of leadership as a method of insightful problem solving, rather
than as an exercise in command and control. The Royal Commission had its beginning in a
few heroes who stood up for what they believed in, becoming whistle-blowers who were
simply branded  as disgruntled officers who couldn’t ‘cope’. They can be said to be leaders,
although they were not formally recognised as such. 
Their leadership involved talking about a vision for a better Police Service but this future had
no room for the changes that these whistle-blowers saw to be necessary. Perhaps those who
spoke out did not share their vision of a reformed organisation but they were determined that
things should change. A significant difficulty in attempting to analyse and define the role of a
police officer is that most of the relevant texts and documents do not clearly state what police
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are actually supposed to do. Even police documents, texts and journal documents struggle to
define what ‘it’ is that police do. There is plenty of information about what they cannot do but
little about this real purpose. This has been lost in the movement to close up loopholes and
constrain corrupt action. Police are basically required to do the ‘Right thing’, or as said in the
police environment, act by the book. However, when it is identified that they are not doing ‘it’
in a way that is transparent, accountable and honest, there is a call for Royal Commissions and
inquiries to rectify ‘it’. 
5.2.2: ‘Coping’ with ‘Reform’
Inquiries and crisis cause such confusion in their process of oversighting that the roles of the
leaders and individuals who are an integral part of the process of sustaining the practice of
corruption become almost invisible. We have to maintain social order so we cannot charge
Commissioners, as a matter of response to corruption cycles of inquiries. But as it is in the
community’s interest to stabilise a police organisation and prevent the welfare of the society
from being put at risk. Fear of negative outcomes cannot be allowed to permit ongoing
generic corruption.  the researcher was employed in 1985 to work as a plain clothes officer
in a task force looking at the connections of organised crime to the gaming industry and this
was a result of the earlier Lusher Inquiry. As the Wood Royal Commission reported its
findings I observed police executive management responding by establishing a Reform Co-
ordination Unit, with the aim of disrupting the connections between organised crime
identities and serving police officers. If the aim had been to arrest corrupt police then there
would have been, to use Bourdieu‘s words, a major ‘cultural disjuncture’ (Wacquant 2004:
388). Although police officers and ex-police officers were suspected of being involved in
organised crime in the gaming industry no action was taken. As I reflected on the logic of
policing corrupt police officers and watched the very same officers go on to be promoted
during the course of years, I experienced a sense of internal conflict that made conducting
this research as an insider an imperative. Bourdieu has described this as a ‘fissuring of
consciousness’ (Wacquant 2004: 387). 
The Police Integrity Commission is an external oversight mechanism set up in the aftermath
of the Wood Royal Commission. According to Anne Martin, an external observer of the
reform process, ‘The Police Integrity Commission is like the video referee, the final judge
(Anne Martin, External Observer 2003). Past inquiries had their advantages, as some
initiatives were specifically aimed at improving police/minority relations. Others involved
blanket reforms for building a more professional, accountable and open police force.
However, they also had their disadvantages. Commissions may run out of control and
undermine reputations based on hearsay, and they are expensive. They may appear to act as
a Star Chamber, investigating without the constraints of normal rules of evidence. These
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factors explain the need for caution (Weller 1994: 266). External highly placed public
bureaucracies are recorded commenting: 
There should be a distance between the Commissioner and the Executive. Is
there going to be the same confidence if there is a change of government? There
appears to be a close alliance between the government and Ryan. We knew there
was something wrong with the system. It had been talked about continually. We
were aware of inefficiencies and managerial problems, but we weren’t aware of
the — the corruption that was found with drug runners in Kings Cross — but we
knew there was a major management crisis within the Police Service. We knew
that there was a fair degree of non-performance within the Police Service
because everyone was watching each other and it was a very splintered
organisation, not serving the public (2402/23/03/1998).
During the Royal Commission, police culture became a convenient label for a range of
negative values, attitudes and practical norms among police officers. The interview material
shows that individual police officers also experienced the confusion that is very prominent
at this period of review.  
I’m describing a situation where the conditioning that occurs in a massive
organisation like this, coupled with the militaristic approach that is part of the
conditioning, makes it almost impossible for people within the Service to grasp
new ideas and to cause them to be implemented because of all the constraints
that they’ve grown up with. Every time they think about doing something
different, there’s a hundred and one reasons why you shouldn’t do it and why you
shouldn’t rock the boat and why you should let status quo remain. And it’s a very
very difficult thing. (4001/13/0219/97)
Many police officers who backed away from giving evidence to the Royal Commission or
in the few criminal proceedings that followed became informants, either to the Police
Integrity Commission or to interested journalists. This type of activity was so prevalent that
it was said that informing became a popular habit. The Commissioner became the focus of
so much media attention that the community was concerned that he might capitulate to
pressure and resign. Community members expressed a desire to write to the Commissioner
and tell him that they wanted him to stay. John Hatton had been fighting corruption in the
Legislative Assembly for years and his history of fighting for an honest Police Service was
the reason that police and other community members contacted him in order for an
independent review of the Police Service to be established.
My research was started in 1996 when Commissioner Ryan had just begun his five-year
tenure as the Police Commissioner. At this time much of the executive police dialogue was
about cultural change and police reform. My doctoral research commenced with the
Commissioner’s permission and had been given two audiences: firstly, the Police
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Commissioner, who was receiving reports from me twice a year on how the reform process
appeared to be progressing; and secondly, the work was being prepared for thesis examiners.
I mention my location within this review because I was a part of an historical event that has
been linked to previous inquiries. Also, the management response was to review the
literature on historical development within policing that may have led to a style of command
leadership. So, as the above section describes, the military and command influences within
which I found myself positioned were also the demands of operational police work. These
led to the theoretical imperative to understand both the police organisation and the
individual working in the police operational area. 
Historically, police record their official response to inquiries with reports to the Police
Minister. These documents are internal to the Police Service and are notable at times for
their brevity. The police response, presented in written monthly documents forwarded to the
Police Minister, attempt to address all recommendations made, at least by stating
‘discussions continuing’; ‘referred for advice’;  or that the recommendation(s) had been
directed to a particular staff member to address. One of Commissioner Ryan’s responses to
the Wood Royal Commission was an internal police document, distributed widely to
operational officers. It promised that workforce reform would result in the following
outcomes: a workforce aligned to the Services; stated objectives; demonstrably improved
professional behaviour; jobs which focus on and enhance police practice; and a stable,
enabled and supported workforce with effective supervision and management. The 1996
document had wide-reaching but non-specific initiatives such as the Command Management
Framework, whose aims are recorded as crime reduction; rationalised and improved work
practices; employee job satisfaction and motivation; public satisfaction; and police
responsiveness (Hay Group 2001). A similar list of desirable outcomes can be found in the
document produced by the NSW Independent Commission Against Corruptions document
produced in 2001. 
As these policy changes were introduced, an operational respondent stated: 
We have not identified what we are trying to achieve, what is the heart and soul
of reform. What is it we are trying to achieve? (3803/10/03/1996)
Commissioner Ryan did introduced sweeping changes in the areas mentioned above,
including a complete reorganisation of the command structure and the implementation of
new recruitment criteria  as well as training programs. One executive officer remarked:
The Commissioner is on a reform process and, and I have every confidence that
he will in time deliver on these (3801/10/03/1996).
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At the beginning of his term in office, as Ryan introduced changes, he was publicly
recognised as the ‘new broom’ but, over time, the media’s attitude changed from supportive
to critical. As the pressure on Ryan about his performance increased, particularly from
politicians outside events, the failure of his ‘magic bullet’ to materialise inspired the media
to apply additional pressure to him.
The police executive is marred by infighting; its members exaggerate their
accomplishments without any substance and only exhibit a certain ‘post-crisis’
type of loyalty, as evidenced in the Police Integrity Commission Findings. The
executive does not have any strategies for managing relationships within the
executive: there are no systematic strategies in place generally. Their course of
action is to ‘react, react and react’ (3708/04/07/1998).
Short-term change seems to happen only in response to a need created by a crisis and a
problem that needed long-range planning. Senior executive members consider tactical
responses, often when they consider risks to be potential threats to themselves and their
careers. Often the official excuse for incorrect decisions is that NSW Police Executive team
does not have the time to bring about, plan, or even think about managerial reform change,
because of hierarchical responsibilities and operational responsibilities. The Executive is
consumed with operational demands and political pressure. The executive group also is
reluctant to grasp and utilise its deep and wide intellectual resources located within its
experienced police officers. Despite this visibly deteriorating situation, Ryan was reluctant
to bring in consultants, almost as if it would be a personal affront to the executive. 
Did Ryan have the operational skills to make decisions? He appeared to have a habit of
gathering information from different sources and then slowly making decisions, often over
months. He was clearly not a reactive leader and making decisions was not a skill that he
overtly displayed. However, he was capable of making technical decisions regarding such
matters as resource issues, and he implemented organisational structural problem solving.
The first decisive action that drew Ryan to the attention of the media was the removal of
several members of the executive — an action that was seen to show that there was a new
leader at thehelm and complacency was in retreat. In this decision, however, there was very
little consultation with the executive, or indeed with any of his team. 
Does the notion that Ryan as an outsider could create change fit comfortably with the rules
of the existing ‘game’? In traditional policing communities, decisions were and are passed
up the hierarchical chain. This was one aspect of running the organisation that Ryan
immediately challenged, creating an unintentional vacuum that by default invested more
decision-making power in the lower ranks of the executive. It became apparent that leaders
within the organisation were very conscious of trying to do what ‘the boss’ wanted, and
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above all wanted to please him and meet his requirements. It also became apparent that
senior police officers were used to passing decisions ‘up the line’ and had difficulty
assuming the new level of decision-making, particularly when they realised the new, higher
level of accountability that came with the authority to make decisions. 
A closer relationship with the Police Minister by a Police Commissioner became part of
Ryan’s Commissionership, developing a dangerous precedent. Earlier Police Commissioners
had not practiced this, as I had observed when working with Commissioners Avery and
Lauer. When Commissioner Ryan, and later Commissioner Moroney took command, a
closer relationship between the government and the police was forged; one of regular
contact. Police officers started regularly voicing criticism that the relationship with the
Ministry was becoming too apparent and dangerously close to the internal decision making
of the ‘independent police organisation’. 
It is clear the officers were confused and divided regarding the value and intentions of the
proposed reform. This was partly due to the increased public and political scrutiny. Ryan
attempted to provide direction in his foreword to the corporate plan: 
Our reform agenda includes a continuing attack on corrupt practices through the
use of Commissioner’s confidence legislation, targeted integrity treating and the
development of corruption-resistant systems (New South Wales Police Service
1998a: 1) 
Police were to utilise this formal statement by declaring to the public that they have defined a set
of standards and that all personnel have read it. Police managers would then ask police if they
understand the ethics statement and so a ‘Cultural Awareness Survey’ advised the executive: 
The New South Wales Police Service officers indicated that clarifying rules
about ethical behaviour would improve practical ethics. They also identified a
need to support good behaviour and recognise honesty as being integral to the
Service (New South Wales Police Service 1996a: i).
Interviews recorded showed a feeling frustration as one commander after another grappled
with the management of policing in this period.
How do patrol commanders handle things, one of the barriers to actually doing
that well is the same culture which on the street says you arrest and incarcerate
and punish, that is the same culture that says you charge and penalise and take
before the tribunals, the police. Am I making that clear, on the basis of police
arresting others we may then also result in arresting police? Which of us …
stand still so that the due process of law can be applied … is this reform …?
(Confidential 1999)
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However, as previously discussed, zero tolerance on community behaviour followed by
police leadership zero tolerance on inadequate crime prevention becomes the focus of police
generally and reform becomes irrelevant. However, at the same time a clear statement of
intent about reform is recorded in the following confidential statement:
... the report simply recommends that eighty police be moved out [of police
headquarters] and that those jobs be done by qualified civilians, but then
management structure also be reduced from about twenty-seven layers … no, I
am exaggerating, from five or six layers — to about two; that there be clearer
supervision and support and encouragement of people; that the … Management
of people occur at patrol level … even today managers are still imposing
directly, under the existing system, all those sort of things you know … draconian
things anyway on the basis of sexism, racism and all those other things
(confidential).
However, in an interview, a very senior police executive stated confidentially late in 1997:
I guess you have to look at who is saying things. I am not too sure that there was
nothing that happened to them either. I mean, the indignity, the loss of credibility,
the loss of respect to their families and the loss of their job was a price that they
paid for that indemnity. I just wish we’d have had the ability to have picked them
up before that and charged them and put the due process of law… in place
(confidential 1997). 
The above statement reflects the frustration and issues that operational police experienced
with the due process of inquiries as they took place in the early days of the Royal
Commission. Senior officers expressed their frustration with corrupt officers as if they
are an anomaly within the organisation. Anyone benefiting from corrupt practices and
unprofessional behaviour will resist change that will result in the loss of those benefits.
But this is only part of the reason that reform does not occur. Neither will it occur unless
all employees are convinced of a different vision involving a new or evolving ethical
base supported by changes in management behaviour that flow through the whole
organisation. Instead the changing structures and improving technology of the police
organisation conspired to hide the continuing failure to reform from those outside the
organisation — a failure that is exacerbated by the organisation’s closed and secretive
community. 
Becoming transparent, accountable and open would have shown the community that reform
was changing individuals’ cultural behaviour. This would have resulted in an increase in
openness by individual officers as well. In fact, where there is no disenfranchisement and
no disgruntled employees, there is a safe environment in which innovators can be heard and
whistle-blowing is not the only way concerned officers can affect change. When reform or
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changes in culture are imposed, leaders remove responsibility from the rest of the culture;
and police throughout the hierarchy cannot make decisions. 
Enforcing the rules and setting up intrusive supervisory regulations provide a false sense of
social and organisational cohesion. Those who want to maintain the benefits gained by
corruption also want to maintain their perceived great individual freedom in carrying out
corrupt acts. Trying to introduce new ideas, therefore, needs to first combat or remove the
benefits gained from old practices. In this thesis it is suggested that informing individuals of
new practices in policing that combine operational command and control with the
interpretation of situations and adaptation of management skills in an open manner will
result in fewer instances and opportunities for corruption. It would only be if the leaders are
those who benefit from corruption, then new practices will not be introduced.
5.3: Changing Management, Changing the Organisation 
When it is pressure from the politicians and the media that informs the pressure for
organisational change, reorganisation and reform hinges on the traditional policing response
to policy, regulation, management and resource management. Policy directives are issued,
for example, copies of a Code of Ethics will appear in frames and be distributed to all
sections of the organisation. This is regarded as a preventative measure. Davis (1991: 16)
defined a code of ethics as a formal statement of a group of ethics, whether as a description
of a pre-existing practice or as a formula creating a new practice. 
The recommendations of the Wood Royal Commission were not written on tablets of stone
but it seemed as if they were edicts not recommendations. Commissioner Ryan and Police
Minister Whelan both claimed that their approach was vindicated by success in affecting
crime rates, accessed using new statistical approaches. Perhaps it is understandable that the
Service should prefer to focus on something as tangible, publicly popular and apparently
‘deliverable’ as statistics apparently showing the reduction of crime, rather than on the
amorphous and challenging task of planning sweeping cultural change (Dixon 2001: 213).
The Police Service’s obsession with image was criticised by the Legislative Council inquiry
into policing in Cabramatta (New South Wales Legislative Council. 2001: 168; Dixon 2001:
206) but basically the smoke and mirrors had done their work with the community response.
Honour was satisfied with a few ritual sacrifices.
It is often difficult to reconcile the high quality of individual officers whose aim is to serve
the community with the secretive character of the organisation. The cliché about ‘rotten
apples in barrels’ may not only need to be revived but also to be revised — all too often, the
barrels rather than the apples appear to be the source of the problem. So the organisation had
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external auditors continuing to comment about the organisation’s performance and the
organisation itself was reverting to old behaviours caused by continuing confusion and lack
of strategic direction. As Dixon commented:
The continuing series of rivalries, insults, disputes, feuds and antagonism
exposed by the inquiries into ‘Cabramatta and the BCP [Behavioural Change
Program] would stretch the imagination of a scriptwriter for a soap opera’
(Dixon 2001: 216).
The media’s concern with complaints about police resulted in an executive leader in the
police organisation recording the comment: 
The relationship between media image and public confidence needed to be
explored, because Ryan’s personality was crucial to the reform process
(confidential 1997). 
In the media fanfare surrounding Peter Ryan’s appointment as Commissioner, the public saw
that some kind of action was finally happening within the Service–the old complacency
appeared to be on the run as sackings and resignations demonstrated change even though the
NSW Police Ombudsman’s office indicated in its Annual Report in 1999 that corruption was
still prevalent in the Service. Positive managers were now actively supporting officers who
blow the whistle on corrupt colleagues. This suggests that it is possible to make a significant
inroad into fighting the battle against corruption. It also gives hope that one day the battle
to create a corruption-resistant Police Service will be won. 
When Ryan resigned and Michael Costa MP became the new Police Minister in 2003 police
structures were changed again, the Police Service was renamed, and different leaders were
appointed — for example, Assistant Commissioner David Madden (subsequently medically
retired in 2005). And a new medal for long service was struck as a reward for police officers
achieving long service — ‘coping’ with the ‘change’. However, there was still no overt,
timely or prolonged interest in the management of leadership styles, ethical education or any
deep appreciation of the very complex role of the police within the community. 
It is this concept that leadership and decision making is the very core of police activity at
every level that needs close examination. The practice of organisational reflexivity was not
at any time embraced as a management practice. The research I have been conducting,
although it was undertaken for the organisation, was also considered a threat — an activity
to be watched, challenged and if possible stopped. The style of leadership that remains
closed, secret and defensive when called to account remains one that is applied to police
human resources/operational and executive police management style. Perhaps the next
inquiry will introduce a serious discussion of the double bind that individuals within the
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police organisation at all levels often face and with which they have ‘to cope’. Police culture
must include an acknowledgement of the implications of the twenty-four-hour nature of a
police officer’s ethical dilemmas. If ‘reform’ again becomes an agenda item, police need to
be engaged within the executive to examine exactly what is actually meant by the term. 
The final chapter engages in the discussion of where the contemporary police organisation
may strategically move in the operational arena.
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CHAPTER SIX
Conclusions and Future Directions
6.1: Introduction
As an operational police officer when this research began, the intellectual voyage of this
thesis has necessarily travelled from practice to theory and then back to practice. In the
writings of Bourdieu, I found the theoretical lens through which I could make sense of the
complexities I had been experiencing during my working life in a police organisation
struggling to satisfy the stresses and strains of urgent demands for change. As I observed the
experiences of my team members under stress from reforms that they couldn’t always
understand and personally observed reforms that made policing more difficult and certainly
more inefficient, I could see the truth personified in Judge Stephen Tumin’s observation that
this was very much a ‘coping culture’. I observed whistle-blowers, early retirees and suicides
in the making, worn out with the struggle to reconcile inner conflicts. I observed excellent
police officers with severe psychological distress being forced to meet the numerous,
inflexible and insignificant accounting procedures while less able or committed ‘flick and
tick’ ones were cheerfully taking promotion. All this misguided frenetic activity has lost the
organisation so many mature, experienced investigators, so much potential leadership, and in
the name of reform the community has lost a great many good police officers as well. I came
to the conclusion that the police executive needed to do more than expect these officers to
‘cope’, for coping is not enough. Planning must be the next step. And it must come from
within the organisation not without.
The argument presented in this thesis is that the ongoing cycle of corruption will only be
reduced when every police officer can examine their ethical dilemmas in a safe and open
environment. While the twenty-four hour nature of the pressures of police work require
specialist leadership skills, it is equally important that that this dialogue can take place without
punitive repercussions. Command and control management is a necessity in policing
operations but it is not necessary to impose this intact within the management structure of the
organisation itself. And it is certainly not a good management tool with which to build an
internal system of organisational openness, not devoid of rules and regulations but certainly
with flexibility for police officers to engage in open dialogue. Such discussions will involve
complex ethical dilemmas and need to be undertaken by police officers who are
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knowledgeable about the laws governing the reporting of corrupt activities but also able to help
resolve issues that occur outside the workplace in an officer’s private life. 
At the close of the Wood Royal Commission the media celebrated its completion with a
statistical sense of triumph — for example, in the Economist in March 1997 reform was seen
as a series of numbers.
After taking evidence from 640 witnesses over two years the Wood Royal
Commission into police corruption has ended. Already the Commission’s findings
have resulted in large scale changes to the ranks of the NSW police and more
dramatic changes are expected after the Commissioner’s finding are handed down
... (The Economist, 22-28 March 1997:  v.342 n.8009). 
That these statistics represented a huge number of innocent people under great stress was never
part of the story. The media conflated ‘large scale changes to the ranks’ with purposefully
targeted reform; and ‘witnesses’ giving evidence to the inquiry with officers alleged to be
corrupt — a confusion that had disastrous effects on police morale and personal self-esteem. 
The Wood Royal Commission highlighted the idea that corruption is a generic problem in policing
in this community and that management was not controlling this. There had been apparent
complacency in the chain of command and its ability to control. As Kelso and Plant stated:
Evidence of the volume and nature of corruption within the service suggests that a
radical overhaul of systems and procedures is required (Wood 1997a: 7).
The main source of information about corruption came from serving police officers who
‘rolled over’ to the Commission. Their provision of primary evidence about first hand
knowledge of corruption in the organisation protected them from criminal litigation by the
state and also, as they provided information, there was a snowball effect with other police
becoming aware of their vulnerability to detection, and possible gaol sentence, also ‘rolling
over’. The main police informants on corruption within the police organisation were
detectives. The areas of corruption involved drug supply, use and accompanying offences such
as stolen goods, prostitution, gambling and so on. As further police came to give evidence to
the Commission they behaved in the same way as the criminals they are trained to arrest —
they denied involvement until evidence accumulated to such a degree that it became expedient
to make a confession with protected witness status. 
These police were operational officers in the middle or lower ranks of the organisation.
The police association maintained legal support at a consistent level and offered moral
support to officers who were fearful of allegations being made about them and their
colleagues. They had to do this for all their members, however, a fact that sometimes caused
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friction when it involved protecting corrupt police.
The police association have a legal assistance scheme and no doubt some police
who have availed themselves of that scheme had been supported financially and
ultimately found out to be corrupt police officers, but … we don’t pretend to be
judge and jury: if people profess their innocence to us, if they have a valid case,
then our legal assistance scheme generally takes them in … we’re there to preserve
and protect the industrial rights of our members … the current furore is … really
a specific attack on a basic fundamental union right, and that’s the right of appeal
against dismissal … this has come from the Royal Commission in an interim report
to the government and the government has therefore drafted legislation based on
that interim report (3802/27/11/1998).
Officers who had no case to answer became swept up with officers who did engage in illegal
activity. Some officers died as a result of the stress and a few committed suicide. In the face
of unrelenting criticism one interviewee said:
We can’t do everything at once, you can put us on the front page of the Daily Tele
saying the reform is failing, but we can’t do everything. The hundred and seventy-
four changes plus two hundred recommendations in the reform project are huge
(2301/09/11/1997).
During and after the inquiry, the government response was to create a politicised police
organisation, making the Police Commissioner an entirely political appointment, as if the
whole organisation had been put on parole. Peter Ryan became Police Commissioner on the
30 August 1996 and stayed in that position for six years. During this time, the police continued
their operational work and the community regained their confidence in the police. Although
the media enthusiastically greeted Ryan’s leadership, it was also a cause for disquiet as some
police officers felt that the separation of powers was being eroded. 
By 1999 that image of Ryan as a successful reformer appeared to be breaking down.
The resolve to reform the NSW Police is slipping away and there is a very real risk
of a return to the corruption which ran rife before the Wood Royal Commission
(Sydney Morning Herald, 15October, 1999: 7). 
The Sydney Morning Herald seemed at the time to be heralding the need for a further inquiry:
a prophecy that John Hatton himself had made two years before in an article published in the
Daily Telegraph.
If the major challenges thrown up in the final report are not properly addressed,
expect another explosion in 5 to 10 years. See you at the opening of another police
royal commission after the closing ceremony for the Olympic Games? I hope not!
(Daily Telegraph, 16 May, 1997: 11).
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The cyclical nature of corruption inquiries has been a phenomenon that has been often
observed. A decade and a half before Nick Greiner had declared that it was ‘no longer possible
to place any confidence in a series of Royal Commissions’. Although ‘six reports covering
broadly the same area have now been issued’, he observed that, ‘the results can best be
described as minimal’ (New South Wales Legislative Assembly 1983: 106).
That this is not simply a problem peculiar to the New South Wales Police Service is attested
by similar patterns existing elsewhere in Australia and around the world. Bradley and Nixon
(1996), who were both very familiar with the police executive world, observed that ‘Police
reform everywhere has a sad history’.
It is littered with broken promises, false hopes, failed intentions, unrealised
dreams. It is a history of short-sighted ad hoc tinkering, quick fixes and bad faith.
It is a history punctuated by scandal, and littered with sensationalist banner
headlines, read today, forgotten tomorrow. It is a history of déjà vu (1996: 7)
It is time to arrest this ‘sad history’ not just because it contains so many ‘broken promises, false
hopes, failed intentions, unrealised dreams’ but because so much more of its sadness is embodied
in the broken lives and ‘unrealised dreams’ of the people who joined the police organisation filled
with the great desire to serve the community.
6.2: Breaking the Cycle of Corruption
This thesis has theorised the internal logic of this recurring phenomenon and broken the cycle
of corruption and corruption inquiries down into its constituent parts: the ‘nature of the game’
itself; the crisis or catalyst that trigger s the inquiry to be set up; the inquiry and the publicity
surrounding the issue of the report; and the responses of the police organisation, individual
police officers and the community. The culture of policing has been theorised in this thesis as
a ‘social field’ of shared understanding between individuals, ranks and groups of police, the
complex nature of which has been made discernible by the theoretical work of Bourdieu.
Translating this theory back into practice has been made possible by the author’s twenty-three
years of police service, which has given the researcher a vantage point within both the social
world of policing and the theoretical viewpoint of Bourdieu — the researcher, as an ‘insider’,
has reflected on her experiences throughout this work. 
During and immediately after an inquiry, operational officers continue to work at the levels that
their resources and personal morale allows. There are only a certain number of incidents that
officers can respond to in a day and, even in the face of recriminations erupting as the Royal
Commission runs its course, operational policing must continue. On the surface, police
returning to their standard level of work, appears to support the claim that the inquiry has done
its job – the corrupt officers have been weeded out and all can return to normal. But this
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superficial survey can be misleading. The very fact that things have gone back to normal can
just as equally suggest that that nothing has really changed. This ‘back to normal’ response also
reinforces the cycle of inquiry. There has been no change in the pattern of leadership or
management behaviour. There is nothing to prevent another event, another crisis, from erupting. 
This thesis suggests that governments and police organisations need to be give time to come
to an understanding of what reform actually means for the Police Service. To date, the various
inquiries have devoted little attention to understanding corruption and how it becomes
embedded in the hierarchical para-military structure of policing organisations. To break the
cycle of corruption it will be necessary to think outside the square of the ‘command and
control’ management approach. The tactical response is inevitably increased control and
tightened levels of command. As the organisation pulls itself in a tactical response mode there
is no space for long term objectives and the much more difficult skill requirement of effective,
mature and experienced communication, are not invoked as priorities. 
Police are compromised unless a discussion such as the one proposed in Appendix M: Dialogue
with a Leader, is considered as an option for the leader. A leader in this research is not only a
leader in a hierarchical sense; a leader is any police officer who makes a decision. Each
individual officer will engage in the role of leader with all the responsibilities of leadership at
different times within different levels of the hierarchy. In other words, every police officer needs
to understand and appreciate the core tasking capabilities of a leader and decision-maker. In
contrast to public common sense beliefs, Appendix M suggests that it is important for leaders
to acknowledge the limitations of their individual capacity to produce fast police reform or even
reform within the time limits provided by the community. There are no quick fixes. 
Dr P.Melser and Dr H.Bryne Armstrong attempted significant contributions to the changes
required at the individual level of changing police dispositions. As they record:
The aim is one of enhancing professionalism and ethical decision making in
everyday operational policing. Longer term, sustainable culture change is to be
built through cumulative ‘small steps’ taken by officers within their everyday
policing environment (Armstrong and Melser 2002: 1).
Reform requires every officer to make a conscious decision to relinquish the benefits of
corruption. Police personnel’s level of satisfaction with reform kept falling over the three years
of Qualitative and Strategic Audit of the Reform Process (Hay Group 2002: 258). At one level,
corrupt police ignore external advisors and internal voices because they choose to continue
behaviours that benefit them. These covert behaviours and attitudes prevent reform. At another
level, that of public accountability, internal and external advisors protect not only themselves,
but the very police organisation itself.
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While the command and control approach is effective in certain operational contexts, it is less
effective as a day-to-day management strategy. It is possible to supplement the command and
control management practices with two important different approaches: first, an investment in
individuals with effective, first line supervision; and second, ensuring that all leaders and
supervisors are accountable for their actions and decisions. These two factors would reduce the
possibilities for corruption and the risk of corrupt practices at all levels in the organisation.
Significantly, the above comments do not just address the lower hierarchal structures, but are also
very relevant, perhaps even more so, to the executive police members. Brunsson and Olsen (1993)
wrote that characteristics of a non-changing organisation are overtly waiting for orders; covering
one self against errors; punishing whoever was responsible; minding your own business;
protecting territory; and getting detailed information; and covertly acting in a corrupt way.
In addition, briefly listed here are the minor categories that can be recorded against police as
complaints in their work practices. Unfortunately, in practice, these supervisory measures
almost amount to harassing innocent police officers — and not only officers of junior rank.
Meanwhile, corrupt officers continue to go about business as usual. They are recorded here to
show the level of minor review that can be investigated and recorded against, for example,
detectives who conduct major and very serious investigations. These so-called ‘offences’ are
supervised and investigated at the local level and reflect a clear example of command and
control. Examples being, incorrect procedures, loss or damage to departmental property,
wrong procedure with warrants, conduct concerning departmental conduct, customer service,
court procedures, interviews such as incorrect procedures, failure to warn witnesses and failure
to complete investigations. These so-called technical responses to reform leave management
practice untouched and reduce police productivity. 
The above list has shown that some supervisors are incapable of dealing appropriately with
police matters within a team environment. This reflects either a lapse in professionalism or a
lack of supervision by any other peer who could stop this type of police practice from
occurring. This petty and useless type reform needs to be redirected to more meaningful police
practices such as conflict in ethical decision making practices. If an officer becomes targeted
by the method of scrutinising the smallest level of detail, that is, a fault-finding approach is
used to undermine his or her work, then personal vilification results and causes an enormous
level of stress for the individual. Of course this also totally undermines the success of the task
force officer or general duties police officer. For example, this method has been used to
identify officers as a ‘risk’ to the organisation. Significantly executive levels of police do not
come under this type of supervision. 
Chan’s (1996) work was discussed in Chapter Two, showing that little cultural change within
the NSW police had occurred because the changes were directed at structural work practices.
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Chan’s (1999b) analysis of the social field of policing offers a view of policing as a series of
networks that work tactically rather than strategically. The police executive response
concentrates on the operational tasks. The results found here (and presented in chapter four)
indicate, though, that work performance does remain tactical. However, the constant demand
for a response means that the available officers will respond in a consistently operational
manner. The statistical data indicates that in spite of recurring crises some operational
managers and officers continue to perform their tasks at the level expected of them. However,
in times of crisis people compete more for resources, so arguments over resources can become
the main focus of managers in a crisis period. This focus detracts from the central concern:
corruption and the required reform. Hence, corruption, per se, does not get addressed.
Justice Wood (1997a: 31) suggested that police officers should develop a set of values, norms,
perspectives and rules which mould their conduct. Bourdieu’s theory suggests strongly that
police officers or individuals rely strongly on their internal moral structures and dispositions. As
discussed in this thesis, there are often many complex factors that influence police decision-
making. Commissioner Wood emphasised that leadership was an important factor in changing a
police organisation and overseas examples supported the belief that a reactive response does not
work. The Mollen Commission Report (1994) conducted in New York, stated: 
[The Mollen] Commission’s evidence indisputably establishes that an anti-
corruption system that relies primarily on the receipt of corruption complaints –
i.e., a reactive system – will grossly underestimate the extent and nature of police
corruption today (Mollen 1994: 101).
Wood offered a similar viewpoint when he added: 
[T]he most serious criticism of all should be reserved for the past failure of the
Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) to maintain broad-based intelligence
gathering operations, and to use aggressive, proactive and covert investigations …
This has been the primary reason for the failure of the Service to detect and deal
with serious misconduct and corruption (Wood 1996: 58).
Royal Commissioner Wood later reiterated this opinion; going even further by stating that a
series of strategies are needed that can bring about fundamental change and maintain the
momentum so that ethics, integrity and professionalism become a way of life within the
Service (Wood 1997b: 523). These management strategies involved integrity testing at
recruitment, the recognition of ethical performance, integrity in the promotion system,
introduction of professional standards councils, ethical counsellors, a uniformed service and
rotation and tenure (Wood 1997b: 492–504).
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This thesis concludes that reactive processes and a technical response do not work in the
everyday contexts of the policing organisation. Instead, accountable, integrated and adaptive
management responses that consider and include the very nature of corrupt practice are needed
— see Figure 6.1. This nature includes the individual’s desire to gain economic, cultural or
symbolic benefits that remove the isolation of policing practice and offer an identity within the
practice of corrupt associations. It is a fact that truly corrupt police officers seek economic gain
despite knowing that it is an illegal/unethical decision. Other police will experience a state of
ethical confusion or criminal behaviour. Their behaviour is exacerbated by the fact policing is
a profession that has twenty-four-hour responsibilities. The temptations never stop. The
responsibility of decision-making in the face of moral dilemmas is an ongoing cognitive
conflict with which every officer is confronted. These conclusions also develop the notion that
theory can be developed alongside practice. In reverse, police management practice can also
be informed by theory. This thesis challenges some of the assumptions around the causes of
police corruption through evidence presented in the data collected and through applying
sociological analysis to this research data. 
This research offers an example of an adaptive response called Active Leadership. 
Figure 6.1: Cube Model: Accountable, Integrated and Adaptive Management
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6.3: Proposals for Change: New Management, New Doxa
Anumber of initiatives/strategies are available to the New South Wales Police Service to assist
in changing behaviour. The first is an acceptance that people outside police culture have
information other than technical information that is useful to police organisations. Armstrong
and Melser’s E-coach program was an example of an outside program that reached into the
areas of open dialogue and problem-solving techniques for operational police. Their work was
reviewed in the literature summary in Chapter Three. Police need to be encouraged to
overcome difficulties and defensiveness about managerial creativity. The command and
control structure needs to be supplemented by two initiatives: first, an investment in
individuals using effective, first line supervision, and secondly, a strategy whereby leaders and
supervisors need to be externally accountable for their actions and decisions. 
Brunsson and Olsen (1993: 147) suggest further that the present ‘new’ approaches to
reform will include the following: test, experiment and make suggestions; take risks;
reward people who take on responsibility; get people involved in change; see the whole
strategy involved in reform and actively share objectives with all participants in reform. 
I shall now refer again to some of the more serious complaints about police officer illegal/
unprofessional/corrupt behaviour that local commands can deal with. These include
improper behaviour, common assault, theft, possession of drugs, obtaining a benefit by
deception, illegal use of a motor vehicle, and damage to personal property, domestic
violence offences and improper association. These in some cases are crimes that police
commit. They come under notice as complaints that directly relate to the management
practices of the organisation. Police have personal issues, work issues, stress and moral
dilemmas that are an integral part of the shared understandings of the human condition, not
just the social field of policing. Supervisors and leaders within an organisation who take on
responsibilities and provide avenues for different methods of problem-solving will
communicate at such a level within their teams and organisations that these categories of
complaints can be significantly reduced. 
Establishing work performance contracts may assist in removing officers who have the
potential to use their experience and maturity but who refuse to take on the responsibilities of
reflective leadership leading to reform. The leaders caught in the past methods of management
do not encourage reform over time. 
Police work performance contracts need to be oversighted, internally and externally. The
wording of performance agreements between the Commissioner and the Executive for
example included the following types of management statements such as: 
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Establish and monitor corruption prevention measures and ensure all staff is aware
of the standards of professional responsibility they are to uphold at all times. The
following Performance Indicators were utilised: Staff awareness of corrupt and
potentially corrupt practices heightened through a planned program of education at
command level. Procedures/measures to prevent corrupt practices established and
their observance monitored regularly. The number and nature of any instances of
suspected corruption uncovered within the Command (Internal Performance
Agreement 1997: Written permission granted for inclusion). 
To use myself as an example: I’m an officer and researcher in my work place, bound by a
contractual agreement which states that I will accomplish the above within a twelve month
contract period. The Command in this instance is the New South Wales Police Service in its
entirety. These agreements need to be reworded to articulate clear, realistic and practical
objectives as opposed to the broad statements that currently exist. I suggest that
recommendations from Commissions of inquiry and directions from Ministers that ask for
reform are followed up by performance agreements between employer and employee that require
realistic action and are relevant to operational objectives that are then externally reviewed. 
The former New South Wales Police Commissioner, Peter Ryan, had a high regard for the
practice of establishing professional standards councils, as they formed a site where dialogue
about resolving corruption at the local level could occur. However, this dialogue opportunity
has now been replaced by local command complaint committees which unfortunately continue
the practice of investigating complaints about officers in their own commands. This means that
complaints may be investigated by officers who have a conflict of interest. Ethical dilemmas
are not reviewed; for example, an officer may review an officer that they have had a past close
working relationship with that may mar their opinion. A reviewing officer needs to be able to
objectively review the level of misbehaviour and appropriate action needs to be the source of
open discussion. In the case where a senior officer is aware of corrupt practices of other senior
officers they are bound by legislation to report that behaviour. This legislated responsibility is
prescribed: a reporting function that has a level of obligation to the police practice as it is an
unequivocal direction by virtue of Clause 30 to the Regulation of the Police Service Act, 1990
(NSW). The regulation may only be the investigation mechanism that requires oversight by
another senior officer. 
According to Davis (1991: 15), moral principles allow us more flexibility in the choice of how
to act rather than just reliance on rules. Police culture and therefore corruption can be changed
by introducing contract policing, financial probity, random employee drug-testing, assessment
centres, promotion on merit, empowerment, rotation, the increased use of civil litigation,
recruiting for diversity and redefining the police role, as well as developing a deep
understanding of the moral dilemmas and moral conflict for individual police officers. 
169
THE NATURE OF THE GAME — NSW POLICE REFORM 1996-2004  •  CHAPTER SIX  CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Improved supervision is an important tool in combating corruption; however it needs to
accompany informed discussion. Justice Wood considered corruption within the New South
Wales Police Service as the fault of the leadership, particularly its traditional approach of
command and control in areas such as staff relations, promotion, training and education. The
contrasting establishment of genuine, trusting relationships within the workplace could assist
in the identification of corruption. A resistance to corruption could be built into each team and
into each command. This would mean each leader and senior officer would act with integrity,
matching rhetoric with behaviour. This would encourage the detection and targeting of corrupt
acts. The Wood Royal Commission indicated that part of the problem was a lack of any real
sense of responsibility at a local level. There was a common belief that the role of corruption
prevention and detection should be left to Internal Affairs (Wood 1997:198). This awareness
of the role of moral/ethical and individual dispositions connected to the behaviour of
individual officers, means that the responsibility for professionalism belongs with everyone.
Stoner et al. (1985: 455) argued that participative management enables the transition period of
change to be much smoother than enforced change. They also argued that resistance to change
could be reduced or even eliminated by allowing those who will be involved in or affected by
the change to participate in the design of the change. Chapter Two suggests that hard
management options may not result in change over a long period of time or the strategic
development of management policies. Stoner et al. suggested: 
Change imposed from above is likely to make people feel that their knowledge and
skills are being ignored (Stoner et al. 1985: 4). 
The movement of contemporary management towards a soft management approach as
discussed previously in Chapter Two advocates strategic management of change over time.
Robbins and Muverji (1990) are also advocates of participative management, a term used for
a different type of management prior to the options offered by the ‘soft management’ option.
They argued that it is difficult for individuals to resist change when they have been part of the
decision-making process. 
(1) Identify the adaptive challenge. Diagnose the situation in light of the values at stake and
unbundle the issues that come with it.
(2) Keep the level of distress within a tolerable range for doing adaptive work. To use the
pressure cooker analogy, keep the heat up without blowing up the vessel.
(3) Focus attention on ripening issues and not on stress-reducing distractions. Identify which
issues can currently engage attention; and while directing attention to them, counteract work
avoidance mechanisms such as; denial, choosing a scapegoat, externalising the enemy,
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pretending the problem is technical or attacking individuals rather than issues.
(4) Give the work back to people, but at a rate they can stand. Place and develop responsibility
by putting the pressure on the people with the problem.
(5) Protect voices of leadership without authority. Give cover to those who raise hard questions
and generate distress – people who point to the internal contradictions of the society. These
individuals often will have latitude to provoke rethinking that authorities do not have the skills
to manage (Heifetz and Sinder 1989: 127). There is an example of this application of leadership
approach at Appendix M.
Changing police leadership practice is very difficult and one of the main reasons is a fear of
what change will bring to currently accepted practices. Of course this also means fear of
abandoning practices that result in the accumulation of economic, symbolic, cultural and social
gains. Fulop and Rifkin (1997) contends that fear regarding organisational change can either
prohibit, propel, or have little effect on learning:
Whether, and what type of, learning occurs depends not only on the nature of our
individual fear but also, and perhaps more significantly on the processes of
interpretation, filtering, and sanitising of representations of that fear and other
fears stimulated in the organisation (Fulop and Rifkin 1997: 42-6).
The discussion of fear of change is relevant to the New South Wales police in that the
organisation is steeped in a tradition of military and command precision that does not allow
avenues of flexible learning to take place. Essentially, being asked to change and reform
management and police practice means that discussion would have to take place about how
these changes may be implemented. Those discussions, if they were to take place, would
require time and sponsorship from educationally based sources. Instead the police organisation
is told to change, pressured to change and embarrassed into changing by outside community-
based groups, politicians and the royal commission inquiry. This promotes fear, reaction and
regression instead of a learning, problem-solving environment. (For an outline of how this
participatory decision-making occurs, see: Appendix M: Exploring Active Leadership). Care
needs to be taken when ‘imposing’ new approaches, as they can be construed as a form of
symbolic violence or an act against individuals’ internal moral values. If an active leadership
is recommended and engaged, there will be resistance. One cannot demand innovation and
cooperation: individuals will oppose the demand. Existing command and control practices will
cause resistance to a new (human resource) management philosophy. Organic change, i.e.
change that originates in the organisation itself, will have the greatest chance of success.
The current practice of policing is hypothetically represented in these percentages which are
representative proportions of contemporary management practice, within the NSW Police Service:
THE NATURE OF THE GAME — NSW POLICE REFORM 1996-2004  •  CHAPTER SIX  CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
172
80% = Command and control
10% = Innovation
10% = Human error
This management practice results in the organisation appearing professional from the outside,
sending out an overt message to the community that the organisation has reformed and is well
organised. It is, however, in essence, a form of collusion between community consent, public
opinion and the rhetoric of the police force using the media to publicly declare itself as a
reformed structure. The message conveyed through the media and political conduits implies
this is what reform looks like and now; hopefully, everyone will leave the police alone. The
referee, who could be a Commissioner, a group leader, or an individual officer, can get on with
the job of controlling the game of policing. 
The new model presented here suggests that it is necessary to change the priorities of existing
management practice. This specifically relates to the degree to which the existing structure is
engaged in the doxa of command and control, while at the same time devaluing innovative
reform strategies. The figures are arbitrary but are presented in this form so that the reader has
some idea of the different weight given to old management processes. 
60% = Adaptive philosophy (applied to management situations)
30% = Command and control (operational settings)
10% = Human error 
The new model involves acknowledging complex thinking, an adaptation, which is a form
of evolution: one that is technical for operational necessity, yet at the same time not
command and control for day to day management. While, as I have previously stated, it is
necessary to retain a degree of command and control in certain critical circumstances, the
new model above reduces command and control and at the same time develops a new
adaptive philosophy which will improve the substance of command and control when
appropriate. The relationship between implementing an enhanced focus on new adaptive
philosophy and an improved command and control will result in a reduced degree of human
error. DiBella and Nevis (1998) writes: 
Finally as there are many ways and reasons for individuals to learn so too are there
for organisations. Rather than presume that there is only one form of organisational
culture or structure appropriate for learning, we need to understand the relativity
of these organisational characteristics and the relationship between learning
orientations and other organisational processes. We also need to understand the fit
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between an organisation’s learning style, its product or service, and its industrial
environment. Further research in these areas would contribute to developing a
pluralistic (rather than normative) view of organisational learning capability
(DiBella and Nevis 1998: 377–378).
The elements discussed above are applied to the new model-specific policing. This model, as
it has been presented to the reader, offers options that have not been open for discussion
previously. These relate particularly to the practicality of fashioning a reformed police
organisation by engaging in dialogue that is usually secretive or not discussed at all. The
following discussion offers further potential areas for future research. 
6.3.1: Active Leadership
Active leadership starts with organisational commitment to the individual officer. The
notions of doing good and doing ethical police work are still in place in the belief system of
serving police officers. Command and control is effective as a response to ‘critical policing
incidents’. However, the process of listening and engaging in open dialogue with serving
officers is not in place. Strategic thinking is not in place. Tactical responses are still the
norm. When complex analysis is introduced and alternative approaches thought about, rather
than reacted to, risks in the form of internal crisis will reduce. It is necessary to engage those
affected by change, both to achieve actual change and to improve the quality of the outcome.
A reduction in the old doxa of command and control will reduce resistance to change. The
following figure depicts the elements of active leadership. No particular order is prescribed,
as it is a flexible and dynamic model. 
THE NATURE OF THE GAME — NSW POLICE REFORM 1996-2004  •  CHAPTER SIX  CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
174
Figure  6.2: Active Leadership
Command and control is situated in the diagram as a crucial element of critical incident
operational management. In addition to incidents of operational urgency, it is imperative that
leaders take the time to listen and act strategically, thereby reducing risks to the organisation
and the individuals who work within it. The next figure summarises the importance of
command and control, a new doxa and habitus. In the discussion following, these elements are
put forward as a new model of integrated management. 
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6.3.2: The Individual (Habitus) 
There needs to be ongoing dialogue about personal problems located within the
private/public nature of the workplace. This is especially important considering the twenty-
four-hour nature of policing responsibilities. The result will be that the separation of an
officer’s personal and public worlds is not easily resolved but it is at least engaged with
throughout the ranks. An ongoing dialogue would require a genuine commitment to
openness, not necessarily to the public, but at least between individuals. Time should be
allowed so that each officer is supported and encouraged under a leader’s guidance. This
dialogue would also see the use of command and control behaviour as a last resort required
only in specific operational circumstances where it must be employed. ‘Ticking the square’
or ‘ticking and flicking’ are terms that aptly describe a particular managerial style used by
supervisors to provide generic impersonal approaches to deal with officers within their
command. These officers are also under the officers’ and organisations’ ‘duty of care’. In
the contemporary approach, however much distress or difficulty officers may find they are
facing, they still may only gain the minimal amount of concern. This often commences with
a question such as: ‘Do you want to see the counsellor?’ Supervisors can ‘tick off’ and be
satisfied they have asked the relevant question and this supposedly ends the extent of their
responsibility and care. The supervisor then makes a paper notation for example, officer
spoken to responsible counselling for suicidal tendencies.
The contrasting approach of openness and dialogue proposed here would mean that ticking
the squares is no longer high on the agenda. Rather, the extent of responsibility and care
would further engage recognition that the personal lives of officers are integral to their
professional lives. The ‘habitus’ disposition, including the moral values of officers,
becomes crucial for teams and their leaders in successful operational working
environments or social fields. This would enhance the organisation’s ability to respect a
reformed group vision that recognises the specific needs and individuality of each person
within that group. Even when there is corruption in an organisation, corrupt behaviour
originates in the individual within the current processes. The field places an individual
within an established network of social structures. An officer engaging in corrupt behaviour
is moving outside his or her field towards establishing a relationship and position within
another field, or another set of rules. Over time, individuals who engage in corrupt
behaviour may finally re-establish themselves in an entirely different field. If peer leaders
are communicating within their executive teams or at local police level there is a chance
that corrupt behaviour could be discussed and perhaps even prevented before it occurs. It
is essential for leaders to accept and recognise that inappropriate or unlawful behaviour
exists. It is argued here that all members of the police are at the same time leaders, captains,
coaches, referees and players. 
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The above discussion on new doxa (philosophy), command and control and the importance
of the individual must be clarified at this point. It is strongly suggested here that every
individual is a coach and a team player, as well as being a referee when required: that is the
nature of the game. To focus on individuals as the wrong-doers is to rely overly on the
individual analysis rather than, as previously stated, locating corrupt activities in the
processes of a complex organisation. The conclusion is that it is not just ‘one bad apple or
one bad decision’. Police executives downplayed allegations of systematic corruption
within this organisation, referring to it as an individual problem. The New South Wales
Police organisation is careful never to admit that this corruption is a system of behaviour
tied to management practice. 
This acceptance acknowledges that the cycle will continue. This work concludes that it is
not the death of an old management style that is required, but the utilisation of a command
style in conjunction with an active leadership approach. Noble cause corruption is one
example where open dialogue concerning the employment of ethical means should result in
the team openly regarding correct procedure as essential. The cycle of public
dissatisfaction and scandals, resultant inquiries and changes, increased paperwork and
public acceptance is just that: a cycle where the wheel of events turns but the same result
occurs. In short, a few rotten apples are not the problem; the true crisis emerges when the
entire barrel has corrupt processes in place within the culture that destroys police morale. 
6.3.3: Individual Decision-Making
The following discussion emphasises the role of the individual decision-maker. In the
following diagram we see an integration of many of the issues discussed in this thesis with
regard to the cognitive dilemma of the individual police officer when choosing what action
to take. 
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Figure 6.3: Conflict in Individual Decision-making
In the centre of the figure of the police officer’s head we can see a further representation of the
diagram that was previously presented in Chapter Four. The external boxes represent areas of
concern that are external to the formal processes of policing. In one box the elements of
cognitive dissonance and internal dialogue are represented. This figure summarises the
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elements of police practice that contribute particularly to corrupt practices. Importantly, the red
circles highlight the source of corrupt behaviour into police practice. Formal practices are
influenced by external pressures. The red spots highlight the areas where different types of
corruption occur. This diagram identifies three main areas of concern to police reform. The
first is the rare instance of pathological self-interest. The second is the attraction of a serving
police officer to external economic and cultural groups for individual gain. Lastly, the figure
represents the concerns of officers who suffer from mental health issues, addictions, and/or
high levels of stress. The elements in the diagram seek to convey the idea that police are
trained to follow legal and procedural process with other complex issues impacting on that
process. This is particularly important when exercising discretionary power. Exercise of
discretionary power forms an extremely important aspect of policing. 
It must be acknowledged that discretion can profoundly influence the relationships between
civilians and the police. In short, discretionary power can profoundly affect the lives of
civilians. Factors that will determine the decision-making process are influenced essentially by
the disposition of the individual officers. When those individual officers are in an emotionally
ill, pathological criminal state, or have immoral and corrupt ideals, then it is those persons who
are interested in a benefit for themselves. The individuals described may develop this type of
moral persuasion or behaviour over time. They may struggle with the decisions to be made,
they may learn to eventually strike a balance between self-interest and community benefit,
noble cause corruption and application of the law; alternatively they balance those objectives
and then choose corruption. There are also officers who apply the law regardless of personal
benefit or consequence to the community.
An example of the technical response to police corruption has been a renewed emphasis on
police investigating police with highly intrusive and covert means of surveillance and inquiry.
These investigations are in line with existing structures of command and control. While
necessary in particular circumstances, these methods are not always appropriate. They can
perpetuate a logic that violates common sense through searching for extreme risks, high risks,
or simply risks within the police ranks. Invariably the risky persons are assumed to be located
within the lower ranks of the organisation. As recently reported in the written media: 
We have had a gutful of being over managed and under resourced (The Sun Herald,
March 27, 2005: 29).
In other words, this blanket effect of finger-pointing rather than producing thorough and open
investigation perpetuates insecurity and anxiety throughout the organisation. This is
counterproductive to reform, as it reproduces a system reliant on practising a ‘code of silence’
as discussed in previous chapters. If effective action is to be taken to prevent corruption, there
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needs to be a complete cultural transformation involving all members of the Police Service. To
bring about this change, operational police officers must discuss the following questions. Do
they act with integrity, professionalism and fairness? Do they ‘walk the talk’ as Armstrong and
Melser suggest (2002: 207) In other words; are their beliefs in ethical policing demonstrated
by their own actions? Do they have a transparent policy, and a reputation that promotes or
invites communication from all members of the command? If the answers to these questions
are ‘no’, action should be taken to rectify this. External review of police contracts would be
one avenue. 
6.3.4: Changing Police Culture
Figure 6.4 depicts the adoption of a new policing philosophy that has been developed as a
possible method to reduce the cycle of corruption and inquiries.
Figure 6.4: Changing the Cycle of Corruption and Crisis
The diagram introduces further discussion for police practice in the future. The police are
located in the midst of the community. The community is located at different points within the
service. Non-profit sectors, unions, judicial educators and lobby groups have points of contact
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within the organisation encouraging open dialogue. This does not mean police are divulging
private operational practices or imperatives; it means that they listen and offer in return
information that builds positive relationships. The dominant view that `one person knows all’
becomes a practice of the past. The rules and regulations governing police structures are in
place and police officers located within formal structures. Importantly, the elements of police
practice are formally recognised at the centre of the model. Figure 6.5 integrates the theory
presented in this work with police work. In this model the field is the New South Wales Police
Service and the habitus is the collective notion of a police disposition. This point moves the
discussion towards future research. Is there a collective notion of habitus in the police
organisation? If there is a collective habitus, what are the defining features of this? In this work
the relationship between the social field and the habitus is described as the doxa, or the
influence of the major management practice of command and control. In other words police
talk, communicate, and dialogue in the form of orders and directions the majority of the time,
instead of reserving that practice for the emergency, disaster, hostage, hold-up and other
operational police interventions. 
Figure 6.5: Practice Model: Changing Police Culture
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Design: Peter McPherson, NSW Police Printing & Design Services (2004)
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Opening the organisation to outside influences and integrating them into the policing
organisation takes time. The notion of integrating organisations into the police organisation has
not been considered widely by the police executive but would be one method of gaining
outside expertise. Change through defensive action has caused inappropriate measures of
police work and police performance and has not produced answers to the problems of
corruption. Outside influences would create positive forms of oversight performance
measures. However, it is clearly not enough to simply order the change to occur; employing
consultants who understand little of the sensitivities of the history of policing and of its
demands, complexities and secret nature, will not help to bring about change. 
6.4: Implications for Organisational Change Without Crisis 
Another criticism of police culture is its apparent insulation from the impact of external
social, political, legal, and other organisations. However, it is salient that police corruption
and misconduct could not exist without the tacit approval of the community. When a member
of the community makes a personal gain from police corruption s/he is colluding and
condoning that practice. In other words it is not only a police officer who may gain from that
police officer’s corrupt act. This can make proving police corruption with evidence difficult.
The individual who is gaining the advantage will not want to admit to it. An example of this
may be an officer on a major highway being paid by truck drivers not to write them a ticket.
Both the truck driver and the officer make a gain – an example of the community agreeing to
and taking part in police corrupt activity. 
The notion that there is a repetitive cycle to the inquiries into police corruption that result in
no change has been a part of community awareness over the years. When there are
discussions of costs and failures to arrest or formally call Commissioners to account, the idea
that there is a conspiracy by government to cover up the real findings is part of local dialogue.
These ideas in the community are detrimental to the police organisation, the judiciary and the
government of the day. However, unless individuals at the upper level of the hierarchy are
made publicly accountable for the decision-making process, these negative ideas will
continue. They are unhealthy for a community as they perpetuate fragile trust between those
policed and the police. 
In Chapter One, the Ulster Constabulary was mentioned as coming under review by an English
police leader by the name of John Stalker, who more than twenty years ago influenced me to ask
questions about what was occurring within my workplace. Further to the argument that police
inquiries into corrupt behaviour are historically cyclical in occurrence and content, the following
title appeared recently in a New South Wales weekend newspaper: ‘Police Examine Ireland
Killings’. The article described a team of detectives who are planning to look back at unresolved
killings that have occurred in Northern Ireland’s conflict approximately 37 years ago. 
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The investigator, Mr Cox, another former officer in London’s Metropolitan police, refused to
specify any cases. Specific cases may come from the conflict that involved riots in Belfast and
Londonderry. Britain deployed troops, a move that sparked riots, leading to eight people being
killed, mostly by police gunfire. Mr Cox stated that looking into these past ‘homicides’
allegedly by police would take some time. 
The project (the investigation) is expected to run for at least six years (The Sunday
Telegraph, 30 January, 2005: 47). 
What the article fails to clarify is the need for public confidence in the peace processes that led
to the new inquiry, a need that arose nearly 40 years ago and may be obtained in another six
years’ time if the community can trust the police. Briefly, the Northern Irish experience is
similar to the experience in New South Wales, although the acts of corruption involved a
‘shoot to kill policy’. British troops police Northern Ireland. The community has triggered the
move for investigations and inquiries in response to the need for ongoing peace in the territory.
However, it appears the cycles of inquiry followed by no reform or reform via a technical
approach have been repeated in Ireland as they have in New South Wales Australia. As
Brown argues: 
Reflexivity starts at home ... Police clearly do a lot more than investigate criminal
offences and initiate prosecutions. But this is an important dimension of police
work, bringing the Service into contact with, and to some extent under the scrutiny
of, a range of other agencies ... (1997: 222).
Investigations, responses and ideas need to be converted into a new philosophy of open
dialogue about complex police decision making. Reformers have to work within the field’s
current capacity for change and act ethically while encouraging reform.
Chapter Two introduced in summary the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ management approaches. To refer to
this again briefly, as Paul Kelly summarises Dean Joseph Nye’s work (a soft power analyst
from Harvard’s Kennedy School):
‘Soft option for hard heads’ and again ‘Soft Power and the Rule of Law’ – They
require international co-operation. And they require what has been called ‘soft
power’, which can be defined as a country’s ability to influence events through
persuasion and attraction, rather than by military or financial coercion (Paul Kelly,
The Weekend Australian, 17 April, 2003: 11). 
For the long term, individual police officers are encouraged to develop enduring resilience so
that they can tolerate the higher pressures that tougher issues generate, somewhat independent
of the personal issues that are also inseparable from their police work. They can promote an
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ethos of learning and creativity. Over time, a community can become familiar with adaptive
work and active leadership – its pain and its successes.
6.5: Conclusion
This research has thrown up a number of questions for future research. How do you persuade
police to give up the benefits of corrupt behaviour? How can the police service be restructured
so that symbolic capital is attained only through ethical behaviour? How do we acknowledge
or support police who make the difficult decision to maintain honest police work? And on the
other hand, how do we ensure that those who choose corrupt behaviour lose symbolic and
economic capital?
Researching the practice of policing has led me to record a reflection on one historical event,
the Wood Royal Commission (1996). The research process has resulted in an ‘insider’ account.
Policing issues of corruption and its recurrence are reviewed within literature, including policy
accounts, legal documents and parliamentary records. The study is summarised in the
following diagrams. Firstly, the thesis question concerned the way the New South Wales Police
Service responded to the Wood Royal Commission findings. The evidence collected leads to
the following conclusions. Figure 6.5 shows the logic of the thesis argument. The first column
shows the components recognised in the command and control management structure: control
of individuals, rule-driven behaviour, governed by patriarchy, mateship and nepotistic
behaviour. The current management practices are a set of value-driven behaviours which are
located in the habitus of individuals and supported by the field in which they operate. The
results of these behaviours are listed in column three: corruption, illegal acts, noble cause
corruption, unprofessional behaviour; the results involve crises. 
The results indicate that more crises will occur that will result in further inquiries. In other
words, corruption has not stopped or reduced its impact on the police organisation. In Figure
6.5: Corruption Control Model, the results of the research are broadened to a wider audience,
suggesting ways to address the problem as it currently exists. 
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Figure 6.6: Proposed Crisis and Corruption Control 2006
The first column proposes implementing active leadership: open dialogue, organisational
commitment, complex thinking and leadership resulting in effective command and control.
The second column reveals the components of the new process: respect for leadership, support
in decision-making, team work enhancement, moral dilemmas discussed, and rapid
identification of aberrant behaviour. The proposed reduction in crises for the organisation and
for individual officers results in ethical policy implementation, awareness of options in
avoiding compromise, respect for individuals, twenty-four-hour accountability, and timely
considered decision-making. One result is open dialogue with a strong strategic direction for
the police organisation. 
One of the most apparent and important findings of this research is that the existing patterns
of command and control can create the trigger effect that results in a cycle of formal inquiries
which do not appear to yield any real change in the cycle of corruption inquiries into the police.
Over the many years that Royal Commissions have advocated changes in the management
style of the NSW police organisation, the community, including politicians, the judiciary and
the police, have not understood the complex relationships between external and internal
management and police corruption.
This thesis has been constructed over a ten-year period by a serving police officer who (at the
time of completing the thesis) had worked for twenty-three years in an organisation that both
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Active Leadership
Open Dialogue
Organisational
Commitment
Complex thinking
Leadership instiled in
Every Officer
Command & Control
Energised Colleagues
Respect for Leadership
Support in Decision
Making
Team work Enhancement
Moral Dilemmas
Discussed
Aberrant Behaviour
Identified Quickly
Ethical Policy
Aware of Options to
Avoid Compromise
Respect for Individuals
24 Hour Accountability
Timely Considered
Strategic Decision
Making
contributes enormously to the stability of the NSW community, but has also spent an enormous
amount of time and resources reacting to external pressure to change. The thesis has tried to
understand the patterns recurring within the NSW Police Service and offers a proactive
approach that will not stop, nor should it stop, the Police Service being accountable for its
actions, but may instead make this accountability and openness ongoing, rather than simply
forming a reaction to reoccurring crises. 
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of………………………………………………………………………………………...
(ADDRESS)
Have read and understood the information for participants on the above named research
study and have discussed it
…………………………………………………………………………………………
(SIGNATURE)
I am aware of the procedures involved in the study, including any inconvenience, risk,
discomfort or side effect, and of their implications.
I freely choose to participate in this study and understand that I can withdraw at any time.
I also understand that the research study is strictly confidential.
I hereby agree to participate in this research study.
Name:…………………………………………………………………………………...
Signature:………………………………………………………………………………
Date:……………………………………………………………………………………
Name of
Witness:………………………………………………………………………………...
Signature of
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Appendix
Media reports of the HISTORY OF EVENTS
Compiled from searching media data bases looking for information relevant to police corruption inquiries. 
DATE EVENT
1789 – 1975 BABIES AND BASHINGS: LOW POINTS IN POLICE HISTORY: SMH 16/05/97 page 12.
1789:  Governor Philip appoints a night-watch patrol of the best behaved convicts which
becomes known as the ‘constabulary’.
1840: Police magistrate Henry Croasdalle Wilson retires after complaints of impropriety.
1954: Report on liquor laws notes:
Suspicion that ‘wholesale unchecked breaches of the liquor law could be in part explained by
police connivance.
Apparent lack of leadership enthusiasm and ingenuity.
Several senior police officers accretion of assets.
1954: Royal Commissioner investigating allegations of brutality by David Edward.  Sudley
Ruxton rejects Ruxton story by entertains more than a slight suspicion that injuries may have
been caused by police.
1962 NORMAN ALLAN COMMISSIONER: SMH 12/6/96 page 1.
NORM ALLAN 1962-72:  Police corruption thrived in the 1960s – Allan admitting that he
could not stop it, attempted to cover magnitude by falsifying crime statistics.  Retired under
pressure in 1972 and died of brain tumour five years later, breeding speculation that he was
not mentally well while in office.
1965 ROBIN ASKIN, PREMIER: SMH 16/5/97 page 12.
1968:  Ng Biu Kuen reports senior police in Dixon Street casubi,  He is allegedly assaulted
by police and later charged with possession of opium – says this was payback.
1968: Geoffrey Rixon assaulted by police, later brings a successful civil action against two
officers.
1971 June: police informer Shirley Britman alleges corrupt practice by Sergeant Fred Krahe and
34 members of CIB.
December: Sergeant Phil Arantz blow whistle on Commissioner Allan’s falsification of
crime clear-up rates.
1972 Arantz dismissed without pension: Allan retired with pension: Fred Hanson Commissioner;
Krahe retires medically unfit with pension; no action taken in NSW on Britman’s allegations.
1972 FRED HANSON COMMISSIONER: SMH 12/6/96 page 1.
FRED HANSON 1972-77:  Ordered sacking of 28 corrupt police on taking office and
announced that drugs were the biggest problem facing police.  Retired in 1977 after allegedly
being seen duck shooting with drugs boss Robert Trimbole and was later labelled a crook in
State Parliament.  Committed suicide on Oct 26, 1980; left estate of around $1 million.  
1973 SMH 16/5/97, page 12.
Sergeant Pat Pitzer states on TV he can name at least one club where police are being paid.
1973-74 Moffitt Royal Commission on organised crime in clubs; no charges laid but Crime
Intelligence Unit formed.
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1975 Askin retires.
1976-1981 
1976 Labor Government in Office.
1977 Mervyn Wood appointed Commissioner.
MERVYN WOOD 1977-79: SMH 12/6/96 page 1.
International rower with follow officer Murray Stewart Riley; Sergeant Riley resigned from
the police in 1962 and joined organized crime.  Merv Wood rose to Commissioner but
reputation damaged over alleged connections with Abe Saffron, George Freeman and others.
Resigned after 30 months, was charged in 1987 with perverting course of justice over Cessna-
Millner affair (but case did not proceed).
1977 SMH 16/5/97 page 12.
1977: Internal undercover operation to investigate allegations police involved in organized
crime.
1978: Nineteen general duties police officers dismissed at Parramatta for involvement in an
organized tow truck racket.
1979-81 SMH 12/6/96 page 1.
Presided over shortest, but most tempestuous, period in police force’s recent history, Tenure
dogged by scandals, culminating in shooting of Warren Lanfrachi by then Sgt Roger
Rogerson.
In 1981 Lees issued statement to senior police on Sep 13, 1981 saying he had not been
consulted on appointment of deputy, Bill Allen, and would retire shortly. 
1979 Magistrate Murray Farquhar gives Roy Cesna bond in Cessna-Milner drug case; Wood
resigns following questions about his role in Cessna-Milner case; Jim Lees Acting
Commissioner, Premier Neville Wran QC appoints Justice Edwin Lusher to inquire into
police administration. 
1979 SMH 16/5/97 page 12.
Final report of Woodward:  Royal Commission finds three detectives had close ties with
marijuana activities.  
1981 29/04/81 Lusher Reform
April:  Lusher ends rotten apple theory; rays the only way to deal with corruption is to treat it
as if endemic; says civilian-dominated Police Board essential;  June: Armed Holdup Squad
Sergeant Roger Rogerson shoots Warren Lanfranchi dead in Dangar Place, Chippendale;
December: Cecil Abbott succeeds Lees as Commissioner.
Coronial jury declines to find that shot fired in self defence.
SMH 16/5/97 page 12. 
1981-84 SMH 12/6/96 page 1:
CEC ABBOTT 1981-84:  Former drug squad head and Assistant Commissioner for Crime,
Abbott investigated roles of Murray Farquhar, Morgan Ryan and Mervyn Wood in Cessna-
Milner case.  Opposed implementation of Police Board after Lusher Report.  End of reign
began when recommended no criminal action against then Corrective Services Minister, Rex
Jackson, on allegations that prisoners were buying their way out of jail.  Retired the following
year.  
1983-1984 1983, October: Police Minister Peter Anderson introduces anti-corruption package;  
December: Wran accepts Police Board.
1984, August Avery appointed Commissioner;  November:  Rogerson charged with attempting to
bribe Drug Squad officer Michael Drury in September 1983.  1984 Police Board established. 
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1984 7/8/84:  Avery appointed Commissioner.  
1984-91 SMH 12/6/96 page 1.
JOHN AVERY 1984-91
Set up major inquiries into allegations against officers.  Began community-based policing and
declared it would take ‘a young commissioner who will have 10 to 15 years in the job’ to
clean up corruption in the force once and for all.  Avery made no secret that he believed Tony
Lauer was that man when he retired – officially for health reasons – in 1991.  
1984 SMH 16/5/97 page 1.
Stephen Basley, former member of Mr Asia syndicate alleges on ABC’s Four Corners that
seven NSW officers were involved in heroin trafficking protecting drug dealers using
standover tactics and ————— redistributing drugs for their own profit. 
1985-1993 1985 June: Rogerson acquitted on attempted bribe charge, but his influence wanes when it
emerges in November that he had $100,000 in accounts in false names.  
1985 SMH 16/5/97:
NSW Police Service Operation Raindrop commences, examining a prison informant’s
allegations of corrupt dealings between himself and a number of police.  
1986 Rogerson dismissed from force.  
1988
1989
1989 SMH 16/5/97 page 12:
International Security Unit initiates Task Force Flintstone, to investigate the role of civilians
and police allegedly involved in conversion of stolen car racket.
Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) established.
Royal Commission investigates the wrongful arrest and treatment of a senior officer – the
Blackburn Affair
.  
1989 17/10/89: Blackburn Royal Commission announced.  
1989 SMH 16/5/97 page 12:
ICAC report on Hakim matter is released, relating to an investigation and hearing arising
from a raid on Frank Hakim’s premises; after which it was alleged that evidence was
fabricated by senior police. 
1990 June 1990:  Report of Blackburn. 
1990 28/12/90: John Avery served as Commissioner until this date.  
1990 SMH 16/5/99 page 12:
Former detective Roger Rogerson found guilty of conspiracy to pervert the course of justice.
1990 Darren Brennan shot by police during raid.  
1991 ICAC report on Sutherland Licensing Police finds that:
Meals and liquor often given to licensing officers.  
1991 Staunton Report on Brennan shooting is released.  Four police face charges for neglect of
duty. 
1991 ICAC finds police received payments from truck repair companies to act as ‘spotters’.  
1991 Angus Rigg held in cell overnight.  Attempts suicide, left severely brain damaged.  
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1991 21/3/91: Lauer’s appointment as Commissioner.  
1991-96 SMH 12/6/96 page 1:
TONY LAUER 1991-96:
Came to the job as corruption fighter but concerns over this issue peaked during tenure and
feuded badly with Police Minister Ted Pickering. Lauer argued no entrenched police
corruption when Wood Royal Commission established (May 1994).  Within year shocking
picture of corruption emerged.  Lauer retired in January 1996 after strains began with new
minister, Paul Whelan, and as Wood’s revelations continued.  
1992 16/9/92: Angus Rigg matter; and subsequent 14 month delay in investigation; are brought to public
notice.  
1992 23/9/92: Pickering resigns.  
1993 SMH 16/5/97 page 12:
Gaming Squad disbanded following evidence of corrupt conduct in ICAC hearing.
Source: Selected from Appendix 25, Wood Commission report.  
1992-94 23/9/92 – 27/6/94:  Griffiths was Police Minister.  
1994 Hansard 11/5/94 pp:2286: 11/5/94:  Debate on need for a Royal Commission in NSW.
Parliament Legislative Assembly.  John Hatton makes a lengthy speech.  
1994 The Australian 16/5/97:
May 12:  Hatton gets the numbers to force the government to create the NSW Royal
Commission into Police Corruption.
May 13: Wood appointed Royal Commissioner.
May 17: Griffiths concedes corruption exists in NSW police service.
August 9: Government refuses Wood request for increased powers to tap phones.
November 24: Hearings begin.
December 1: Grusovin uses parliamentary privilege to name solicitor John Marsden and
former MP Frank Arkell as alleged paederasts.
December 2: Grusovin forced to resign.
December 6: Lauer appears before the Commission.
December 14: Fowler ordered to appear under threat of arrest.  Louis Bayeh appears.
December 15: Bill Bayeh makes first appearance.
The Australian 16/5/97. 
1995 January to August 1995 1995 The Australian 16/5/97:
January 27:  Prominent solicitor Chris Murphy says ‘Hitler would have been proud’ of
tactics used in Commission.
February 21:  Whistleblower senior constable Greg Wheadon testified that he received a
death threat from fellow police.
February 24: Mooney turns whistleblower despite threats against his family.
February 27:  Hatton resigns, citing stress over the commission.
March 1: Sergeant Peter Lewis cries, admitting he and Constable Brett Hartmann based a
civilian with a baton.
May 2:  First surveillance video released showing three off-duty police punching, kneeing
and kicking an unconscious man outside a Sydney hotel.
May 7: Detective Constable Kathleen Hooke admits she lied to the inquiry after anonymous
callers warned her not to change her evidence.
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May 15: Former bodyguard to one of Sydney’s biggest alleged drug dealers says police
sanctioned protection racket had been paid thousands of dollars to ignore illegal casinos and
drug networks.
May 23: A young prostitute says Kings Cross brothel owner ‘Fat George’ supervised a rape
and torture session against her at Pink Flamingo massage parlour.
June 1: Staunton, an associate of alleged heroin dealer Bill Bayeh, is the first witness jailed
for refusing to answer questions.
June 5: Corrupt detective sergeant turned informant Trevor Haken is exposed as the
Commission’s star witness when he is shown in a secret videotape passing $30,000 in bribes
from criminals to Fowler. Haken’s wife and four children are taken into the witness protection
scheme. Fowler suspended.
June 13:  Inquiry hears that thousands of dollars were paid to two detectives to fix a Supreme
Court criminal case in which two underworld gunmen were charged with shooting up the
home of Louis Bayeh.
July 14:  A businessman who provided secret information about alleged police harassment
and corruption commits suicide.
July 27:  Galea becomes the second person to be jailed indefinitely for refusing to answer
questions.
August 1: Lauer refuses to say whether he will stand down at the end of the inquiry.
August 3: Louis Bayeh rolls over and says he paid hundreds of thousands of dollars to police
over 20 years
August 7: Bill Bayeh admits lying to the inquiry when he denied paying corrupt police more
than $100,000 over past five years for protection.
August 17: Lysaught stood down after corrupt allegations. Dismissed on December 12.
August 23: Haken begins a week of evidence during which he adversely names 200 people,
including Lysaught.  He alleges that Bill Bayeh is the biggest supplier of heroin and cocaine
at Kings Cross, denied by Bayeh.
The Australian 16/5/97. 
1995 SMH 16/5/97:
Name:  Charles Staunton
Charge: Wilful refusal to answer
Sentence:  11 months jail from August 1995.
1995 September – December 1995:
September:  Haken gives evidence of corruption in State Commonwealth Joint Drug Task
Force.
September 7:  Gosford Drug Unit segment of hearings commences.
September 11:  Donaldson says he intends to resign after allegations he received $1000 from
a drug taskforce scam known as the ‘Christmas Club’.
September 29: Government announces inmates who might have been wrongfully convicted
will have their cases reviewed.
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November: On urging of Justice Wood, Carr Government offers general amnesty to corrupt
police.  Tony Lauer publicly admits he was wrong about extent of police corruption.
December: Gosford Detective Sergeant Wayne Eade caught on video organising drug deals
while having sex.
November 29:  Three-month amnesty offered to corrupt police.
December 11: Eade pf the Gosford Drug Unit is suspended after a videotape shows him
having sex with a female informer, sampling cocaine and bartering over a child pornographic
film.
December 17: Government says police engaged in protecting paedophile rackets will not get
amnesty.
1996 The Australian 16/5/97.
January – October 1996:
January 15:  Lauer says he will retire early.
January 16: Wood rejects suggestions from Marsden that the inquiry used illegal method of
entrapment.
February 5:  First interim report finds systemic and entrenched corruption and recommends
establishing a Police Integrity Commission to investigate.
February 19:  Lauer’s resignation.
March: Paedophile term of reference begins.  Evidence given that millionaire Phillip Bell
sexually assaulted young boys.
March 18: Paedophile inquiry begins.
March 29: Inspector Robert Tait, 49, shoots himself dead at a country NSW police station
after being mentioned at the Commission.
April: Evidence emerges that police and Catholic Church failed to deal with sexual assault
allegations against the late Brother Michael Evans.
May: Former Wollongong mayor, the late Tony Bevan alleged to have organised child sex ring.
June: Police superintendent in charge of the Sydney Olympics security, John Garvey sacked
for allegedly assaulting a prisoner.
June 11: British policeman Peter Ryan appointed Police Commissioner.
June 6: Garvey stood aside after accusations he assaulted a prisoner with mace.
July 12: Urquhart named to run the permanent PIC.
July: Bill Bayeh arrested after leaving the witness box.
August 8: International manhunt for Moller ends with his arrest in New Zealand on drugs
charges.
SMH 16/5/97:
Name: Clinton Moller (deceased)
Charge: Failure to answer a summons to appear.
Sentence: 8 months jail from November 1996.
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August 31: ‘Ryan swore an oath to protect the people of NSW and lead its policemen and
women into the future’.   SMH 11/4/02 p.12.
September 9: First officers to be charged plead not guilty to supplying false or misleading
information to the Commission.
September 23: Detective Senior Constable Wayne George Johnson, 31, who is named at the
Commission for cheating on his travel allowance, murders his wife then shoots himself dead.
October 31: Franca Arena names former Supreme Court judge David Yeldham and former
State MP Frank Arkell as being given preferential treatment by the Commission.  Four days
later Yeidham, 67 commits suicide.  The Commission had heard claims of paedophilia against
Robert Joseph ‘Dolly’ Dunn and Phillip Bell, who both escaped prosecution by fleeing
overseas.
The Australian 16/5/97.
1996 November 1996
The Australian 16/5/97:
November:  Ryan is given more powers.  The Age 11/4/02 p.2.
November 12:  Second interim report grants Ryan massive powers to hire and fire officers.
November 14: Griffiths admits he ordered Lauer to send officers to State Parliament to
support him during a debate on police.
November 19: Lauer admits corruption is entrenched in force.
November 19: Phase One Document is released by Ryan.
November 20: Major police demonstration outside Parliament House resulting in ‘send the
pommie home’.
November 20:  Ryan appears at the Commission and outlines first phase of a reform program.
November 23:  Police union denies claims that corrupt officers orchestrated a campaign to
intimidate Ryan.
November 26: Charges against the first 14 officers put in doubt after a magistrate dismisses
the first case.
1997 1/1/97:  PIC commenced operation (CN 97/8)  1997 January:  Ryan sacks a dozen senior
officers.  (The Age 11/4/02 p.2). 1997 SMH 16/5/97:
January 18:  Bell arrested in South Africa.
February: Failure of Education Department to deal with teacher who had 20-year history of
sexual misconduct with female students.
March: Special Branch commander Neville Ireland admits agency kept files on barristers
and civil liberties activists. Police Commissioner Ryan abolishes Special Branch.
March 13: Last sitting date.
March 14:  NSW Supreme Court rules that secretly bugged phone evidence cannot be used
to pursue petty criminals.
April 2: Staunton jailed for 10 years in Canada for helping to smuggle $300m worth of
hashish.
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April 14: Moller found hanged in his prison cell.
April 16: Whelan overrules Ryan’s decision to reform the notorious Special Branch unit.
April 24: Supreme Court rules that 10 search warrants issued by the Commission were
‘impermissibly broad and manifestly lacking.
May 16: Peter Ryan gets his copy of the Wood Report.  
1998 January 1998: Phase 2 – the next phase document released.
February 1998: Peter Ryan accuses senior officers of ‘white anting’. The Age 11/4/02, p.2.
1999 
2000 Daily Tele 5/3/02, p.3.
The Story so far . . .
October 2000: James Ritchie, a member of the crime management support unit set up by Mr
Ryan, says officers scuttled reform and began a witch-hunt on CMSU members.
December 2000: Mr Ryan sacks Mr Ritchie, CMSU member Englishman Ken Seddon
without explanation. 
2001 Daily Tele 5/3/02, p.3.
March 2001:  Malta hearings begin, PIC told Mr Ryan set up the CMSU two weeks before
he was due to appear before the Parliamentary Budget Estimates Committee in June 2000.
March 2001: Mr Ryan’s former Internal Affairs chief Mal Brammer criticises Mr Ryan’s role
in setting up CMSU and for improperly pursuing Seddon and co-workers over claims they
rorted travel expenses.
The Age: 11/4/02, p.2.
July 2001: Peter Ryan rejects calls to resign over gang warfare.
The Age: 11/4/02, p.2.
September 2001:  Peter Ryan sacks his Deputy Jeff Jarratt.
Daily Telegraph 5/3/0, p.3.
September 2001:  HR chief Edd Chadbourne tells PIC that a member signed by Mr. Ryan, in
which Mr. Ryan denied knowledge of the employment terms of CMSU members, was ‘false’. 
2002 Daily Telegraph 5/3/02, p.3.
February 2002: Dr Chadbourne is sacked without explanation.
The Age 11/4/02, p.2.
April 10, 2002: Ryan quits.
April 11, 2002: ‘He walks away from the position as the nation’s second highest paid public
servant with a $455,435 golden handshake….’
Manly Daily 11/4/02, p.2.
April 11, 2002:  ‘Mr Carr was full of praise for Mr. Ryan, who finishes on April 17.’
April 17, 2002:  Mr Ryan finishes and his Deputy Ken Moroney, fills in the position.
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APPENDIX  I
CONDUCT
All Service personnel are expected to conduct themselves with a high level of ethics.
For more information refer to the Code of Conduct and Ethics and the Police Service
Regulations.
Public expectations
The people of NSW are entitled to expect laws are upheld, public peace is preserved
and that police exercise authority responsibly. Treat all people in a fair and impartial
manner, regardless of:
• sex
• race
• age
• culture etc.
Balance your commitment to prevent and investigate crime with the need to Speak
courteously. Do not harass or hinder any person.
Treat people under your control properly remembering, no matter what the alleged
crime a person is innocent until proven guilty.
When detaining anyone, adhere to the principles of the Code of Practice for CRIME.
Avoid involving yourself in neighbourhood disputes, trivial street offences and
matters concerning family and friends when off duty, unless immediate
intervention is justifiable.
When on duty avoid becoming involved in police matters which concern family or
friends or in which they have a personal interest unless immediate intervention is
justifiable. Handover the investigation without delay.
As a general rule, do not become involved in civil disputes (particularly over property),
unless you have to prevent a breach of the peace.
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If you do intervene, use considerable caution. Check COPS in advance for AVOs
concerning the parties or location. Ensure you do not facilitate a breach of an AVO
and that the parties understand you are impartial and there to keep the peace.
Do not mediate in property disputes. Advise the parties to seek a resolution through
court action or a Community Justice Centre if they cannot sort the matter out for
themselves.
Do not write a complaint off as a `civil matter' without satisfying yourself that a criminal
offence has not been committed.
Off duty conduct
When you are off duty you should involve yourself in incidents only to the extent that
your involvement is proportional to the need for immediate police intervention.
Additionally, when you are off duty and unarmed:
• you are not expected to directly respond to any incident in a way which might bring
you into contact with armed people
• exercise powers which might put you in a dangerous situation.
Examples include, confronting an armed person or using your powers to search for
dangerous implements under the Summary Offences Act, or giving a reasonable
direction under that Act.
When you are off duty and a police response is required but direct intervention by you
would place you in danger, you should respond by focusing on:
• contacting local police for help
• attending to injured people
• excluding anyone not involved from the danger zone
• closely observing the offenders for future identification
• disengaging if your safety is at risk
• minimal or no engagement of offenders
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APPENDIX J  
Source of Police Service Funding Difficulties
A range of analyses have been undertaken to identify the major causes for the current financial
difficulties being confronted by the Police Service. Research has identified the following
factors as impacting on the availability of funding to support Police Service operations: -
• Reductions in funding.
• Unavoidable cost increases.
• The cost of the re- structure following the Royal Commission
The Combined Impact
The following Table outlines the progressive impact of the factors impacting on funding
availability on actual and projected budget results.
2000/2001 financial year the service had its budget eroded to the extent of approximately
$103.5M.
Summary of Factors Eroding Funding
Description 1993/
1994
1994/
1995
1995/
1996
1996/
1997
1997/
1998
1998/
1999
1999/
2000
2000
2001
$'000 $'000 $'000 $'000 $'000 $'000 $'000 $'000
Factors Decreasing Funding
Productivity Savings (Cuts) 7,163  10,163  10,613  16,583  31,557  42,301  47,301  50,301  
Award Increases Not Fully Supported By Treasury 500  2,000  7,500  9,167  9,891  
Costs Increases Not Fully Supported By Treasury (50)  2,119  213  8,005  21,064  34,638  33,838  
Salary and Grade Creep from the New Police Serv
Structure 4,331  6,416  9,499  9,499  
 
Funding Decreased By 7,163 10,113 12,732 17,296 45,893 77,281 100,605 103,529
Factors Increasing Funding
Generation of Additional revenue  7,000  6,000  4,000  4,000  4,000  4,000  4,000  
Rundown of Cash 10,000  5,000  
Treasury Supplementation 18,000  25,000  (9,000  
Funding Increased By -  7,000  6,000  14,000  9,000  22,000  29,000  (5,000)  
Costs Absorbed / (Overrun) 297  20,831  7,773  (19,689)  35,916  60,605  42,529  
Budget Result (2,816)  14,099  4,477  (56,582)  (19,365)  (11,000)  (66,000  
Notes:
1)  Rundown of cash refers to use of the Police Service cash from its bank account.
The Service’s Ability to Absorb Budget Reductions and Cost Increases
The Police Service does not have the flexibility to manage its budget from a global
perspective. External pressures to maintain both police numbers and an outdated service
outlets (police stations) places severe restrictions on our ability to absorb the  cumulative
impact of the budget reductions already imposed.
Our capacity to absorb costs and funding reductions needs to be examined within the context
of the proportion of the budget from which savings have to be made.
The flexible component of the Police Service budget represents that portion of the budget
where the Service can ‘technically’ make a decision to reduce costs. In reality from an
efficiency and effectiveness viewpoint this does not mean that these costs are 100%
discretionary.
The relationship with Treasury is reasonable. I think there are unrealistic expectations.
They’re coming from a direction where they say ‘We are giving you this amount of money
to run the police service: get on and do it and we’ll make you accountable for the way you
spend this. There are certain restrictions on that, you must do these things.’ Unfortunately
that collides with political reality being there must be thirteen thousand six hundred and
however many police by 31 December 2001. I can’t say where a new police station is to
be built. That is a political gift. Or a new police station is going to be refurbished. It’s a
political gift. (3807/2002-01-01)
The second thing is that the Treasury operates as they often do, as economic rationalists; they
expect to make savings from a declining revenue budget. The only extra money we’ve had in
the police service of any consequence has been salary. The salary base has gone up enormously
hence the budget over all looks like it’s gone up enormously, but the actual revenue base upon
which we support operations has not really gone up at all. It’s gone up so marginally it’s almost
in the greater scheme of things negligible. But at the same time they’ve agreed large pay rises
where I’ve got to find six per cent, so I’m supposed to be the employer in law and I’ve got to
find six per cent; the only place it can come from is operating revenue, which has never really
moved in the five years I’ve been Commissioner. So we’re struggling a little bit. And the way
we’ve made ends meet in the past is to use the uncommitted salary because we have a vacancy
factor running all the time: it peaks and troughs, peaks and troughs, and we finish up with a
lump of money which you can then use or we did use, to balance the books at the end of the
year in revenue terms. So Treasury have these expectations and then they’ll suddenly turn
round and say: ‘Right, everybody has to save two per cent this year. You’ve got a new
computer system, it has to result in cash savings of percentages.’ And then we get into the
political smoke screens of if we do this it will save ‘x’ number of police and they’ll all go back
on the street and all of that sort of thing. Now I’ve been fighting that all the time. I do not like
mentioning numbers, it’s a smoke and mirrors thing anyway, and I’m fighting one at the
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moment where there is a new process to be introduced in the courts of the electronic transfer
of files you’ve probably heard about it and it will eventually result in the judge having a
computer on the desk and the magistrate, everybody walks in with a CD ROM, you stick it in
and away we go, and that’s the prosecution and defence case, the judge has got it all there,
video and the whole nine yards, and they’re already looking for this must be an enormous cost-
saving to police. My response is: No. We’ve still got to type it all up, the officers have got to
develop the file, it’s then got to be transferred onto a disk, the only time saving is barristers
walking around with a sheaf of papers. It does not result in guilty pleas therefore cops do not
go to court. So that’s the sort of silly translation we have and there’s this dichotomy between
being given responsibility for the budget but at the same time Treasury constantly dipping their
fingers in saying ‘We want two per cent here, six per cent there’ and holding you to those
performances. It’s very difficult. (3807/2002-01-01)
In 1994 this component amounted to 18.9% of the Net Cost of Service (NCS) and currently
stands at 17.4%. 
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Flexible Component of Net Cost Service
17.0%
16.7%
18.6%
19.1%
18.2%
16%
17%
18%
19%
20%
1995/1996 1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000
As a proportion of NCS the flexible component in contracting.
Analysis of Corporate Support Services
The area of Corporate Support costs is always seen as a potential target for budget savings. The
Police Service has already taken action to improve efficiencies in this area of the budget.
• The Service has been pursuing several key strategies in corporate support areas
including: -
• Assessing services against industry benchmarks and studying of outsourcing
opportunities.
• Definition of service levels and development of Service Level Agreements with
customers.
• Rationalisation and modernisation of service delivery models, business processes and
structures.
• Investment in new technology to improve business efficiency and reduce costs.
In particular improvements have either been put into affect or commenced in the Infringement
Processing Bureau, Fleet Management, Firearms Registry, Property Services, Purchasing and
Supply Corporate Records and HQ Logistics, Security Industry Registry, Legal Services,
Financial Services, and Human Resource Services.
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Net Cost of Service 1999/2000
Non-Flexible
Component of
NCS
83.0%
Flexible
Component of
NCS
17.0%
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Headquarter Costs
6.3%
7.6%
8.3%
7.5%
5%
6%
7%
8%
9%
1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000 2000/2001
Projected Net Cost of Service for 2000/01
Headquarter Costs
6.3%
Operations
93.7%
Net Cost of Service 1999/2000
Headquarter Costs
7.6%
Operations
92.4%
The following table reflects the impact of the changes already introduced and proposed in the
area of ‘Headquarters’ support functions.
The Real Increase in the Police Service Operating Budget
In recent years the real value of the Police Service budget has been
• Inflated by salary increases and CPI adjustments
• Devalued by unavoidable cost increases, and
• Devalued by a range of productivity based funding reductions.
At the same time the budget has been increased by
• Increases in authorised strength, and
• A range of budget enhancements
The following table takes all of the above into account in plotting the real or effective increase
in Police Service resources since 1995/96 from both a net cost of service and recurrent funding
basis.
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Net Cost of Services
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Increased Demand and Workload for Policing Services
Demand for Service
Reported crime represents a measure of demand for policing services.
The Service categorises calls from Priority 1 to Priority 5 with the categories P1 to P3
representing those calls requiring police attendance. 
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Consolidated Recurrent Funding
-
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
300,000
350,000
400,000
450,000
500,000
550,000
600,000
650,000
700,000
750,000
800,000
850,000
900,000
950,000
1,000,000
1,050,000
1,100,000
1,150,000
1,200,000
1,250,000
1995/1996 1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000 2000/2001
$m
Consolidated Funding
Consolidated Funding in 95/96 $'s
Firearms Buyback Scheme-$70m, 1 year funding
246
The graph highlights the following: -
• An increase in the number of calls by 7% over the past year.
• The number of calls per officer on 24 Hour policing duties has increased by 6% over
the same period evidencing an increase in workload.
• An increase in the number of P1 and P2 calls by 13%. These calls require multiple unit
responses (average 1.63 units per response).
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Increased Workload
Crime Incidents - The following graph examines the movement in  the total number of
crime incidents over the period 1995/96 1998/99. It is reflective of the workload handled by
police on 24 Hour service duties.
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The graph highlights the following: -
• An increase of 23.4% in total incidents.
• An increase of 20.4% per 1000,000 population.
• An increase of 13.2% over the last year in the number of incidents per constable.
Attending Court — cases that result in defended hearings at Local Courts involve police
officers attending court.  This results in officers not being available for deployment on crime
reduction activities.
For the period 1995/96 to 1997/98 (latest available figures) the number of defended matters
increased by 16.2%.
Drug Offences — the corporate strategy to target drug offenders has resulted in an increase
in drug offences of 24% since 1995/96.
Legislative Change — During the period under review the Police Service has also
experienced an increase in workload as a result of changes in legislation. Unfortunately our
systems do not capture resultant workload data in relation to each of these changes. 
Organisation Performance
Although the Police Service has been operating in an environment of contracting resources
and increasing demand there has been an improvement in service delivery outcomes.
Crime Reduction
The Service has adopted a strong focus on ethical cost effective crime reduction and has
concentrated effort on reducing levels of crime in the areas of Assault, Break and Enter,
Robbery, Stealing, and Motor Vehicle Theft.
The following graphs illustrate a reduction in levels of crime in each of these crime types.
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On 6 August 1999, the Director of the Bureau and Crime Statistics and Research
Dr Don Weatherburn commented on the crime reduction results saying: -
‘Over the last two years police have engaged in a deliberate policy of targeting repeat
offenders for arrest, not just for serious offences but for any offence they commit. This is a
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clever strategy because overseas research has shown it to be an effective way of bringing
crime rates down.’
• The onset of the Olympics has had an impact on this performance because of the
following two factors: -
• The diversion of approximately one third of local police staff to Olympic duties during
the event, and
• The impact of the loss of police on leave post the Olympics, because of the
requirement for police to defer their leave entitlements.
Road Trauma
Improved deployment of Highway Patrol police (times and locations) has also contributed to
an 8% reduction in road deaths since 1995/96.
Conclusions.
Although the overall satisfaction rate has decreased slightly (currently 63%), there has been a
steady increase in public satisfaction regarding professionalism, and honesty.  In terms of
complaints against police there has also been a significant decrease in adverse findings. One
external spokes person said, 
Community perceptions I don’t think there has been much change in the last ten years. I
think even through the worst part of the royal Commission the community thought the
local police were doing a good job by and large. I think it has gone up. A good measure
of that is the media. The media think the sun shines out of police at the moment
(3801/1996-08-30v2).
Another person records the federal view that, 
We may have been surprised that - that the New South Wales Police Service had such
strong links to drug people and we knew that they were all forms of - police and prostitutes
and police and gambling and - but I never realised that the New South Wales Police was
on the nose federally. (3811/1998-03-23v2).
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APPENDIX  K 
New Doxa Applied in Operational Decision-making 
(some examples provided by a Detective Sergeant at Manly))
Public Order Management 
Situation: Whilst working as a Duty Officer at the Manly LAC during the night of Australia Day,
I was confronted with the potential for large-scale public disorder and negligible police
resources. The nights leading up to the Sunday, Australia Day, had been relatively incident-free
due to a large commitment of Operation Vikings staff (30) extra beat police. A Licensing Accord
agreement had also restricted public access to various hotels on those nights. Our commitment
to Vikings staff (10 staff for two nights) resulted in few staff being available for beat policing on
the Sunday night, despite our concern for it being a busy night. A late request from the Region
for staff to assist in the Sydney CBD practically depleted us to the First Response Agreement
(which was the minimal amount of police for an ordinary, quiet Sunday night. However, the
crowds continued to pour into the area in droves. This over-crowding, combined with the fact
that there were no restrictions on trade, and because the next day was a public holiday, meant that
late-night anti-social behaviour escalated into offensive conduct and street fights. 
Objective: To maintain public order with the limited resources available.
Action: I tasked all available General Duties crews to conduct regular walk-throughs of the hotels,
to create an appearance of a large policing presence. I spoke with various licensees to gain an
appreciation of the number of ‘problem times’. Realising earlier in the evening that I had
insufficient staff, I had requested the assistance of the Regional TAG staff. Though few in number,
they too were tasked with high visibility patrols. Having an appreciation of the potential problems
and the intoxication level of the crowd, I negotiated with the operation commander in the CBD
for the early return of the Manly staff (4). I also managed to ‘borrow’ a further four staff from a
neighbouring LAC, who were also returning from their commitments in the CBD. I conducted a
briefing at the station with these eight staff, divided them into teams and deployed them to
problem areas. In the absence of a field supervisor, I remained in the field with the teams, giving
them support and advice. Although many officers were tired and needed breaks, I encouraged
them to stay in the field during the peak times, for example, when the hotels closed, advocating
prevention over arrests and time consuming investigations. 
Result: The high visibility and early intervention approach proved successful, with police rapidly
intervening and dispersing the crowds. Very few arrests were made and no extra costs were
incurred to the Command. The ‘borrowing’ of staff did not compromise any other LAC or
operation. 
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New Year’s Eve 2002
Situation: I was tasked by the Commander of Manly LAC to compile the operational orders for
New Year’s Eve and to coordinate the necessary resources. Planning for NYE 2002/03 contrasted
with previous years because of the upcoming war in the Middle East, the potential for terrorism
and the change in Regional boundaries which resulted in Manly LAC coming under the Inner
Metropolitan Region. 
Objective: To plan and coordinate the policing response to New Year’s Eve 2002 to ensure the
safety of all those involved in the festivities. 
Action: As part of the planning, I sourced previous operational plans, sought feedback from
managers and staff on the effectiveness of those plans and identified external service providers
such as the local Council, RTA, Youth Services, community groups, emergency services, the
military and managers of large infrastructures, for example, the wharf and transport services. I
ensured that delegations were followed up and staff had the competence to complete their tasks.
I arranged for negotiations between the local Council and RTAover the legality of changed traffic
conditions (as an anti-terrorist strategy) and provided a solution for the Council to recoup some
of the money it had to outlay. 
I also fulfilled the role of liaison officer between various support services within the service
(Mounted, OSG, VKG, Water Police, POC, REV). I sought advice on each agency’s capabilities
and incorporated their services into a comprehensive set of operational orders. These orders
included the identification of potential terrorist threats, preventative strategies and contingency
plans. As the liaison point, I conveyed to various participants how they contributed to the overall
success of the operation, thereby minimising confusion and gaining their commitment. 
Result: NYE at Manly went according to plan and without significant harm to any individuals
or structures. The Commander complimented me on the comprehensive planning that
contributed to the success of NYE. 
Identification Parade, East Timor 
Situation: During March 2001, whilst working in East Timor as a member of the United Nations
Civilian Police and investigating Crimes Against Humanity, I organised and managed an
identification parade in a remote village for two men suspected of Crimes Against Humanity. 
Leadership skills were paramount to the success of the operation, due to uncertain environmental
factors and the absence of protocols (there were no legal precedents and no policies). There was
considerable community hostility towards the suspects and the likelihood of bloodshed was
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compounded by inexperienced staff, which was made up of local police  as well as police from
other third-world nations. There was negligible infrastructure, equipment was scarce and there
were extreme communication difficulties. 
Objective: To peacefully conduct a large-scale identification procedure in a potentially volatile
environment, ensuring that the rights of the offenders were balanced with the needs of the victims
and the wider community. 
Actions: I had to utilise my leadership skills to convey my objectives, identify and inspire local
resources (police and community leaders) and maintain control of the process. I identified the
critical components of the parade which were prisoner security, prisoner protection, victim welfare
and transport, admissible statements and interpreters. I also identified competent individuals who
were able to manage these issues. Time was a critical factor, due to the legal requirement of having
to bring suspects before the Court and the need to cope with the diminishing daylight. I briefed
each manager on their roles, explaining how they contributed to the overall objective. Some
managers were police, some were UN staff while others were community leaders.
The local UN Human Rights officer, who had a close rapport with the community, located
similar-looking people for the parade. I later tasked the same officer, who was to remain
independent, to take photographs for evidence. I had a very competent Singaporean officer make
a staging post in a nearby field for witnesses who intended to participate in identifying the
suspects. I arranged for an Australian investigator and a military interpreter to take statements
from witnesses after they took part in the parade. I briefed the group of ‘similar’ persons via an
East Timorese police officer who interpreted to a village chief, who then spoke to the group. The
village chief maintained control of the villagers. I tasked the local UN police (African police)
with maintaining public order and prisoner security. 
Result: Over three hours, eight witnesses went through the outdoor ‘ill production line,’
identifying both suspects for various crimes: rapes, homicides, assaults and intimidation. Quality
evidence was obtained whilst police maintained order and cared for young children. Both
suspects were indicted for Crimes Against Humanity. 
The parade was conducted in three languages and proved to be one of the most difficult, yet
rewarding, experiences in which I have ever been involved. Many of the victims/witnesses
reported a great deal of satisfaction in confronting their perpetrators and community involvement
improved chances of future reconciliation within the community. After the exhausting process, I
picked up the tab at the local restaurant for all the people involved in the process (both witnesses
and police), since many villagers had travelled days to attend the parade and had little or no food
with them. For many, it was their first meal in a restaurant; others never passed up a free meal!
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Operational Briefing
Situation: During February, 2002, I organised and led an overt operation focusing on Public Order,
Alcohol and Theft offences in and around licensed premises in the Sydney CBD. I drew on the
resources of City East Street safe police, SPG Dog Squad, general duties staff, licensing police, staff
from NSW Gaming & Racing and Highway Patrol. In all, there were some twenty police from six
different sections, and two civilians, many of whom had never worked together before. 
Objective: As the Operation Commander, I wished to convey clarity in the purpose of the
operation and to ensure that staff acted in accordance with their specified duties. 
Action: I made formal written requests to the respective commands (SPG, Streetsafe), requesting
their resources and outlining the general nature of the operation being planned.
On the night of the operation, I arranged for civilian guests to be looked after by an appropriate
officer. I arranged a briefing room of sufficient size and with appropriate refreshments and
facilities, such as toilets. 
I handed out numbered operational orders that I had compiled, setting out the background of the
operation, the objectives, the means to achieve those objectives and team-tasking. I arranged for
specific sections to give an overview of their area of expertise and what they could contribute to
the operation. Intelligence gave a briefing on local crime trends, Dog Squad personnel, spoke
about their operational procedures and legislative requirements, and Gaming & Racing spoke
about their licensing powers. My presentation integrated each of these components, alluding to the
intelligence and how the teams would operate. I drew attention to the need to act ethically, and to
the various cameras and recording devices used in and around the hotels. I addressed contingency
plans and the need for flexibility, as covert officers in the field directed the operation.
I conducted the debriefing along similar lines, recording each of the locations ‘raided’on the white
board and tallied the number of drug searches, intelligence reports, FCANS and arrests. I also
encouraged each of the specialist sections to give a short debriefing on their experience of the
operation. 
Result: The operation ran smoothly, with no identified problems. There were adequate staff,
records and equipment to achieve the objectives of the operation. The staff worked well together
and performed their duties professionally, in accordance with the briefing. Six hotels were
searched with the use of a drug dog. This resulted in some 40 people being searched, drugs being
located and a total of three arrests. The overt nature of the operation sent a very clear message to
patrons and licensees alike, with licensing issues being pursued by licensing and NSWGaming &
Racing. All staff reported a very successful operation; I have since had further requests to be part
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of similar operations. I was impressed with the teamwork displayed and gave written feedback to
the Commander of Street Safe which was passed on to all the staff involved. 
Community Liaison
Situation: As a Crime Coordinator, my role involved the identification of potential problems,
and the development of strategies to curb impending problems. Through liaison with my peers
at other LACs and Regions, it was suggested that robberies were being committed by groups of
youth from a particular ethnic background. A suggested reason for their activities was that they
might have had difficulties adapting to a multi cultural environment. Whilst the local robbery
level was low, there were indications that similar youth groups frequented our posting and lived
locally. 
Objective: To identify any emerging trends in violent crime among a particular ethnic youth
group. 
Action: In consultation with the Ethnic Community Liaison Officer (ECLO), I sought to gain a
better appreciation of cultural diversity.  It was suggested that this group was undergoing
problems similar to those that many other ethnic groups. It was agreed that the ECLO would take
the lead role in making contact with the community and their elders. I attended some of those
meetings to hear the problems first-hand 
Through these meetings, common areas of interest were identified. I gave some undertakings to
the group elders which were within the scope of my team resources, i.e. to improve
communication between the community and the police.  then advocated to my Command to
pursue these contacts to meet a long-term need. I encouraged discrete investigative operations to
target potential problem areas, whilst tasking my Youth Liaison Officer (YLO) and ECLO to
conduct regular overt visits to the community. 
Result: In the short-term, a few members of this community were arrested and charged with the
robbery offences that occurred within our LAC. A number of short-term, covert operations
identified potential problem youths within the community; this improved police awareness of the
problem. 
The ECLO has established a good relationship with the community elders and the YLO is still
making inroads into the youth scene. This long-term strategy has the interim support of the
Command. In time, provided some tangible results can be shown, the programme is likely to get
greater support from the police force than previously.
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Command and Control
If it wasn’t for police officers the whole community out there would be – there would be
blood in the streets and the disorder would be extraordinary. There’s an assumption there
that one police officer working at a police station at eleven o’clock at night is keeping
order in the community. Actually we are so responsible here, that all of us have a role to
play. It may well be that because of my particular position I have some additional
responsibilities, but I can’t possibly discharge those without tremendous support from a
whole body of people. That’s an Avery notion, which says you’ve got to do it with the
community. (3801/1776-08-30v2).
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APPENDIX  L
THIS MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING is made on 
9 November, 1997 by the Commissioner of Police (Police
Service) of the one part and Senior Constable Jann Karp. 
OBJECTIVE 
The objective of the understanding is to enable an ongoing
monitoring process of the reforms of The NSW Police Service in
response to The NSW Royal Commission findings. 
Four key areas will be monitored and provide feedback to
the police administration over the next five years. Those four
areas are arrest rates (and conviction rates), police morale,
police corruption and community satisfaction. These will
provide information about those serving the community and the
community we serve. 
The objective of the Understanding is also to facilitate
the completion of a PhD thesis to be submitted for the award of
Doctor of Philosophy, Sydney University being undertaken by
Senior Constable Jann Karp.
THE UNDERSTANDING 
(1) That the NSW Police Service will financially assist
with the surveys undertaken concerning police morale and
community perception. 
(2) That guidance will be provided by Senior Constable Karp
in the composition and completion of those surveys. 
(3) That police data collected in all four areas will be
utilised in a PhD thesis that will be placed on open access at
Sydney University Library. 
(4) That bi annual reports be made available to The
Commissioner depending on the data collection process however, 
(5) That an annual report be available for consideration
each year of the project, 
(6) That each annual report and the final document may be
utilised in any audit process required by parliament. 
(5) That parts or all of the thesis may be utilised to
develop policing policies or strategies. 
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(6) That Senior Constable Jann Karp will undertake the
research programme as part of the Royal Commission
Implementation Unit or other section deemed suitable on a part
time basis. 
(7) That Senior Constable Jann Karp will undertake two
operational shifts per week and two shifts per week involving
recording the reform process. A minimum of a total 38 working
hours per week.  Any variation to this arrangement must be
approved by the Commissioner.
(8) That three different methodologies will be utilised, (a)
data collection: arrest rates, corruption rates, community perception
and police morale; (b) interviewing key administrators; and (c)
situational analysis. 
(9) That the need to gather this important information is
supported y The Commissioner. 
(10) This understanding will be effective from the 1st
December, 1996 to 1st December, 2001.
THIS UNDERSTANDING IS DULY SIGNED BY
P. Ryan 
Commissioner 
New South Wales Police Service 
J. Karp 
Senior Constable 
New South Wales Police Service 
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APPENDIX M: Example of a dialogue concerning the application of Active
Leadership. This dialogue has been drawn for the work of Heifetz (1994).
V1: What is authority?
V2: For police, authority is something given by others. The police are seen as an authority on
crime. People in authority are regarded as people with all the answers. They will ‘fix’ the
problems. 
V1: How is that different to leadership? 
V2: Leadership is knowing that you may have to help others to arrive at the answers. 
V1: So, in the policing and other changing, adaptive contexts, exercising real leadership from a
position of authority means going against the tradition of expecting leaders to come up with all
the answers. Does that mean that leaders pose questions?
V2: In technical (or command) situations, we expect authorities to define the problem and
propose a corresponding solution. This is about restoring order and maintaining norms. 
V1: So leaders who are faced with problems other than technical ones ask questions. Authorities
in adaptive situations exercise leadership by generating questions to identify the nature of
problems, not just answers to them.
V2: Take corruption, for example. Instead of addressing it with ‘answers’, active/adaptive
leadership encourages questions around what is causing it in order to address it. 
V1: So what do we, as police do when we feel under threat?
V2: Instead of a leader protecting everyone from outside threats, they disclose corruption itself
as the real threat. People’s sense of responsibility to contribute to the questions and hence
solutions under strong leadership is also important. In this sense, it is important for the leader to
disorient roles rather than affirm people in their existing ones and seeking to restore order. Active
leaders expose conflict instead of scrambling to restore order and assuming sole responsibility
for a ‘quick fix’. They allow the nature of conflict to emerge and be acknowledged. 
V1: But our police and general community generally experience a lot of conflict, both internal
and external.
V2: That’s why dialogue is so important, especially one that recognizes and engages diversity,
value conflict, economic issues and personal dilemmas. 
V1: In doing so, you allow norm values to be challenged?
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V2: That’s right. To reflect on this, there are five strategic principles of leadership. Firstly,
identify exactly what the strategic/adaptive challenge is: what are the values at stake? Secondly,
keep the level of distress in a tolerable range. Too much pressure threatens and destabilizes
people while too little disinclines them to change or become active in change. Thirdly, focus
attention on the issues rather than trying to ‘reduce stress’ by providing distractions, scape-
goating, externalising the enemy, pretending the issue is technical, attacking individuals or
getting rid of people. Participants become involved in change with their own interests at stake.
Fourthly, you have to ‘pace’ the issues by presenting aspects of the problem to people gradually
at a rate they can handle. And finally, you ‘protect’ the voices of those who ask questions but do
not carry authority. In doing so, the Commissioner could advocate to open dialogue but allow
advocates who work for the executive to engage in it.  
V1: That’s fine, but in a model where authority is expected to fix problems, power comes through
having authority. 
V2: That power only comes through the expectation of a service, which is to fix the problem. You
assume complete responsibility and blame in return for the gift of power. The expectation is that
that person with the authority, in the case of police, the Commissioner, will be infallible, protect
everybody and offer direction.
V1: People then absolve responsibility and defer problem solving to the authority figure as their
leader. And if the Commissioner can not fix it, we then look to the politician as a higher authority
to fix it. If the politician can not fix it, then we’ll set up a Royal Commission, which fulfils a
general expectation that an answer or solution is forthcoming. 
V2: Yes, and what invariably happens is that no one can fix the problem, which is adaptive by
nature, because there is no engagement.
V1: At the same time, it meant police and the community did not have to ‘deal’ with it because
someone else had responsibility.
V2: Authority that exercises leadership will acknowledge the difficulty of arriving at a solution,
but invite people to be a part of it by offering direction and an assurance of safety. The leader is
also upfront about not having the answers but being willing to arrive at possible ways forward
through dialogue with people at a rate they can tolerate. 
V1: That’s why we may fail in people’s expectations to clear up corruption immediately. People
who fear things not being in control are threatened by this and interpret leadership as weak.
V2: The temptation for that person in leadership is to throw the question out as ‘too hard’.
Otherwise, they can highlight the difficulty of the question and invite everyone to work on the
solution, which means exercising leadership and challenging values.  
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V1: As long as it is with a clear purpose and not just to ‘keep people happy’. This reverts to
technical authority, not real leadership, and once again, people will expect solutions. 
V2: That’s right. Authority is seductive in that you’re seen as having the answer, and you’re given
the power to look like you’re actually providing the answers, or in fact making the problem ‘go
away’. Authority is a power granted in exchange for a service.
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Origins of Command Policing in New South Wales
In the early days of the New South Wales colony, soldiers carried out policing functions.
In 1788 the First Fleet marines took on the responsibility for public security within the
colony, including the custody of all prisoners. The original role of the marines was to
protect public property, and indeed the culture of policing at the time was dominated by
rules about the protection of property. Two and a half weeks after the arrival of the First
Fleet, Governor Phillip appointed a freeman, John Smith, as Constable (Swanton 1984: 1).
The Judge Advocate Collins and Governor Phillip had no knowledge of police or of police
systems (O’Callaghan 1923: 277). At this early point in the colony the task of securing
property and public order was given to a few men (marines) who were immediately set apart
from the new local community. The security role of the marines was then taken over by
pardoned convicts. A night watch was started in August 1789, consisting of twelve people led
by Judge Collins: 
The men composing the force were selected from amongst the best behaved of the
convicts. They were at that time described as constables, and did police duty by day
as well as by night when necessity arose. No pay was given to these men, but they
were clothed, housed and fed by the Government (O’Callaghan 1923: 278–279).
The allowances promised to them included entitlement to emancipation and the liberty to leave
the settlement once they had served as constables for a set period. At this early stage the
policing role offered an important advantage over those being policed in that the working
police officers had access to more resources in the new colony. The men were not encouraged
to work in teams; instead, they worked in isolation (O’Callaghan 1923: 279). From 1796,
additional elected freeman constables supplemented the night watch:
In November 1796, Governor Hunter issued an order in which he drew attention
to the disorderly conduct and frequent disgraceful breaches of the peace committed
in the town of Sydney and its neighbourhood. He said that he had thought it
necessary to number the houses and to divide the town into certain portions, the
inhabitants of which should proceed to elect from amongst themselves three of the
most decent and respectable men residing within such portions, to be appointed as
watchmen (O’Callaghan 1923: 279).
The men were placed in a role that separated them from the community and worked in
isolation. Governor Hunter stated that his police and his watchmen were not only unreliable
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but also corrupt (O’Callaghan 1923: 280), with the exception of a few. These same sentiments
are often expressed regarding today’s police force. 
A ‘general order’ issued by Governor Hunter only three years later in July 1799 stated:
That an increased number of nocturnal robberies, have given much reason to
suspect that the petty constables and divisional watchmen are either extremely
negligent in their duty, or that they suffer themselves to be prevailed on by the
housebreakers to be less vigilant than they ought to be, and to connive at their
depredations upon the honest and industrious. A continuance of this unpardonable
remissness in the duty they are charged with will certainly give room for strong
suspicion of their honesty, and dispose the more respectable inhabitants to suppose
them partakers with the thieves (O’Callaghan 1923: 280).
In 1801 New South Wales police were under the control of the Provost Marshal, a military
officer.  The control and management of the police was entrusted to magistrates, amongst
whom were several military officers. There was occasional friction between the Governor and
the Military Commandant in relation to these magisterial duties (O’Callaghan 1923: 281).
Disputes frequently erupted over whether a military regulation permitted the performance or
omission of some act. For a period of time during the early 1800s, military personnel controlled the
police. The Governors wanted to control the military and their duties within the new policing
model. In 1810, Governor Macquarie directed policing towards the suppression of vice and
immorality, the encouragement of marriage and the establishment and preservation of order
(1923: 284). 
On April 1, 1810, a police fund was established. From that date, three-quarters of all the
duties and customs collected in the port and town of Sydney, as well as in the other parts
of the settlement, were to be paid into the hands of the treasurer of the police fund (1923:
284). On June 29, 1810, orders were issued to the magistrates and police to regulate
Sydney’s traffic. New police attended to the orders so strictly that only a few months later,
the street traffic was under complete control (O’Callaghan 1923: 288). Magistrates were
responsible for carrying out police regulations and for managing police in the town and
port (O’Callaghan 1923: 292). In December 29, 1810, Mr D’Arcy Wentworth was
appointed Superintendent of Police (1923: 282). He was also appointed a ‘magistrate of
the territory, and upon him was placed the responsibility of dealing with all offenders
arrested by the police’ (1923: 286). The expanding police duties were supported by new
regulations and the role of the police within the new community became established
(O’Callaghan 1923: 288).
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In 1811, Governor Lachlan Macquarie introduced a system of ‘semi-civilian’ constables under
the direction of Superintendent John D’Arcy Wentworth. During this time, police upheld the
law and also responded to commands from pastoralists and magistrates. Constables who were
appointed in rural areas by local justices became known as ‘Bench Police’ or ‘Benchers’. It
was not until 1821 that the police system was fused into a centralised organisation (King 1956:
214). The character of the colony changed as the proportion of convicts in the population
declined; by 1821 the convict population made up less than one and a half per cent of the
whole population. However, the incidence of crime in proportion to the total population
remained high (King 1956: 20). The organisation of policing had been restructured but this had
not affected the crime rate. 
The year 1833 saw the beginning of a new era with the passing of the Sydney Police Act
(4 Wm 1v, No. 7). In some respects, this Act was based on the London Metropolitan Police
Act 1829; certain clauses were almost identical. Large sections of the Sydney Police Act,
however, bore no relation to its prototype. The Sydney police were given extensive powers
to remove nuisances and obstructions. Many of the provisions of the Act related to matters
of health and hygiene; for example, the police were given power to prevent pollution of
the public water supply. Other provisions related to matters that underlined the entire
absence of any form of local government (King 1956: 218). Indeed King argued: 
In New South Wales, the police constable could hardly be said to represent the
local community, for the local community had no real cohesion, no vital
corporate life (1956: 219).
The British colonial control had become a case of the military versus the community. The
military personnel became the police leaders and they directed the early community
settlement. The Commissioner appointed a civilian called Augustus Miles as a Commander
of the Sydney (1833) Police area. He had no practical experience in the Metropolitan
Police but had been in close contact with the Commissioners, and was an enthusiast for
‘The System’ (King 1956: 220). An account of the New Metropolitan Police Force in London
during the early 1800s stated: 
Miles intended modelling the Sydney Police even more closely on London’s
Metropolitan Police Act. He brought out various forms such as were used in
London and framed regulations strongly influenced by those of the London
Metropolitan Police. The prestige of the force was not improved when, in 1848,
charges were heard against Miles of insobriety while on duty and that he had
wrongfully dismissed an Inspector of Police (King 1956: 222).
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The Sydney Police Act, passed in 1833, regulated police activity. Its enactment effectively
placed the eighty-four-strong Sydney police force on to a statutory basis, and the police
personnel and organisation were formally subjected to the control of magistrates. The force’s
staff still comprised many convicts and emancipated officers. However, from 1834, it was
boosted by the first of several groups of police recruited from the United Kingdom. The ‘New
South Wales Police’ (as such) was established in 1862 by amalgamating several co-existing
police forces including water, mounted, metropolitan foot and gold police (Brien 1996: 12). In
1833, policing in Sydney came under the influence of the British Metropolitan Police and was
one of the earliest colonial forces to do so. Police organisation in New South Wales was by
then dispersing. By the 1840s, there were six independently controlled separate forces. At this
time, the force management style was autocratic and the historical practices of that can still be
recognised in policing practice today. Fosbery, a former Inspector General, cited the humble
education of most police officers as the reason why strong leadership was needed, and he urged
that the Inspector General be given all the power necessary for a tighter command approach to
leadership. His attitude to promotions indicated that he was governed less by merit and
performance than by public opinion (Brien 1996: 13). Fosbery also stated: 
I think it would be an exceedingly bad thing for this community if the head of the
police department, acting solely on his own authority, were not in a position to
purge the police force of men who were not considered capable of carrying out the
high duties devolving upon them ( in Brien 1996: 14).
Military discipline existed in the armed forces and there were prison regulations for convicts.
Civil matters were dealt with separately (Castles 1982: 39). Men in military service and
convicts were still subject to ‘ordinary’ law, which was in effect, British law. The role of the
judiciary was to oversee law enforcement by police officers; this in practice blurred the
boundaries between police and the courts. There was then (as now) a fear of making mistakes.
Mistakes were not, and are still not permitted, as is discussed later in this chapter. The
organisation was, and is still, ruled by a fear of punishment. The punishment today can be
transfer, holidays cancelled, suspension of or relieving of duties, or informal peer pressure of
non inclusion. In 1838 the first police magistrate, Colonel Wilson, was suspended from office
for alleged misconduct, supposedly for misappropriating public funds. This led to an
immediate divorce between the officers of police and police magistrates. In traditional policing
communities, decisions are passed up the hierarchical chain. 
In August 1838 a further Act was passed, separating the role between the police and judiciary
further, empowering the Governor to appoint police magistrates for Parramatta, Windsor, Maitland,
Bathurst, and other towns. These magistrates were to appoint and control police in those places. The
magisterial control and direction of police in New South Wales, which had existed for almost sixty
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years, was set aside by this Act. Police numbers were drawn from convicts, the military and the
marines, and there was dissension between the different types of members in the service. The
military members of the police were criticised by magistrates for changing their loyalties from the
civil areas toward the criminal areas. The convicts were rewarded with freedom if they stayed in
police employment. Police inspectors came from English and Irish backgrounds and each group
had a different concept of what a professional police force should be. There were not enough free
persons to fill all the necessary positions in the Government Service (King 1956: 20). 
King (1956) argues that there are two fundamentally contrasting principles upon which police
systems may be based:
(1) that of making the community itself responsible for upholding the law and
maintaining the peace; and
(2) that of imposing a rule from without, by means of agents (1956: 21).
When the latter principle is applied, it often takes the form of centrally controlled military or
semi-military armed forces, which remain alien to, or at least somewhat apart from, the
ordinary life of the community in which they operate. Sir John Moylan, Receiver of the
Metropolitan Police District in England in 1934, suggested that the constitutional theory of the
English police system represented not the central government, but more the local
community. He stated that police discharged duties and exercised powers, which, by
common law, belonged to all citizens. During a period of reform in the New York Police
Department in the late nineteenth century, President Theodore Roosevelt (1828–1919)
expressed the view that the police structure should be modelled along military lines. According
to critics at the time general attempts at professionalising the force led to militarisation, which
originated as a ‘reform strategy’ (Walker cited in Das 1986: 268). There are often periods of
public scrutiny in which more involvement from the community is recommended
(Commissioner Avery 1984) and then a general movement towards command and control
within the NSW police (Commissioner Ryan 1996). It is open to question who is most
competent to judge whether or not a reform has been successful. A common approach is for
external evaluators to use measuring instruments that they consider to be general or objective.
For example, the evaluators might compare the initial objectives of the reformers with the
effects that can be measured, and if they find agreement between aims and effects, they see this
as indicative of the reform’s success. In this thesis, I apply a different means of measuring
success. A successful reform is one which results in obvious behavioural change. Reform
cannot be unambiguously described; it is a social construction. However, as the community
understands, the police are not the army, although it is the police who are most aware of the
‘marginality’ of their role, particularly when strike breaking or controlling demonstrations and
policing terrorist threats.  Waddington clarifies the distinction between military action and
police services as:
The crucial distinction between the police and the military is that the former
do not confront an ‘enemy’ but fellow citizens and that makes their position
acutely marginal, for they must exercise coercive authority whilst retaining
at least the grudging acquiescence of those over whom such authority is
wielded (1999: 298). 
Waddington (1999) recognises the historical influences that unify the roles and identities of
policing which are shared throughout the United Kingdom, including Scotland and Northern
Ireland, though there are disparities.  Waddington states:
Despite the liberal democratic mythology of the police as ‘citizens in
uniform’, the reality is that they (the police) are set apart, by the authority
that they wield (Waddington 1999: 299).
Police action that takes the style of a military type reaction always causes media commentary
and often public outcry, which is dealt with by initiating critical academic discussion over the
management style used. The contemporary style of ‘hard management’ as described by
academics referring to military type civilian action such as quelling civil disturbances is
utilised by the NSW Police. However, this military management style is utilised in form if
not with the same force in most daily decision making. Hard management is described by
Robbins et al. (1997) who define the ‘omnipotent’ and ‘symbolic’ concepts of management:
Omnipotent view of management: The view that managers are directly
responsible for an organisation’s success or failure. The symbolic view of
management is the view that managers have only a limited effect on
substantive organisational outcomes because of the large number of factors
outside management’s control (Robbins 1997: 87).
The movement of the police management style away from its military traditions has been
discussed as an option by policy analysts and also by judges in the final reports; for example,
Justice Lusher and the Lusher inquiry (1983). However, the cycle of inquiries in NSW suggests
that the continuing policy of command management as a day-to-day practice does not prevent
corruption from occurring. Appendix N: lists historical events that depict the ongoing nature
of policing and inquiries from the early periods of policing to 1996. 
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APPENDIX O
The following data supports places corruption activity within an historical process. The Model
presented in Chapter One, summarises the cyclical nature of inquiries and crises as they occur
in the New South Wales Police Service. The information below details the results of the
analysis of past Royal Commissions and Inquiries.
Report of Royal Commission of Inquiry into the matter of the trial and
conviction and sentences imposed on Charles Reeve and Others
Commissioner Ewing 1920.
Commissioner Ewing examined the convictions and sentences imposed on several men who
were members of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW). 
Trigger:
Public opinion is that the defendants in the IWW were wrongly convicted (Legislative
Assembly New South Wales 15 June 1920: iii). 
Terms of Reference: 
To inquire into the diverse matters touching the guilt or innocence of Reeve and others
convicted of conspiracy before the honourable Mr Justice Pring (New South Wales
Parliamentary Papers 1920 Vol: 1 2nd session: iii)
Recommendations:
Not the duty of the government to (a) assist in the employment of people released from
prison, (b) no compensation to be considered. 
Police Response: 
Police action was supported in the matter. 
Community response:
The community accepted the judge’s decision, as stated in his conclusion, that: 
there are many aspects of the case with which I have not attempted to deal and I
wish it to be thoroughly understood that throughout the matter I have applied the
principles to which I have already referred namely the giving of the benefit of the
doubt, if any exists, to the accused (New South Wales Legislative Assembly
Parliamentary Papers [72012]) 
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Although at the beginning of the proceedings it is admitted that: 
The evidence of these witnesses was properly placed before the jury, and the
presiding Judge left the jury to say, whether, under all the circumstances, these
witnesses were accomplices, but whether the jury placed them in this category
cannot now be ascertained. They were admittedly police informers [72012].
The implication is that police were corrupt in that they manufactured evidence against the
accused and police witnesses were used, who admitted being police informers. These
witnesses appeared to be crooks and liars. The inquiry appeared to be at least a partial
whitewash, in that it accepted wrongful conviction by blaming the witnesses. No action in
response to the inquiry was required from the police; the impetus for inaction appeared to be
with the Commissioner. 
Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into Allegations Against the Police in
Connection with the Suppression of Illicit Betting Commissioner Markell 1936.
Trigger:
Mr Lazzarini (Marrickville) Questions and Answers [New South Wales Legislative Assembly
3 March 1936] Start-price Betting, [3.10] moved (1) that a select committee be appointed to
inquire into and report upon the methods and procedure adopted by the police in apprehending
and securing convictions against persons alleged to have been guilty of starting-price and
street betting. 
The notion of motion has been on the business-paper for nearly two years and I have
made a number of unsuccessful efforts to discuss it in order to ventilate certain aspects
of the methods adopted by the police of this state The police do not appear to have the
flair for dealing with serious crime that they have for getting around hotel bars on
Wednesdays and Saturdays, apprehending men who are alleged to engage in starting-
price betting, and getting them convicted on the most flimsy evidence [New South Wales
Legislative Assembly Hansard 2314]. 
Captain Chaffey (Tamworth) Colonial Secretary [Hansard 3.31] moved that:
as the allegations are of such a serious nature the government feels that a select committee
such as is proposed in this motion could not investigate the charges as impartially or as
properly as could a Royal Commission clothed with comprehensive terms of reference.
The vote 38 against 32, the majority being 3 [New South Wales Legislative Assembly
Hansard 10 March, 1936, [2424].
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Terms of Reference:
Be appointed with respect to the methods and procedures adopted by the police in
apprehending and securing convictions against persons alleged to have been guilty of start-
price and street betting. 
It is interesting that the member for Marrickville, Lazzarini, also spoke against the issue of the
Royal Commission after it had been issued, saying: 
I have seen the results of too many Royal Commissions that have been held in this
country. A little while ago a Royal Commission, known as the Milk Board Commission,
inquired into the conduct of a number of men who held important positions. A report was
submitted upon which the Crown Law office suggested that certain action should be
taken. But no action has been taken. Although the judge said that one man could not be
believed, as anyone who obtains a copy of the report can read; and although the
Commission cost thousands of pounds, it lies pigeon-holed in the Minister’s Department,
and no action has been taken [New South Wales Legislative Assembly Parliamentary
Papers Hansard 1936 [2427].
Recommendations: 
The R.C. found a substantial amount of improper police action, with reports of police
framing defendants, false evidence being presented, inducing guilty pleas and wrongly
entering private premises. It also found that the remarks made by members of Parliament
were substantially justified, and that the activities of the police in regard to the suppression
of illegal betting were urgently in need of investigation. 
It appears to me that quite irrespective of the evidence that is placed before the bench in
these cases, the magistrate invariably convicts… I am charging the police with deliberate
perjury (Markell 1936). 
Police Response: 
It must be kept in mind the officers who have been found guilty represent a very small
proportion of the total number of men engaged in this branch of Police activity. The
evidence of Mr Commissioner Mackay and Sergeant Keefe shows that every endeavour
has been made to ensure that the law is properly enforced with a due regard to the rights
of private citizens (Royal Commission Report Markell 1936:116).
This type of response is identified here as the ‘bad apple’ explanation. The Inquiry’s
conclusion indicated that there would appear to be no reason to believe that the irregular
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practices are general. The police as an organisation are vindicated. 
The police senior management responded by laying down ethical rules. 
It appears that every precaution has been taken to prevent abuses, and particular the
Commissioner, when Metropolitan Superintendent, delivered three lectures in relation
to these matters dated respectively 2 August, 1932, 2 July, 1934 and 20 December,
1934. 
These lectures speak for themselves, and it appears from the evidence that they are
either read or handed for perusal to all the Police officers who are put on to this special
work before they take up duty so that may fully appreciate the way in which they are
expected to act (1936) 
Community Response:
One remedy proposed was a judicial one, rather than police organisation change, being
that ‘if the Gaming and Betting Act were amended in the direction that police would
be prevented from being tempted for any Police officer to act in this way’ (1936: 117). 
The Inquiry revealed a state of affairs that appeared to be exceedingly serious. It must
have had a very disturbing effect on the attitude of the community towards the Police
Service. The public are entitled to expect the police to act honestly and fairly, because
it is their duty to see that laws are obeyed. In doing so, the police should at least fulfil
the primary obligation of telling the truth, particularly when they have sworn to do so.
Instead of being able to rely on trustworthy guardians of the law, the community is
faced with the harsh reality that their police force is untrustworthy. The Service was
undergoing investigations and facing allegations of police impropriety in their
methods of securing arrests as well as convictions for street betting and starting-price
betting. 
The inquiry also included statements such as: 
There can be no doubt that betting in hotels is an evil from every point of view. It leads
to large numbers of people congregating in the vicinity on Wednesdays and Saturday
afternoons, which is most undesirable, and as a result, the tasks of the Police in
endeavouring to suppress illegal betting is rendered very much more difficult (Markell
1936:117)
Report of the Royal Commission on Liquor Laws in New South Wales 
Commissioner Maxwell 1954
Trigger: 
Beer was so scarce that Smith’s Weekly noted: ‘there is ample beer to go around in Sydney,
but not at regulation prices. You can get it but only if you deal ‘on the black’’ (Hickie,
1982:99). Hansard included a full debate on the terms of reference, which examined who
was making money from the gambling and illegal sale of alcohol. The Judge stated that the
evidence provided: 
Shows the care with which the whole House set forth the several terms by which the
Commissioner was to be, and is bound. This feature is rendered not less, but rather more
representative appearing before the Commission; none of the counsel who was given
leave to appear found any real difficulty in understanding the extent or the limits of the
enquiry. Counsel assisting the Commission and those instructing them; spared no effort
to adduce complete evidence on every aspect which could be said to be relevant to any
of the terms of the Commission (Maxwell 1954).
Terms of Reference: 
Investigate ownership of financial interests in and control of hotels, the ‘tied house’ system
of liquor trade, effect operation and application of the Liquor Act. 
Recommendations:
There was an abuse of police powers in interrogations, police corruption in the licensing
area and that the ‘practice’ of police unity in the face of internal investigations (New South
Wales Legislative Assembly Parliamentary Papers [3.40]). The report also suggests that a
Royal Commission can result in negligible consequences. However, the conclusions are
extensive, however, statements from the Commissioner include statements such as:
[it] is, however, indiscreet, to say the least, for a licensing inspector to accept a
testimonial which comes substantially from the liquor interests in his district, or from the
gambling interests in his district since the policing of the latter also comes under his
general duty (Maxwell 1954, Term, 8:99). 
The emphasis on change talks about structure. Inspector Young, as I understand his
evidence, suggested that a reorganisation of the licensing police force, by delegating the
clerical work to clerks or similar officials, would be an improvement. He calls for a
tightening up of investigations and some form of reorganisation of the licensing branch.
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Police Response: 
The inquiry suggested that a licence branch should be reorganised to constitute a separate
career branch of the police that would be in some way independent of the remainder of the
force and ‘without interchange of personnel with other members of the force’. The Learned
Counsel for the Department submitted that this was undesirable for reasons of promotion,
as it restricted promotion prospects and moreover, ‘you can not leave even the most trusted
officers in such a position as to become open to temptation’ (Maxwell 1954:100).
Community Response: 
The community became aware of the diversion of alcohol from licensed hotels to illegal
venues, illicit sales through the city’s nightclubs, dummy ownership of regular hotels and
systematic police corruption at the highest levels (Hickie 1982: 100). 
Did it lead to another inquiry? Police were recognised as falling short of the duty imposed
on them. Maxwell was satisfied that nightclubs were tipped off about police raids and noted
that the occasions when everybody but the waiter were arrested at restaurants were marked
exceptions (Hickie 1982:100). The next Inquiry was linked to the Maxwell Inquiry; this was
to be the Moffitt Inquiry. 
Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into Respect of Certain Matters
relating to allegations of Organised Crime in Clubs Moffitt 1974.
Trigger: 
Mr Dowd, New South Wales Parliament Hansard, extract, Address-in-Reply, 12
September, 1979:
I have been particularly concerned in the area of organised crime, as it became more apparent
to me that respectable money is used to finance criminal operations and that a series of
company structures are used to hide those involved in criminal operations. Organised crime,
SP Operations and illegal casinos are also used to cloak that payment of money and the
laundering of funds used or drug purposes… it was necessary for … questions upon notice
in this House before the Premier would do anything about them (Moffitt 1974:739).
It is interesting to note that the member of the assembly stated:we have corruption in sections
of our police forces, indeed, have all police forces throughout the world [but] one should not
have to change Commissioners of Police to get SP operations and illegal casinos closed down
(emphasis added Moffitt 1974:740). 
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Terms of Reference:
Moffitt (1974) stated in his Recommendations that:
The terms of reference call upon me to make factual decisions. They do not provide for
the making of recommendations [317]. The terms of reference in summary had three
aspects to them, to examine files and disclose if there is sufficient reason to take
proceedings against any person in respect of alleged organised crime in relation to Clubs
registered under the Liquor Act 1912, whether there has been any attempt by the
government of New South Wales to cover up the existence of such crime or the identity
of any person responsible and whether the Bally Corporation of America offers a risk of
infiltration of organised crime into or in relation to Clubs (Moffitt 1974 part 1,(2)).
Recommendations: 
The first recommendation was that; ‘there be a frank and drastic review of the methods of
investigation of organised crime of overseas and local origin and that particular procedures
be established appropriate to this as a special class of crime’ (Moffitt 1974 318 (1)).
Police Response:
Police acted on the above recommendation and also on the following comments by
establishing a special squad of police to follow up on issues arising from the inquiry. 
The recommendations led to two further inquiries, the Woodward and Lusher inquiries.
According to Moffitt: 
A stage was reached when it appeared that the inquiry, as it touched upon the position of
Bally, was quite unsatisfactory. The further the inquiry proceeded, the greater were the
revelations and in a more concrete form than mere intelligence material of significant
affiliations of Bally with criminals. Bally was asserting the affiliations had been
discontinued, but was complaining it was unfair that these grave matters might be referred
to adversely in my report, in the course of report upon the police inquiry. The police had
not reported upon these matters in the final report and in fact discarded this aspect of their
inquiry (Moffitt 1974 [48]). 
Moffitt (1985) also made an important recommendation that played a significant part in the
inquiries that followed. He stated: 
that for the protection of persons investigated or charged and for the protection of police
officers, police instructions concerning note-taking and concerning return and security
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of notebooks and diaries be required to be observed and that any other form of
‘unofficial’ recording be not regarded as relaxing the requirement and that such other
recordings be not privately retained but be held as other official police records [318 (6)]
(emphasis added)
Moffitt also asserted: 
there needs to be a change in attitudes to ‘political’ appointments not only to judicial
posts but to all other offices that are intended under constitutional theory or which are
held out to act independently of external and in particular political influence. A change
in attitudes and practices needs to be not only by appointing governments but by
oppositions, which no longer object and by professional bodies and the media which
now rarely object and by the community (Moffitt 1985:240). 
The community’s response was also evidenced by the Federal Parliament’s establishment of
the National Crime Authority on July 1, 1984 (Bottom 1984:164).
Report of the Royal Commission into drug Trafficking Commissioner
Woodward 1979.
Trigger:
Family and public concerns about the disappearance of Donald Bruce McKay; the
community believed that the disappearance was probably linked to drug activity in the
Griffith area. Family members also had reason to suspect that certain police officers in the
Griffith area were not trustworthy. 
Terms of reference:
There were inquiries into the cultivation, production, manufacture, distribution, supply,
possession and use of drugs, and the identity of persons involved in drugs that are for the
time being drugs of addiction, or prohibited drugs within the meaning of the Poisons Act,
1966. There was also provision made for a review of the laws concerning the above
offences.
Recommendations:
The inquiry resulted in 89 recommendations. Two of these recommendations were
specifically directed at conducting investigations into serving police officers. There was
also an important, Recommendation 62, which required police accountability with regard
to the use of search warrants (62 (a), (b) and (c)). 
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Police Response:
Police activity in drug-related crime has been under review for as long as police have been
policing illegal drug activities. Each inquiry has revealed inappropriate, criminal and
unprofessional behaviour. Drug inquiries are very good examples of the cyclical nature of
police response to community demands for accountability. Police accountability and
practice has improved over the years; however, in this area – an area involving economic
advantage – police seem to always find a method to circumvent the legal practice. 
Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the New South Wales Police
Administration: Commissioner Lusher 1981.
The report by Mr Justice Lusher of the Commission of Inquiry into New South Wales Police
Administration was submitted on April 29, 1981. 
Trigger:
The contemporary position follows many decades of either an awareness or indifference to
developments necessitating change, or an inability to grapple successfully with them on the
part of successive government and police administrations (Preface to Lusher Report,
Lusher 1981:i).
Terms of Reference: 
Inquire into the structure, organisation and management policies of the police force,
including the rules and policies governing recruitment, appointments, promotions,
seniority, classification, training and development of members of the police force and other
such personnel matters. 
(i) The structure of the relationship between the Police Force and the Executive
Government, including the functions and responsibilities of the Police Department; and 
(ii) The structure, organisation and management policies of the Police department. And
to make such recommendations as is thought fit for improvements and changes therein
(Lusher 1981:ii).
Findings: 
The Inquiry found that the administration tended to rely excessively on the
authoritarian style of management which is facilitated by the rank structure and the
disciplined nature of the Force. Moreover, until very recently training of police was
minimal and certainly did not include any content on management principles. 
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As the Police Force has always been regarded as a career service and as there is no
avenue for lateral entry, then it is not surprising that the approach to management
which is general throughout the Force is outdated and includes many informal
traditional ‘police’ practices (Lusher, 1981:69).
The impression gained by the inquiry was that sergeants, inspectors and superintendents all
tended to see supervision as consisting of simple things such as visiting stations on a regular
basis, checking station records and signing occurrence pads, etc.
Recommendations (one of many): 
Professor Wilenski went on to suggest that the first practical step could be the
establishment within the organisation of an Organisational Development Unit with
professional expertise to promote organisational change. However, he warned such
units should be established only in those organisations where senior management are
genuinely committed to change and the re distribution of power (away from
themselves) that such change brings’ (Lusher, 1981: 117; emphasis added). 
One important implication from the Lusher Report is as follows:
[In the] Inquiry’s further opinion, it is desirable that a government should have the power
to dismiss at pleasure. Accountability is an essential part of the Commissioner’s
responsibility to the executive for her superintendence of the Force. It is equally
desirable that a Commissioner and his reputation should have such protection as Section
4(4) offers if it is desired to remove him for the reason of misbehaviour or incompetence
specifically and to publicly assign such conduct as its reason (Lusher 1981:128).
The Royal Commission of Inquiry into Drug Trafficking, Commissioner: The
Hon. Mr Justice D.G. Stewart 1983.
On September 8, 1980, the Prime Minister, the Hon. Malcolm Fraser, issued a press release
stating that the life of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into Drug Trafficking was to be
extended until February 28, 1983. The Governor General and the Governors of New South
Wales, Victoria and Queensland formally approved the extension.
Trigger: 
The Victorian Coroner indicated that one of the criminal groups was engaged in a very
large operation of illegal drug trafficking at enormous profit and appeared to have engaged
in the corruption of several law enforcement agencies. To quote: ‘present law enforcement
methods have had only limited success in bringing members of these groups to justice’
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(Stewart, 1983:2). A police team was established to examine elements of the Stewart
inquiry that related to New South Wales. 
Terms of reference: 
Inquire into and report on the drug trafficking activities of Terrence John Clark and
associated matters. 
Police Response:
At this particular time, the tone of the evidence was not flattering to police. The Inquiry
was told that police lied on Wilson tapes (The Courier Mail, 3 July, 1982) (Bryett &
Harrison 1993:88). 
State police departments responded to 102 formal recommendations in the areas of law
enforcement and justice. Clark died in prison and police will have a difficult task in following
the prosecution trail in many instances. In some cases prosecution has proven to be out of
reach (Stewart 1983:102). 
The Stewart Royal Commission reached a similar conclusion to other Commissions in that
police have an apparent compulsion to defend their own turf against possible invaders (Etter
& Palmer 1995:112).
Community response:
Their views [the Royal Commissioners’] as to the setting up of such an authority with
wide powers were supported by the later comments from positions of considerable
experience. The recommendations for a permanent authority were accepted and
implemented, but in such a watered-down way and omitting such essential elements
recommended by all such Commissioners that the resultant National Crimes Authority
represents a totally ineffective attack on organised crime (Moffitt, 1985:106).
Did it lead to another inquiry? Mr Justice Stewart became the inaugural Chairman of the
National Crime Authority. Bottom (1984) suggested that under the limited powers of the
National Crime Authority, Stewart would make the best of a limited brief. He also argued that
the Federal authority cannot even demand that people give their name and address. Yet
compulsory interrogation powers are already embodied in the Bankruptcy Act.
The Report of the Royal Commission into Drug Trafficking Commissioner
Woodward 1979.
Trigger:
Family and public concerns about the disappearance of Donald Bruce McKay; the
community believed that the disappearance was probably linked to drug activity in the
Griffith area. Family members also had reason to suspect that certain police officers in the
Griffith area were not trustworthy. 
Terms of reference:
There were inquiries into the cultivation, production, manufacture, distribution, supply,
possession and use of drugs, and the identity of persons involved in drugs that are for the
time being drugs of addiction, or prohibited drugs within the meaning of the Poisons Act,
1966. There was also provision made for a review of the laws concerning the above
offences.
Recommendations:
The inquiry resulted in 89 recommendations. Two of these recommendations were
specifically directed at conducting investigations into serving police officers.
Recommendation 62 required police accountability with regard to the use of search
warrants (62 (a), (b) and (c)). 
Police Response: 
Police activity in drug-related crime has been under review for as long as police have been
policing illegal drug activities. Each inquiry has revealed inappropriate, criminal and
unprofessional behaviour. Drug inquiries are very good examples of the cyclical nature of
police response to community demands for accountability. Police accountability and
practice has improved over the years, however in this area – an area involving economic
advantage – police seem to always find a method to circumvent the legal practice. 
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